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DEMOCRACY AND CAPITALISM:
THE ISSUE JOINED
FROM WITHIN

Christopher E. Bischoff, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1991

This study utilizes contemporary and classical literature to
illuminate the complexities of Western democracy.

Of specific focus is

American democracy and the effects that capitalism has had upon demo
cracy in America.

The achievement of democracy on the scale of the

modern nation-state appears problematic even without the adversarial
burdens posed by a capitalist economic consort.

It emerges that Ameri

can democracy is particularly compromised by its roots in liberal
tradition.

Forced by nature to depend upon the allocative abilities of

its economic consort, democracy must endure a relationship that dra
matically undermines its ideological orientation.

Although American

democracy is not yet in crisis, there is little doubt about the inevi
tability of crisis as democratic practice is increasingly sabotaged by
capitalism.

For democracy to prosper, capitalism must be the servant

and not the master of democratic society.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Two hundred years ago capitalism was developed in an environment
which already included emergent democracy.

The significant problems

associated with this relationship have emerged more recently.
Correctly or not, capitalism is typically viewed as the limiting
variable in the democratic capitalist equation.

Capitalism now appears

to many to be fundamentally incapable of supporting the basic demo
cratic ideals of equality for all individuals, acceptance of individual
rights, and freedom for all individuals (see Arrow, 1951/1963; Dahl,
1961, 1967, 1971, 1985, 1986, 1970/1990; Laski, 1933; Lindblom, 1962,
1977; Rawls, 1971).

If capitalism is successful in its own ideals it

necessarily leads to substantial disparities of income and wealth which
lead in turn to disparities in the degree of access to public policy
making.

Indeed, "inequality is fundamental to its [capitalism's]

achievements" (Markovich & Pynn, 1988, p. 49).
The American experience since the end of the nineteenth century
has found each successive decade bringing an escalation in the
internecine struggle between capitalism and democracy.

Because of

concern with the relationship of capitalism and democracy, admini
strations from Roosevelt (FDR) to Carter have all sought through the
transfer of payment and tax policy to freeze the distribution of wealth
and income to the levels of the 1930s and 1940s.

Initially, it

1
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appeared that problems between capitalism and democracy had been solved
by the New Deal— that the social welfare state could indeed reconcile
the differences between capitalism and democracy.

However, after the

Carter administration the executive and congressional interest has
deflated with government programs shifting away from the impetus estab
lished by the New Deal (Philips, 1990; Thurow, 1985).

Simultaneously

it has become evident that capitalism is increasingly hostile to
democracy (Dahl 1971, 1985; Lindblom, 1977).
New evidence of democratic capitalism's ill health is based on a
renewed perception of incompatibility which developed from two major
inconsistencies that served to exacerbate the relationship.

The first

inconsistency grew from the disparity of wealth in America and the
disillusionment of the demos with attempts to alter the distribution of
wealth through the New Deal model.

After the stellar growth of the

1950s and 1960s, the panacea associated with capitalism and the
industrial society has been replaced with a realism wrought with
stagnating economies, cumbersome bureaucracies, stifled human creativi
ty, and feelings of personal powerlessness (Schumacher, 1973).

At the

same time the perception has developed that large-scale industrial
organizations are not socially responsible.

Since the owners and/or

managers of such organizations are rarely accountable to employees and
to the communities within which they reside, their interests are no
longer accepted carte blanche as being congruent to those of the
community or even the state.

Additionally, the burden of how industri

alism uses natural resources and the exceptional contributions it makes
to environmental pollution— all in the name of producing products which
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are often of dubious social value— has brought about "a fundamental
reappraisal of the virtues of post-war industrialism" (Davis & Scase,
1985, p. 4).

The second inconsistency grew from the re-assertion of

populist democracy.

The heightened expectations that resulted in

increased citizen participation also made the citizens more aware of
political inequalities whose origin was economic.

While the re

assertion of the populist movement was new, the conceptualization of
the position was not, for it is one of the classical models of
democracy that parallels the classical pluralist position.

Today there

is considerable intellectual ferment surrounding the issue of whether
capitalism and democracy— especially in the American context— can co
exist without a resultant mutagenesis producing the wholesale deviation
of either systems' basic tenets.

Assuming that the traditional raison

d'etre of America is democracy, the issue revolves around the question
of what democracy is and how it is to be preserved or attained.
Within the American democratic political environment, there
exists a range of schools— from the conservatives who would restrict
the role of the leadership, and the neo-conservatives like S. Hunting
ton who would restrict populist and participatory politics; to
advocates of the resurgence of populism and strong participatory
politics like S. Wolin.

However, for the purposes of this paper, it is

the pervasive middle ground— pluralism— which has dominated American
political analysis that is most interesting.
important features to offer.

Indeed pluralism has many

It has attempted to disarm any hasty

retreat to Schumpeter on the right while similarly resisting any
marriage of desperation to C.W. Mill on the left.

However, pluralism
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too has its detractions.

Critics question how an extremely divided

society can reach meaningful consensus on any issue or whether the
various participants in the system represent the interests and values
of the general population and whether the influence of the various
participants is equal to the number of citizens for whom they speak.
Additionally, pluralism can only be understood in a context that grants
recognition to the necessity of some degree of participation.

Statement of Problem

The roots of the present "crisis" of Western democracy are
threefold.

First, democracy is faced with a number of internal hurdles

that remain unpacified.

Second, democracy has yet to decisively

resolve what is now the old quandary over which economic counterpart is
most appropriate for it— capitalism, socialism or some combination of
the two.

Third, after accepting capitalism by default— for want of a

better alternative--democracy is being forced to recognize the
increasingly severe handicaps that capitalism presents for it, while
simultaneously realizing that the much vaunted and proffered solutions
of socialism may not be as viable as it previously appeared (Seldon,
1990).

Many advocates of democratic capitalism were euphoric over the

1990 collapse of Soviet style democracy for it was perceived as a
victory for democratic capitalism.

Given the emergent orientation of

democratic capitalism, this euphoria is perhaps premature since the
implications of the

democratic socialist failure are not in toto

positive predictions for the democratic capitalist future.

While the

humiliating collapse of the Soviet People's Democracies was most
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visible, there was already significant waning of the aspirations of
planned economies on the Continent— most notably in France and Germany.
In what was previously the DDR (German Democratic Republic), the high
hopes for democratic capitalist salvation have proven to be largely
transitory as the new converts begin to fathom the schism between ideal
and method.

Ultimately the daunting problems facing both democratic

capitalism and democratic socialism mean that the proper economic
consort for democracy is not self-evident from either perspective.
That is to say, it is not at all clear what the best economic consort
to democracy might be or even whether democracy itself remains viable.

Methodological Parameters

The governing methodology of this paper is as follows.

The paper

will trade on the age-old wisdom that recognizing a problem is a
substantial portion of its solution.

No effort is made to provide

solution to the democratic dilemma or even to answer its specific
cause; all the orientation of effort has been expended on outlining the
range and extent of the dilemma rather than how to best preserve and
pursue democracy.

This paper will elucidate through a loose appli

cation of "strategic analysis," some of the foremost problems facing
democracy in consort with capitalism.

The utility behind the concept

of strategic analysis, is that it permits focus on one or some of the
critical elements of a grand debate without the naive hope of covering
all critical elements (and their associated variables).

Starting with

empirical fact— that income and wealth in America is further concen
trating in the hands of a few— this discussion pursues the premise that
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democracy is in decline.

From this starting point, the discussion

proceeds to the application of deductive reasoning to select assertions
and hypothesis of eminent scholars.

The justification for utilizing

this methodological approach is found in the effort to avoid the
promotion of pre-foregone conclusions based on postulates emanating
from isolated or highly selective bits of data.

The result of this

methodological approach is (hopefully) that the beginning premise
remains malleable so that it can be altered if necessary as new data
are assimilated.
Debates such as this paper seeks to undertake suffer a myriad

of

problems which stem from the natural limitations of man's ability to
analyze issues of great complexity and scope.

Any attempt at a

synoptic discussion is destined to be futile (Lindblom, 1979) for a
multitude of obvious reasons which hardly need reiteration.

In this

circumstance the goal of producing a synoptic analysis even with
strictures delineating particular focus on the American experience is
more than formidable, it is utopian.

Therefore certain obvious avenues

of inquiry and study have intentionally been left unexplored.

An

example of this is socialism— especially as it occurs in consort with
democracy.

Despite the conviction that socialism has historically

played a crucial role not only as an alternative to capitalism, but
also as an agent of developmental influence,

it must remain unde

veloped.
Initially this paper is based on two assumptions.

First, it

assumes that democracy is both desirable and attainable.

Second, it

recognizes the socially indivisible nature of economics and politics.
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It is imperative to establish that from a practical or theoretical
standpoint economics and politics (or more specifically capitalism and
democracy) cannot be separated.

America is "a society in which

economics is married, if only at common law, to politics" (Dahl &
Lindblom, 1953/1976, p. xlv).

While it is beneficial to separate

capitalism and democracy to facilitate and focus discussion, they
should by no means be regarded as being separate entities that would
occur in similar phase out of the company of each other.
It is to be a basic but undeveloped premise of this paper that
the locus of both economic and political theory must be in the question
of what are the necessary conditions that must be satisfied so that
large numbers of individuals can maximize the degree to which they can
achieve their goals through the utilization of social mechanisms.
Certainly Dahl and Lindblom were correct when they postulated that "no
theory could unify politics and economics unless it made explicit the
elemental sociological and psychological premises on which both bodies
of theory rest" (1953/1976, p. xlvi).

Perhaps the greatest signifi

cance of the contemporary return in the use of the term "political
economy," is the connotation it carries about the critical inter
relationship of these two social aspects which in function form the
foundation of every society.

Overview of the Study

At the nucleus of this paper are to be the myriad problems not
only of democracy in consort with capitalism, but also with democracy
itself in the methodological application of the ideal.

The American
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experience with democratic capitalism suggests that at least capitalism
is somewhat capable of addressing its "defects" from within (Seldon,
1990).

Recognizing at least superficially the recent set-backs of

democratic socialism and the previously

underrated durability of

democratic capitalism (Schumpeter, 1942/1976; Heertje, 1981) is a new
impetus to review the revisionist position.

Ultimately any possibility

of revisionist success or failure will by necessity be tempered by the
historically inconsistent American commitment to the democratic ideal
of equality.
It is the primacy of the democratic ideal, and the theoretical
and practical application of this ideal, that form much of the basis
for the paper.

Preceding the conjunctive application of democratic

capitalism is an attempt to ascertain what the democratic ideal is and
what is required to achieve it.

It is quickly apparent that democracy

as an ideal can be established with only limited specificity, and that
it is not without very significant methodological (real-world)
limitations.

Given such modern requisites due to scale and pluralism,

there is no singularly obvious procedural method to achieve democracy.
Subsequent focus is on the issues which revolve around the dilemmas
poised by prescriptive application of democracy and the conjunctive use
of capitalism.
At first blush, it is easy to be deceived by the overt relation
ship of modern democracy and capitalism.

As Dahl pointedly notes "the

extraordinarily close linkage between modern democracy and capitalism
hints at an extraordinary affinity between the two systems, in fact
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that link has always been accompanied by extraordinary tensions, both
in theory and in practice" (1986, p. 8).
The crux of the democratic capitalist dilemma is to be found in
the interaction of two separate social systems— political and econ
omic— which have considerable overlap in their spheres of application.
While the systems are at times independent, inter-dependent, or
complimentary, they are most often opposed to the respective functions
of each other.

That is not to say that they are anathema to each

other— rather each system gives central emphasis to a different
perspective and hence to a different end.

Friction occurs where these

different ends cannot be reconciled.
There is a new sense of urgency emanating from an increased
sensitivity of incompatibilities which are in fact long standing but
have taken on a new and greater importance in recent times.

These

factors range from the increasing inequality of wealth and income and
the failure of the New Deal model, to the heightened expectations of
participation among participatory democrats, and the reduced attrac
tiveness of the socialist alternatives.

Simultaneously capitalism's

might has eroded somewhat as it has had to bear the brunt of a number
of endogenous and exogenous set-backs.

The weakening of capitalism in

its ability to support and perpetuate itself makes it more dependent
upon the political sector for its existence.

Although some scholars—

especially C. Lindblom— would probably disagree, it now seems arguable
that capitalism is more amenable to pressure from the political sector
than it has been for many years (this could be a bonus if the political
system was inclined to better the lot of the individual citizen). This
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new dependence of capitalism is new only in degree.

Capitalism has

long been dependent on the perks and structural advantages offered by
the political system.

Hence, the business of government is now more

than ever before not only to oversee that businessmen perform their
tasks of public sector service, but also to cultivate and promote an
atmosphere conducive to those business interests (Lindblom, 1977).
Thus, it is the hypothesis of this paper that modern Western
democratic theory is in trouble today for two reasons.

First, it has

myriad unsolved internal problems stemming from its application on the
grand scale of the nation-state and its oft uncomfortable reconcil
iation of liberalism and egalitarianism; and second, that democracy as
yet has been unsuccessful in its search for an amicable and supportive
economic consort.

Capitalism, it appears, is based on fundamental

goals and values that are inimical to its joint operation with
democracy. At issue is how to reign in the capitalist market system to
bring it more into line with democratic principle without inhibiting or
destroying the necessary and useful functions the market system
provides.

Conversely the option of socialism is excluded at the onset

in part because it is beyond the limits of this paper but more
critically because of its failure as it has existed.

To date the most

thoroughly socialist (Marxist) paradigms have had to be maintained by
authoritarian regimes, a fact which renders dubious the possibilities
of democratic socialism upon an explicitly Marxist basis.

Thus, by

default capitalism remains, and while the case against capitalism is
based on its having fundamental goals and values which are often
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inimical to the fundamental goals and values of democracy, there
appears to be no more viable alternative.
Ultimately the genesis of this paper must be grounded in the
realization that there is no definitive answer to the problematic
application of capitalism and democracy.

Further clouding the

democratic perspective are the negative experiences of the command
economies.

The development and evolution of the manifest dilemmas of

democracy in the American experience from the 1930s through today, lend
support to the conclusion that some change, incremental or drastic,
must occur to deal with the crisis of the democratic political economy.
Thus, this paper devolves from not only the individual weaknesses of
capitalism and democracy, but also from their collective weaknesses.
In final analysis it becomes evident that American democracy is
imperiled not because of the burdens of capitalism, but because of the
burdens placed upon it by liberalism.

Without disputing the epistemo-

logical position that liberalism is necessary for democracy (it
provides the essential basis for a pluralist tradition that advocates
the toleration of dissident opinion with the hope that greater insight
and better policy will emerge), it appears that aspects of liberalism
create heavy baggage for democracy.

Democracy unbridled from its

liberal baggage— at least to its historical degree— may quite possibly
be viable in consort with capitalism.

It is the liberal tradition that

has tethered democracy so significantly as to create a situation where
capitalism dictates democratic method.
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PART I

THE CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY

No definition of democracy can adequately comprise the vast
history which the concept connotes. To some it is a form
of government, to others a way of social life. Men have
found its essence in the character of the electorate, the
relation between government and the people, the absence of
wide economic differences between citizens, the refusal to
recognize privileges built on birth or wealth, race or
creed. Inevitably it has changed its substance in terms of
time and place. (Laski, 1935, p. 76)
Democracy means only that the people have the opportunity
of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them.
(Schumpeter, 1950/1976, p. 285)
The test of the adequacy of a political system is whether
it tends to provide for the interests of the governed and
protects them against the abuse of power. Democracy, ...
is likely to do this better than other systems. (Democracy,
1967, p. 341)
Democracy is a principle and a method for adjudicating ...
conflicts. (Dahl & Lindblom, 1953/1976, p. 41)
Democracy ... the optimum method for making collective
decisions. (Bobbio, 1976/1987b, p. 99)

12
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CHAPTER I I

OVERVIEW OF DEMOCRACY

Democracy is an enigma.

If one is even remotely cognizant of the

political world around them, they are also cognizant of the existence
of a number of somewhat dissimilar political systems that all claim to
be democratic.

Other than showing a kind of widespread and tacit

desirability of democracy, this diversity roughly defines, while
simultaneously contributing to, the muddle that surrounds the use of
the term.

The goal of this chapter is to establish the necessary

elements of Western democracy.
The pursuit of the necessary elements of democracy should take
place on essentially two levels.

It would be an easy matter to

generalize and claim that the theory of democracy is simply that
political theory which focuses on the processes whereby the demos
exercise control over the leaders of the polis.

However such a claim

would be mis-leading for at least two reasons.

First, "there is no

democratic theory— there are only democratic theories" (Dahl, 1956, p.
1).

From his quote, it might be possible to presume that Dahl finds

that there are significant differences between systems that are
otherwise to be considered democratic.

On the

other hand, Sartori is

inclined to argue this point (Sartori, 1987, p. 376).

By inference,

Sartori contends that it is possible to achieve an ecumenical level of
meaning that validates the use of the term in the singular.

Sartori's

13
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contention is the epitome of the second reason of deception contained
in generalized definition.

The definition is general enough to be

perceived as correct, but that does not necessarily mean that it
describes anything of much significance— it covers essential ground but
misses the essence entirely.

The positions of Dahl and Sartori are

both correct and valuable and this paper will seek to draw from these
two perspectives.
From the opening array of definitions, it is evident that there
is both an abundance and a considerable diversity in definitions of
democracy.

Such diversity in definition has led some individuals to

incorrectly suggest that democracy is a conceptually vague or even
elastic concept (Bobbio, 1976/1987b, p. 90).

In all likelihood the

variances of definition should be attributed to a variety of factors
stemming from the lengthy history, relative complexity of that which is
to be defined, and the lack of any singular paradigm which can be cited
as an example. What causes this variance— and also makes democracy
initially seem difficult to define— is not that the concept lacks
substance or specific meaning, but that it may refer to either an ideal
or a method.

"The democratic goal is twofold.

It consists of a

condition to be attained and a principle guiding the procedure for
attaining it" (Dahl & Lindblom, 1953/1976, p. 41).

Thus, much of the

confusion over the meaning of democracy most likely stems from the fact
that it has two distinct (non-sectarian) aspects of meaning.

However,

in the distinction of the two different aspects of democracy, it is
important to realize that the two views are not mutually exclusive and
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that the employment of one inevitably invokes the employment of the
other.*
A few common threads in the diversity of the preceding defin
itions exist, but for the most part, the definitions merely elucidate
different aspects of democracy or different elements in the democratic
compound.

Although all definitions directly or indirectly deal with

the political aspect of democracy, it should be noted that there are
also economic and social aspects, that though important, will remain
largely un-addressed. Within the diversity and range of definition are
contained many of the essential ingredients that form the basis of the
modern theory of democracy.

In addition to the overtly stated elements

of democracy are some critical but unmentioned elements as well as some
contingent variables that must be developed to give democracy its true
essence.
In the quest to ascertain the essence of contemporary democracy
there are two particular areas that muddle the issue:

historical

circumstance, and the indiscriminate use of democracy to refer to
either the ideal or the method.

By first understanding the contribu

tions and ramifications of historical circumstance it is possible to
wade through much of the initial confusion surrounding the meaning of
democracy.

Bobbio observes that "from the start democracy has always

meant government by all or the majority, as opposed to government by
one, or a few, or a minority" (1976/1987b, p. 89).

Though this

statement may not survive serious scrutiny, it is certainly acceptable
enough at a superficial level.

However, where the confusion (and no

doubt controversy) arises is not in the ecumenical application of this
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statement, but in its underlying intricacies.

For example, it is a

vexing problem for democracy to define who constitutes the "all" in
Bobbio's statement.

The historical sense of democracy as it applied to

the Greek city-states and the Roman Republics is not (usually) what is
meant today when the word is applied to modern circumstance.

Further

confusion undoubtedly arises because the meaning has changed through
time.

Bobbio is inclined to suggest that what has changed in time is

not really its ideal or "prescriptive use" but rather its method or
"descriptive use."

It is the ideal that has remained relatively

constant while the method has changed with time and appears in a
variety of incarnations.

Yet additional obfuscation of the meaning

occurs when the term is bent by opportunistic use and re-definition.
That is, "the traditional concept of democracy becomes muddled when
government by the people is confused with government for the people"
(Bobbio, 1976/1987b, p. 89).

Compounding the confusion over historical

meaning is the problem(s) that arise(s) due to the ambiguity of
meaning— the term unless qualified may engender either an ideal or a
method. Perhaps worse is the unqualified alternation in use— sometimes
it is used to indicate "liberal democracy" while at other times it is
used to indicate only "democracy."

In the former sense, democracy is

given all the attributes of liberalism— i.e., the democratic ideal is
presented as one of freedom— while in the latter use, liberalism and
democracy are disentangled and the democratic ideal reverts back to one
of equality.

Although there is little or no appreciable difference in

the political sense between the condition of democracy and the
condition of liberalism, this immediately changes if democracy is used
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in the social sense where it means democracy and not liberalism.

Even

when the political context of usage is defined, more muddle in meaning
develops as the result of the merger of democracy and liberalism.
While the requisite element of liberal democracy is freedom, it is not
the requisite element of democracy per s e .

Tocqueville (1835,

1840/1981) and many subsequent scholars have noted that freedom is not
consistent with the internal logic of democracy— in fact, it is a
highly secondary element that is at best extraneous.

Conversely,

equality is, to put it mildly, inconsistent with the internal logic of
liberalism.

Why Democracy?

Finally it seems germane to consider the appeal of democracy.
Many authors have addressed this question and arrived at numerous
answers, but for the purposes and scope of this paper none offer better
insight and solution than Bobbio (1976/1987b, pp. 92-6).

He

suggests

that there are four elemental arguments which support a preference for
democracy.

First is the ethical dimension encompassing positive

freedom where freedom is thought of as autonomy.

To wit, freedom for

Rousseau meant "the obedience to laws which all individuals have laid
down for themselves" (Bobbio, 1976/1987b, p. 95).

The second argument

revolves around the political preference for democracy because it is
the most effective solution to the abuse of power.

It becomes

necessary because historic pattern shows that those who hold political
power have the tendency to abuse it.

The third argument trades on the

utilitarian assertion that democracy is preferred to autocracy because
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the collective interest of the people can best be determined by the
involved parties themselves.

Finally there is the circumstantial

argument that democracy must be desirable because of the great pains
taken by so many otherwise non-democratic states to proclaim their
political systems as being democratic.

Greek Origins

The concept of "democracy" originated more than two thousand
years ago in Greece.

As would be expected in any lengthy social

history, the term has acquired a variety of diverse meanings as an
outgrowth of its varied historical settings and applications. "As new
forms came to be justified by older ideas, changes in political
consciousness occurred that were subtle, elusive, and confusing" (Dahl,
1982, p. 5).

Some aspects of the term's meaning are the evolutionary

product of cumulative experience while other aspects are less well
developed, being based on novel approach and applicable only to modern
circumstances.

As a result "today's concept of democracy has a very

slight resemblance, if any, to the concept that was developed in the
fifth century B.C." (Sartori, 1987, p. 278).

The original conception

of democracy was as an intrinsic piece of a relationship built on the
Greek conception of the polis. This conception (which lasted at least
until Rousseau) was based on the assumption that the communities were
small in both area and number of citizens.

"On the smaller scale of

the little community, interdependence was palpable, the community
sharply defined, the commonalities often rather apparent" (Dahl, 1982,
p. 140).

The pervading notion was that the ideal of a common good
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would transcend factional interests and the resultant conflicts.'*

An

individual's community was normally (and quite plausibly) perceived as
being merely the extension of the individual1s family and group of
friends.

Even the commonly used modern translation of polis as a city-

state does not stand up to the rigors of translation out of context or
across time, for the classical Greeks had no conception of "state" as
such.

Sartori notes that "Machiavelli was the first author to reify

'state' as an impersonal entity and to employ the term in its modern
political denotation" (Sartori, 1987, p. 278).

Thus democratic process

in its original conception was held to apply only to very small states
like the city-state.

For the classical Greeks it was exactly the

condition of statelessness that characterized their democracy.

Hence,

the contemporary notion of the "democratic state" would be a contradic
tion in terms for the Greek of the classical era.

Ultimately it is

evident in both the "descriptive" and "ideal" sense that the ideals,
institutions and political practices of democratic ancient Greece and
Republican Rome were small-scale (city-state) democracy and differs
radically by design and necessity from that of the contemporary
democracy large-scale (nation-state) democracy.

It becomes evident

that modern democracy and the democracy of classical Greece differed in
not only method (as a result of geographic and demographic dimensions),
but more critically in ideal.

"Hence, ancient democracies cannot teach

us anything about building a democratic state and about conducting a
democratic system that covers not merely a small city but a large
expanse of territory inhabited by a vast collectivity" (Sartori, 1987,
p. 279).
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Significance of Scale

The requirements of scale— both the demos in numeric terms and
the territorial size— are such that the political possibilities of the
small city-states were entirely different than those possibilities of
the large nation-states.

Or in the words of Bealey:

"within a small

political unit such as a city-state, the implications for democratic
relationships will be quite different than those in the nation-state"
0

(1988, p. 42).

The differences are not just matters of method or

procedural application, but also matters of ideal application and
aspiration.

The substantial differences in the scale of the city-state

and nation-state are only partly responsible for the differences
between the political institutions of the two kinds of popular regimes.
The paramount examples of small scale popular government occurred
in some relatively democratized city-states in classical Greece, the
Roman Republic and some medieval Italian "communes" circa 1080 to 1300
(Dahl, 1982, p. 7).

The possibilities of popular government on a large

scale in a relatively democratized nation-state first appeared with
many of its distinguishing features— albeit in a still incomplete
form— in the U.S. in the early 19th century.

However, most examples of

regimes espousing popular government on the scale of the nation-state
have arisen only in this century.

It is interesting to note that

historical evidence indicates that the actual practice of democracy in
the city-states is hardly worth idealizing for suffrage was extremely
limited and transitions of office were often accompanied by violence or
repression or retribution.

The demos was reduced by exclusion:

women
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were denied political rights, as were a substantial portion of adult
males.

Consequently the "demos" was always a minority of the adult

population, and often a rather small and select minority at that.

With

this in mind, Dahl observed that "consequently it is a mistake, though
a common one, to regard the popular regimes of the city-states ... as
examples of extensive popular participation in public affairs" (1982,
p. 8).
Small-scale polities have numerous attributes or attribute
possibilities which in and of themselves are quite desirable.

The

small territorial area of the city-state was generally confined enough
to permit the citizens to assemble as a body or to communicate easily
with each other and with leaders— luxuries the nation-state could
obviously never enjoy.

Within the decision-making context of the

small-scale regime, the individual has far greater capacity to relate
their values and interests to those of other citizens (Bealey, 1988, p.
43).

The responsibility of result for both proponents and opponents of

particularistic action— groups as well as individuals— is much more
clearly defined in the small-scale polity.

"Citizen control appears to

be maximized and 'government by the consent of the governed' is visibly
in operation" (Bealey, 1988, p. 43).
obtained,
making.

Information is more easily

thereby increasing the possibility for rational policy

As J.S. Mill once noted, the participatory inclusion of the

individual tends to educate them in the policy-making process— which in
turn tends to yield individuals who can propose political action and
act more politically rationally.

Finally, the leaders of the small

scale democracy are more easily monitored and held accountable for
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their actions and decisions.

While small scale democracy has many

desirable aspects, in the overall scheme of political action they do
not appear to be capable (at least in the forms existent to date) of
achieving the same overall relative benefits that the large nation
state is capable of.^
There frequently exists the mistaken perception that the direct
democracy of the city-states can be contrasted to the representative
democracy of the nation-states.

However, it was increasingly common,

especially in the later city-states, to reduce the burden of popular
assembly by placing the decisions and responsibilities of day-to-day
government in the hands of officials. While there are some examples of
government offices being filled by lot in some city-states, the trend
in the later emerging medieval communes and republics was for officials
to be appointed or elected with "a marked tendency for officials to be
chosen from the same leading families" (Dahl, 1982, p. 9).

While the

dichotomy of direct and representative democracy refers in the strict
sense to the difference in the institutional methods of making
decisions, the application of each institutional method is more suited
to a particular circumstance.

"Direct democracy is clearly more

appropriate to small polities, whereas representative democracy is much
more suitable for large" (Bealey, 1988, p. 42).
Although it is not democratic in origin, the modern idea of
representation in conjunction with democracy developed in the 18th
century "when advocates of popular government realized that represen
tation might be joined with democratic process to bring about democracy
on the giant scale of an entire country" (Dahl, 1982, p. 9).

Probably
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the most meritorious aspect of the small scale of the city-state was
the potential for a political life that appears unattainable in the
modern nation-state.

This potential political life often becomes a

misconception of reality— as occurred with perceptions of direct
democracy.

It is also frequently believed that in the political

thought of the city-state there was a prevalence of the ideal of a
society-wide common good that is sharply contrasted to the egocentric
pursuit of self and group interest that prevails in modern democracy.
Yet the actuality of historic fact seems to indicate that political
life in the city-states was not without strife.

"Their history is a

tale of bitter conflicts and almost total failure to develop effective
institutions for settling political disputes (both internal and
external) by peaceful and constitutional means" (Dahl, 1982, p. 10).
In the modern democracy the scope of decision-making is extensive
and often highly technical. There are two limitations of large scale
that are especially significant to the contemporary problem of
democratic pluralism.

First, the government of a nation-state is

incapable of being highly participatory due to the inherent limitations
imposed by the vast numbers of citizens qualified for participation.
Second, possibilities of influence wielded by the citizen in a large
nation-state are substantially less than would occur in a much smaller
unit like a city-state.

The participatory ideal of the city-state

remains imbued in the concept of democracy in the nation-state. Given
the impediments of (and resource limitations of) scale the participa
tory ideal is unattainable (Dahl, 1982, p. 12).

"For those who believe

that the essential value of democracy is in the opportunities it offers
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individual citizens to participate in and exercise control over public
life, the attempt to apply democracy processes on a scale as large as
the nation-state is bound to produce a sorry substitute for the real
thing" (Dahl, 1982, p. 13).

Even if polyarchies were to become

considerably more "democratized" than they currently are, they could
not fulfill the participatory promises of small scale city-states.

It

is often argued that in view of the limitations of large-scale
democracy, that the application of small-scale democracy should be
increased and developed.

C

.

.

.

.

In many ways, the organizations m pluralist

democracy function as a kind of response to latent desires for the lost
benefits of small-scale democracy.

Indeed the desires and opportunity

for influence and participation in a large democracy are substantially
fulfilled by the function of organizations.
For democracy on a large scale, the existence of relatively
autonomous organizations is a necessary but not sufficient condition.
That is to say that, they are a necessary element in a large-scale
democracy, both as a prerequisite for its operation and as an inevita
ble consequence of its institutions.

The same rights that are required

for large-scale democracy are those that make the existence of
relatively autonomous organizations both possible and necessary.

For

example, it would be impossible to have competitive elections without
political organizations.

These organizations are possible because the

institutions of polyarchy are structured so that any efforts to destroy
the relative autonomy of organizations that are formed to contest the
government's conduct would come at a prohibitively high cost (Dahl,
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1982, p. 37).

A more complete discussion of the functions and role of

organizations appears in the section on pluralism.

Classical Democracy

In the years intervening since the birth of classical Greek and
Republican Roman democracy, Western civilization has extensively
modified and enriched the values and goals attributed to democracy.
The process of re-articulation has endowed democracy with values and
goals that the ancients could not have been aware of because of their
place on the continuum of history.

However, this period of re-

articulation has been relatively short and recent.

Until the fall of

the absolute monarchies in the 18th and 19th centuries the struggle in
political theory was between monarchy and republic.

Only after the

republic had been achieved— and from the experience of the French
Revolution--was there consideration of democracy and its antithesis,
liberalism.

Parenthetically it should be noted that socialism arrived

on the heels of the democratic-liberal debate.
As for the conception of state scale:

"Before the national state

became the focus of democratic ideas, prevailing doctrine insisted that

the most appropriate unit of republican or democracy government was the
small city state" (Dahl, 1986, p. 115).

Thus, classic democracy as

opposed to ancient classical Greek democracy, takes its meaning
somewhere around the time of Rousseau or Bentham or the Mills (Pateman,
1970, pp. 17ff).

Far more important than establishing the birth date

of classic democracy is that "What neither its critics or its defenders
have realized is that the notion of a classic theory of democracy is a
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myth" (Pateman, 1970, p. 17).

The point here is neither to establish

who deserves credit as the original author of classic democracy nor the
precise definition of democracy.

Rather the point is to illustrate

that the contemporary theories of democracy are substantially defined
by whichever classic model they trace their roots from.

Major

contemporary theories of democracy will be reviewed in a subsequent
chapter.

Until then, the discussion remains one of establishing the

historical nature of

democracy.

As any student of politics realizes "politics hinges, in the long
view of history, on elementary oppositions and polarizations" (Sartori,
1987, p. 372).

At this juncture it is valuable to review the opposite

political position of classic democracy— liberalism.
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CHAPTER I I I

LIBERALISM

The term liberal as a political word was coined in Spain in the
early 19th century as a somewhat derogatory name for the Spanish rebels
of the day.

It was not until the mid-19th century that the term

achieved acceptance and use in England.

From this background Sartori

(1987) concludes that the noun liberalism was established some three
centuries after the thing itself— far too late for its individual
identity to become established before being merged with the concept of
democracy.

He goes on to tell us that "classic liberalism is

certainly more definite and corporeal than a mere ecumenical feeling,
and at the same time much less contingent and variable than sectarian
Liberalism.

It is true that liberalism is also an attitude, a mental

pattern" (1987, pp. 369-70).

Although the precepts and conditions of

the liberal ideal have been an integral role in the flowering of
Western democracy for 300 plus years, the dimensions of the term have
been, and remain even today rather chimerical.

"A nameless liberalism

has constituted between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries the
most fundamental drive of Western civilization,

institution as a

denomination pleno jure intended to epitomize that experience has
achieved status and regard only for a few decades" (Sartori, 1987, p.
371).

If liberalism is qualitatively— rather than quantitatively—

oriented it is intrinsically anti-egalitarian and hence anti-

27
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democratic.

However, given that liberalism promotes the welfare of the

governed by increasing their ability and opportunity to govern, it is
supportive of democracy.

Economic Liberalism

Finally, classic liberalism— the political liberalism of Locke,
Blackstone, Montesquieu, and Madison et al.— is far different than, and
must be held distinct from its offspring, economic liberalism.

Sartori

(1987, p. 379) suggests that only through the recognition of this dis
tinction does it become possible to assess the scope of the interaction
and interrelation between the liberalist political system and the
liberalist economic system.

By following the linguistic distinction in

Italian of (political) liberalism and (economic) "liberism," Sartori
has attempted to duplicate what Dahl has done with the distinctions of
democracy and polyarchy.

In this sense, classical political liberalism

is based on the rule of the law, and the constitutional state and
liberty was (is) political freedom.

Alternatively, liberism is the

economic doctrine of laissez-faire— the economic principle of free
trade; or in its most perverted state, the economic survival of the
fittest (Satori, 1987, p. 374).

At the same time the various classical

theories of democracy were vying for prominence they were engaged in
competition with the contradistinctive political concept of liberalism
which was as yet unnamed.

As with democracy, there is question as to

whether there is a singular school of political liberalism.

However

the important question is about the role of liberalism relative to
democracy.

All future references to liberalism will imply— unless
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otherwise noted— its political orientation as opposed to its economic
liberalism.

Classical Economic Liberalism

Society and social institutions to the early liberal were useful
to produce not only political benefits such as collective security, but
also economic benefits from the division of labor which made developed
society possible.
Building from the Hobbesian (1651/1946) assumption that man,
without restraint, would pursue selfish motives that would lead to a
"natural state" of conflict where each man struggles for survival
against all others.

For Hobbes, the only solution to the "natural

state" came from the establishment of a source of absolute power— a
centralized government.

It was envisioned that each man would subject

themselves to the central government in exchange for protection from
all others.

Contradicting the Hobbesian proposal for a central

government was the classical liberalism and its cardinal tenet that men
(especially those in business) should be free to pursue the egoistic
motives with a minimum of restraint imposed by society.

Reconciling

the contradictory stance of these two positions was liberal economics.
With a creed stressing the benefits of competitiveness and the rivalry
born of unrestrained egoism battling in a capitalist market setting,
the liberal economics of Adam Smith (1776/1976) asserted gain to accrue
to individuals as well as to society.

Smith believed if both capital

ists and workers went unimpeded, that their pursuit of self interest
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would lead them to use their capital and labor where it was most
productive.

Hence Smith and the classical liberals were opposed to the

existence of central authority or legislation that sought in any way to
determine what was produced when the "invisible hand" of the market was
clearly much more efficient.
The laissez-faire role advocated by Smith for the role of
government on the intellectual level (i.e., protection against foreign
invaders, protection of citizens from "injustices" caused by other
individuals, and the building and maintaining of socially beneficial
public works) was adulterated and re-interpreted under the classical
liberal businessmen and industrialists (Hunt & Sherman, 1975, p. 53).
Government protection against foreign invaders was re-interpreted to
include the procurement "or even enlargement of foreign markets through
armed coercion" (Hunt & Sherman, 1975, p. 53).

Protection against

injustices was redefined to essentially mean the "protection of private
property, enforcement of contracts, and preservation of internal order.
... Giving the government the function of protecting property relations
meant giving government the job of protecting the source of power of
the economically and politically dominant class:
(Hunt & Sherman, 1975, p. 53).

the capitalists"

The division of labor and complex

organization required for capitalist society meant that for it to
succeed, contract enforcement was crucial as was internal order.
Finally the building and maintaining of public works become a facade
for the construction of infrastructure projects (and institutions)
which would promote profitable production and exchange.

Already among

the philosophy of classic liberals was the opinion that government
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intervention in economic affairs was grudgingly acceptable if limited
to stabilizing and promoting business interests.

Neoclassical Economic Liberalism

Neoclassical economics developed in the late 19th century as a
response to the growing schism between classical theory and the
economic reality of the time.

That is, it sought to accommodate the

burgeoning economic concentration of corporate capitalism. Much of the
economic dogma of classical liberalism "was combined with Benthamite
utilitarianism (which was already implicit in Adam Smith's normative
model of the invisible hand) and refurbished within an elaborate and
esoteric framework of algebra and calculus" (Hunt & Sherman, 1975, p.
95).

Assuming both the current distribution of wealth and income as

well as the existence of a free market where consumers could enter into
the unimpeded exchange of personal income for commodities,

the

neoclassical economists argued that consumers would distribute personal
income naturally through purchases of desired commodities in such a way
that it would maximize the welfare of all.

After beginning with the

assumption of "original" income and wealth, much of the neoclassical
dogma was based on the defense of Adam Smith's concept of the policy of
laissez-faire and the functioning of the invisible hand of market
competition.
The foundations of neoclassical economics developed cracks from
its dependence upon the assumption of "perfect competition."

The neo

classical school recognized that conditions of monopoly, social service
provision, and natural resource consumption or pollution, all contrib

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

32
uted to the instability of an unrestrained free-market capitalist
system.

Solution was found in government intervention.

For example,

government antitrust actions could coerce large and powerful firms into
acting as if they were competitive.^

Special sector oriented taxes and

subsidies could designed and applied to circumstances where private and
social costs differed.

Finally, prudent government intervention with

fiscal and monetary policy was recognized as a means to eliminate the
instability of free-market capitalism.
Neoclassical economics recognized the flaws in the system as
being of a relatively insignificant and ephemeral nature easily
corrected by an enlightened government. Among neoclassical economists,
two positions developed concerning the proper course of action to
remedy systemic flaws.

The liberal position advocates "extensive

government intervention in the economic system" (Hunt & Sherman, 1975,
p. 99) where the free market does not maximize social welfare— with the
caveat that the said intervention not destroy private ownership or the
capitalist market economic system.

Conversely, the conservative

position views the systemic flaws as being minor and advocates the
barest minimum of government intervention— and then only those tasks
that directly or indirectly promote business profitability.

This

position places the contemporary conservatives very close to that of
the 19th century political liberals.
Once beyond the intellectual strictures of Adam Smith on the
responsibilities and duties of government, the dogmatic stance of the
classical liberal manufacturers and industrialists as well as the neo
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classical economists after that, makes them considerably more tolerant
of government intervention than their politically liberal brethren.

Liberalism

The primary concern of liberalism is the "outer" freedom of man—
the thought that no one should be incarcerated or restrained without
due process and/or due cause.

Thus at the core, liberalism is "the

theory and practice of the juridical defence, through the constitu
tional state, of individual political freedom, of individual liberty"
(Sartori, 1987, p. 380).

The practical contribution of abstract

(ideal) liberalism has been to curb absolute and arbitrary power.
Liberal democratic ideas— i.e., liberalism— developed in opposition to
the concentration of power.

"Liberal democracy represented a movement

away from the uniformity of centralized regulation imposed by means of
power concentrated in the crown, the royal ministers, and an unrepre
sentative parliament" (Dahl, 1982, p. 105).

It is the affirmation of

liberalism that solves the difficult questions of "who controls the
controllers" and "how to reign-in arbitrary applications of the state
power" (Dahl, 1982, p. 105).
A further complication exists in the understanding of liberalism.
As would also be the case with democracy and the Democratic party,
there is at best only a tenuous link between liberalism and the
present-day Liberal parties.

Sartori attributes the confusion between

the ecumenical and sectarian use of the term to the fact that "since it
is not easy to identify the historical essence of liberalism, the term
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is up for grabs" (1987, p. 369).

Thus the term becomes connected and

confused with the more easily perceived sectarian meaning.

Liberalism and Democracy

Historically the relationship between liberalism and democracy
has been much more than one of conflict and competition between two
contrary positions.

Sartori observes that in the latter 19th century

"the liberal and the democratic ideals blended with each other, and in
their blending became misapprehended. The happy historical conjuncture
that bound them together erased their respective characteristics, let
alone their boundaries" (Sartori, 1987, p. 367).
Tocqueville was one of the first to abandon the classical use of
democracy and to embrace its contemporary use when in a September 12,
1848 speech he said "Democracy and socialism are linked by a word,
equality; but the difference must be noted:

democracy wants equality

in freedom, and socialism wants equality in poverty and slavery"
(Sartori, 1987, p. 373). Sartori notes that in dividing democracy into
two parts, Tocqueville attributes the non-liberal part of democracy—
democratic despotism— to socialism, while he associated its nondespotic part with liberalism.

By doing this, Tocqueville disarms the

inherent contradiction that liberty and

equality hold for each other.

"The equality that is inimical to freedom was to be found in socialism,
whereas the equality that is in harmony with freedom was to be found in
anti-socialist democracy, in the democracy that accepts liberalism"
(Sartori, 1987, p. 373).
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Liberal Democracy

In simple terms the basic relationship between liberalism and
democracy is a relationship between liberty and equality— where
liberalism calls for liberty and democracy calls for equality.

In the

fusion of liberalism and democracy, liberalism has in substance
prevailed over democracy.

With the contemporary democratic position

maintaining that freedom is the end whereas democracy is the means;
liberalism is evidenced to have absorbed democracy to a far greater
degree than democracy has coopted liberalism.
The procedural viability of combining liberalism and democracy is
borne out by the experiences of the Western polities that are both
liberal and democratic.

This procedural relationship entails more than

a simple merger of liberty and equality.

First, there is a distinction

to be made between democracy in the political sense and democracy in
the social sense.

In the social sense it is a relationship replete

with role divisions, where the liberal has a more political orientation
and the democrat is more inclined to have a welfare orientation.
Within their respective role divisions, it is the liberal who under
stands the creation of social order and who instigates the development
of procedural democracy.
as to method.

The democrat, on the other hand, is diffident

His concern is with the substance and results of the

democratic endeavor.

The democrat is more inclined to exercise power

than to preside over the application of it.

"In the political sense

there is no appreciable difference between the democratic and liberal
state; the former is, for the most part, the latter under a new name.
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When, on the other hand, we speak of democracy in the social sense, we
are speaking of what is properly democracy and not liberalism"
(Sartori, 1987, pp. 385-6).
In a more ecumenical sense, liberalism is primarily concerned
with the form of the state and limiting the state's power, whereas
democracy is primarily concerned with the normative content issuing
from the state and the insertion of popular power into the function of
the state.

Sartori (1987) asserts that in the role division between

liberal and democrat,

it is not the liberal as much as it is the

democrat who appreciates social order.

"Perhaps the [most] fundamental

difference is that liberalism pivots on the individual, and democracy
on society" (Sartori, 1987, p. 384).

Democracy reveres social cohesion

and distributive equality, while liberalism reveres individual primacy
and differentiation. The liberal antagonism with the equality of
democracy rests on the contention that without differentiation,
equality— especially where it is guaranteed— promotes mediocrity by
stifling individual initiative.

Thus, the problem for liberal

democracy is to promote the individual initiative that brings progress
while at the same time promoting the social cohesion that enables a
society to function and survive.

Bell finds the contradictory nature

of this issue to grow "from the fact that liberal society was origi
nally set-up— in its ethos, laws, and reward systems— to promote
individual ends, yet has now become an interdependent economy that must
stipulate collective goals" (1976, p. 176).
Finally, much of the liberal democratic theme rests on the
premise that there is a direct relationship between individuals'
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freedom and their freedom to accumulate and disburse information.
Though ignorance may initially be blissful for the polity, in the long
term it is detrimental because it decreases the polity's ability to
deal with reality in an effective manner.

Systemic constraints aside,

the ability to effectively deal with reality is what in essence imbues
the polity with the capacity to control their leaders.

Loss of popular

control results when leaders are permitted (or able) to deceive the
polity.

Deception of the polity nullifies the popular ability to see

through the achievement of popular desires and interests.

Democracy Within Liberalism

Initially it was the liberal component that dominated the
democratic component; however, in the 20th century the democratic
component is beginning to prevail over the liberal.

Since the turn of

the century, liberalism— especially in the U.S.— has retreated
considerably from its prior commitment to dispersion.

Dahl (1982, p.

105) attributes this trend reversal in the U.S. to be the result of
desire by Liberals (progressives, reformists, New Freedomites, and New
Dealers) to be able to implement national policies.

Woodrow Wilson's

New Freedom and Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal both required that
these policies be uniformly applied on a national basis. "As a direct
consequence, the new liberalism sought greater centralization of
control over policies and decisions in federal agencies and a greater
concentration of political resources at centers in Washington" (Dahl,
1982, p. 105).

In a similar vein, Sartori attributes the "deprecia

tion" of liberalism to be the result of its success (1987, p. 389).
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Power has been so successfully reigned in by the constitutional state
that now economic constraints supplant political constraints as being
the onus of the people.

However, given that the modern state no longer

functions as "a minimal state," this situation appears increasingly
close to reverting to a condition where political restraints may again
reign prominent if not prevalent.

"To the liberal democratic panoply

of legislature, court, and executive have been added administrative
agencies that are not legislative or judicial or simply implementers of
statutory law.

Such agencies exercise great discretion, which is often

loosely if at all, bound by citizen preferences, statutory declaration,
or judicial review" (Elkin, 1985a, p. 2).

Ultimately if Sartori is

correct in his assertion that liberalism has "depreciated" due to its
success, those who subscribe to the idea of democracy within liberalism
may find liberalism's present lack of success— including its contextual
failings in the U.S. to implement national policies of systemic
reform— may help it to regain its previous stature. While avoiding the
topic of democracy without liberalism—-which is too dangerously close
to the actual socialist cum Marxist position— a review of the ramifica
tions of seeking increased democracy is necessary.
The pursuit of more democracy in the democratic/liberal equation
is not restricted to democracy in the political sense— more social
equality and economic welfare can be sought.

It means that the foun

dations for "democratic life revolves around small groups, face-to-face
relationships, a multi-group society," (Sartori, 1987, p. 388) and the
development of self-governing voluntary associations outside govern
ment. Addressing the limitations of nation-state government to provide
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more democracy, Dahl and Lindblom observe that:

"the nation-state can

only provide the framework within which the good life is possible, it
cannot fulfill the functions of small groups" (1953/1976, p. 520).

The

problem is that few citizens recognize that representative political
democracy does little more than permit them entry into a legalized
framework based on "techniques of liberty" but does not provide de
facto democracy.

Seeking more democracy does not necessarily entail

less liberalism, it is not a zero-sum proposition.

There is no mutual

exclusion in simultaneously seeking more democracy and at the same time
more liberalism.

However, to maximize the democratic element of the

system at the expense of the liberal element accomplishes little more
than to hobble the whole of liberal democracy at best, and initiate its
ultimate demise at worst.

In the relationship of liberalism and

democracy, liberalism functions as a tool of democracy, while democracy
itself does not function as a vehicle of liberalism.

The liberal

democratic equation is built on "equality through liberty, by means of
liberty, not liberty by means of equality" (Sartori, 1987, p. 388).
Democracy, then, should not be viewed as a replacement for liberalism,
but as a "completion" of it.
"procedural"

Given the unidirectional nature of the

relationship between the liberty of liberalism and the

equality of democracy, the exchanging of liberalism for democracy is a
process with potentially dire consequences.

Although Sartori may

exaggerate the actual threat of trading liberalism for democracy, one
should not dismiss lightly his contention that "from liberalism we are
free to go on to equality; [while] from equality we are not free to get
back to liberty" (Sartori, 1987, p. 389).

Ultimately it emerges that
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"freedom from political fear is a truly enormous achievement and that
the liberal-constitutional state is the precondition for everything"
(Sartori, 1987, p. 389).
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CHAPTER IV

DELINEATIONS OF IDEAL AND METHOD

In the opening quote at the beginning of Part I, Dahl and
Lindblom (1953/1976) provide a crucial clue about the meaning of
democracy.

They point out that democracy can be used to describe both

a method and an ideal.

In very much the same vein, Sartori asserts

that "what democracy .is cannot be separated from what democracy should
be" (1962, p. 4).

It is precisely this differentiation which causes

much of the obfuscatory umbrage surrounding the term.

This distinction

must not be allowed to detract from the realization that prescriptive
democracy and descriptive democracy must, and indeed do, interact in a
complementary relationship.

Despite this relationship "the democratic

ideal does not define the democratic reality, and vice versa, a real
democracy is not, and cannot be, the same as an ideal one" (Sartori,
1962, p. 5).

Ideal

Where ideal (theoretical) systems are realistic, they devolve
near or even slightly beyond the limit of human possibility.

In this

latter sense of ideal, the concept of democracy has historically meant
government by a large portion of the people.

Dahl articulates five

criteria that he finds are necessary (but not sufficient) for the ideal
democratic process:

41
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1. Equality in voting: In making collective binding deci
sions, the expressed preference of each citizen (citizens
collectively constitute the demos) ought to be taken
equally into account in determining the final solution.
2. Effective participation: Throughout the process of
collective decision making, including the stage of putting
matters on the agenda, each citizen ought to gave adequate
and equal opportunities for expressing his or her prefer
ences as to the final outcome.
3. Enlightened understanding: In the time permitted by the
need for a decision, each citizen ought to have adequate
and equal opportunities for arriving at his or her consid
ered judgment as to the most desirable outcome.
4. Final control over the agenda: The body of citizens
(the demos) should have the exclusive authority to deter
mine what matters are or are not to be decided by means of
processes that satisfy the first three criteria. (Put in
another way, provided the demos does not alienate its final
control over the agenda it may delegate authority to others
who may make decision by nondemocratic processes.)
5. Inclusion:
The demos ought to include all adults
subject to its laws, except transients. (Dahl, 1982, p. 6)
Indeed the ultimate goal of democracy as an ideal is the condition of
political equality.

Political equality occurs when "control over

government decisions is shared so that the preferences of no one
citizen are weighted more heavily than the preferences of any other one
citizen" (Dahl & Lindblom, 1953/1976, p. 41). The ultimate achievement
of democracy is to permit the individual to have self-control and selfrealization.

This is possible only if the appropriate social condi

tions are created by the presence of the social principles of demo
cratic liberty and democratic equality.
merely ends, but they are also means.

Liberty and equality are not

They are the prerequisites that

permit the existence of realistic individual participation.

By

extension, democracy is seen in the liberal individualist tradition as
a method to safeguard and reconcile both individual and group inter

ests .

In the American context this meant the Madisonian safeguards
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designed to balance diverse interest against one another so as to
prevent the tyranny of the majority.

These safeguards then permitted

"no faction, not even a majority, to deprive minorities of their
natural rights by demanding the concurrence in action of independent
authorities" (Dahl, 1956, p. 33).

Thus democracy is seen to require

the dispersal of power among the people, not the traditional concen
tration of power among an elite.

This is essentially the distinction

between democracy— which is power from below, and autocracy— which is
power from above.
Following along ideal lines substantially similar and wholly
compatible to those enunciated by Dahl, Bobbio proposes what he sees as
a generally agreed upon "set of rules" which form the conceptual basis
of democracy.

In the succinct words of Bellamy (1987, p. 21), Bobbio's

rules for democracy require:
1. That all citizens who have reached the age of majority,
regardless of sex, race, creed of economic condition,
possess political rights and can vote on collective issues
or elect someone to do so for them.
2. That everyone's vote has equal weight, counting for only
one.
3. That all citizens can vote according to their own freely
arrived at opinion, that is in a free competition between
rival political groups which vie with each other to
aggregate demands and transform them into collective
decisions.
4. That they have a free choice in the sense of having real
alternatives to pick from.
5. That they are bound by the majority decision (whether
relative, absolute, or qualified).
6. That no majority decision can limit the rights of the
minority to become in their turn, and on an equal basis,
the majority.
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The semblance of scholarly agreement over the general requirements of
ideal democracy substantially degenerates upon entering the realm of
democratic method.

Method

Possibly the greatest area of controversy in democratic theory
occurs at the threshold where ideal is transferred to method. At times
the gap between ideal and method appears rather ill defined as the two
occur concurrently.

The normal schism between ideal democracy and

method (actual democracy) is due only part to factors which may be
humanly controlled (and are therefore open to human remedy) while the
remainder of the gap simply results from the inherent limits posed by
the application of democratic processes on the grand scale of the
nation-state.

Hence, modern democracy— like the regimes of the city-

states— still remains rather short of fulfilling in actuality the
criteria of ideal democracy.
Contemporary democratic method retains in it vestiges of a
tradition based on popular self-government— i.e., direct government by
the people.

For the vast majority of citizens, the bounds of their

participation in government in the popular sense is perceived as being
limited to the right to vote.

In the highly pluralistic democracies of

today, it is frequently beyond the comprehension of the average citizen
to conceive of the many opportunities for participation or even the
ways in which they inadvertently participate.

Riker goes so far as to

claim that "voting, therefore, is the central act of democracy" (1982,
p. 3).

However, this perspective leaves little leeway for the impact
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of scale which mould the actions of method undertaken by the modern
democratic nation-state.

It also does not recognize the value of the

developments of the last few hundred years which extended the democrat
ic process to the government of an entity as large as a country.
Implicit in the scale of a nation-state is a demos that are unavoidably
numerous and diverse.

And where number and diversity coexist on the

scale of a nation-state, political conflict becomes inescapable but
need not be inherently undesirable.

The methodological coup of

democratic systems is to recognize that conflict is inevitable and to
encourage its open expression through organized political parties and
interest groups— a method that can be monitored easily and controlled
where necessary.

Indeed "organized political parties and interest

groups were necessary, normal, and desirable to democratic political
life" (Dahl,

1982, p. 10).

From this background Dahl finds the

development of seven political institutions which together distinguish
today's historically unique democratic political regimes from all
others.

The institutions are:

1. Control over government decisions about policy is
constitutionally vested in elected officials.
2. Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly
conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively
uncommon.
3. Practically all adults have the right to vote in the
election of officials.
4. Practically all adults have the right to run for
elective offices in the government, though age limits may
be higher for holding office than for the suffrage.
5. Citizens have the right to express themselves without
the danger of severe punishment on political matters
broadly defined, including criticism of officials, the
government, the regime, the socio-economic order, and the
prevailing ideology.
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6. Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of
information. Moreover, alternative sources of information
exist and are protected by law.
7. To achieve their various rights, including those listed
above, citizens also have a right to form relatively
independent associations of organizations, including
independent political parties and interest groups. (1982,
pp. 10-11)
Countries which do not approximate these criteria cannot be considered
democratic— at least in the Western sense of the term.

To distinguish

between democracy in the above sense of the term and the ideal sense of
the word Dahl and Lindblom (1976) introduced the term "polyarchy."
Further complicating any description of the democratic method is
the fact that the theory of social justice is an inherent part of it.
Thus within democracy is the stipulation that "there is an intimate
link between the ultimate results and the procedures by which they have
been obtained" (Bobbio, 1976/1987b, p. 67). To more thoroughly fulfill
this end, Bobbio proposes that the principle "'the end justifies the
means' should be corrected to read:

'the end justifies the means which

do not modify, and thereby corrupt, that end'" (Bobbio, 1976/1987b, p.
99).

Conversely results should never be ignored simply to augment

desirable procedure either.

Ideally then, democratic results should be

achieved with a cautious eye toward procedures.

Democratic method must

simultaneously fulfill both ideological and methodological criteria.
In fulfilling these criteria, there emerge a number of key characteris
tics which are exclusive, at least in degree, to that system.
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CHAPTER V

TENETS OF DEMOCRACY

Participation

The first characteristic of democracy is that of popular
participation in government.

Participation, or the principle thereof

as Rawls calls it, is the political application of "equal liberty" as
constitutionally defined.

Participation "requires that all citizens

are to have an equal right to take part in, and to determine the
outcome of, the constitutional process that establishes the laws with
which they are to comply" (Rawls, 1971, p. 221).^
Riker on the other hand, finds participation to have two somewhat
different aspects. First, participation means the subjecting of rulers
to popular judgement.
tion that:

Second, he relies on the Aristotelian distinc

"ruling and being ruled in turn is, said Aristotle, the

essence of good citizenship, and good citizenship he equated with the
good life" (1982, p. 6).

It is participation, then, which permits the

individual to achieve their maximum amount of self-control in society.
Democracy in contradistinction to autocracy, requires participation as
a necessary but not sufficient element.

Even when a political system

makes collective decisions— i.e., those decisions which affect the
community as a whole— through the aggregated inputs of its members it
may not be democratic in the Western sense of democracy (polyarchy).

47
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Much of the inherent difficulty in addressing participation
arises from the question of how broadly equality of political liberty
is to extend.

Rawls suggests that the main variable "in the extent of

equal political liberty lies in the degree to which the constitution is
majoritarian" (1971, p. 224).

However, effective but equitable partic

ipation is anything but simple to achieve and faces many difficulties
vis-a-vis achieving collective decision.

For example, decisions must

be made on an equal basis but since not all citizens will agree on what
basis the opinion of some is to be valued over the opinion of others,
popular participation will likely face stasis, or worse yet, conflict.
Parenthetically, democracy in the liberal democratic sense has at
various times been described as a way of adjudicating conflict.
Equally vexing is that where large numbers of persons are involved in
the decision making, there will be large numbers of alternatives
proposed if the system permits.

Therefore some sort of guidelines or

rules like those proposed earlier by Bobbio, are necessary to provide
an orderly decision-making process.
Participation manifests itself in a variety of ways;
group activity, party membership, campaigning, incumbency
are all possibilities.

interest

and voting

It must be noted that Bachrach (1975) would

disagree with the preceding interpretation of what constitutes
participatory activity.

Rather, he would relegate the preceding

activities to the status of "essential attributes of a democratic
polity" where some of these forms of political action are indeed
"important if not vital means to the realization of democratic
participation" (Bachrach, 1975, p. 41).

None of them "affords the
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individual the opportunity to engage in the decision making process"
(Bachrach,

1975, p. 41) so he considers them not to constitute

democratic participation.

The ideal objective of the democratic

constitution to undertake and promote those actions which "enhance" the
value and the opportunity of participation for all members of society
on a basis of equal rights.

The definition remains as originally

tendered with the additional parameters that the activities should not
be violent

o

and that they should be voluntary.

9

Of the above listed examples of participatory activity, one of
them— voting— is not only the simplest and most common form of par
ticipation, but it is also of a different genre.

Voting belongs to

that group where "not only must an individual make up his own mind
about alternatives, but in a loose sense a group must make up "its
mind" (Dahl & Lindblom, 1953/1976, p. 89).

Within this spectrum "there

are a limited number of basic ways by means of which alternatives can
be cast up, selection made, and the selected goal or goals scheduled
for action" (Dahl & Lindblom, 1953/1976, p. 89).

Dahl and Lindblom

continue on to recognize three "mechanisms for scheduling goals" that
are of particular significance:
market choice.

(1) voting, (2) delegation, and (3)

Though the mechanisms cannot be treated here in

accordance to their importance, a brief review seems necessary.
Voting schedules goals by counting the expressions of preferences
(votes).

Voting in particular is significant because through this

deceptively simple act, it is possible to discern much of the basis for
many democratic institutions.

Voting is additionally interesting

because of the position of primacy (relative to other forms of partici
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pation) that it holds in many democracies.

For example, despite the

constitutionally guaranteed potentialities for political action, in the
American context virtually all political activity for the masses
revolves around the contribution made at the ballot box. And even this
limited form of participation is performed by only very small numbers.
Some scholars have noted that such apathy may at least be a sign of
healthy democracy since political activity and passions tend to run
high only when there is strife.

"A study of participation rates and of

factors stimulating participation suggests that there is little
likelihood that intense political interest and involvement will develop
so long as government functions adequately, enabling citizens to keep
politics as a peripheral concern in their lives" (Milbrath, 1965, p.
149).

Unfortunately such apathy may become so habitual that democracy

run astray may go unchallenged.

That is, "disinterest and apathy are

not approved because, should they become widespread, power could easily
be usurped and the quality of government seriously decline" (Milbrath,
1965, p. 142).

On an alternative note, Sartori postulates that "the

average voter does not act, he reacts.

Political decisions are not

arrived at by the sovereign people, they are submitted to them.

The

processes of forming opinion do not start from the people, they pass
through them" (Sartori, 1962, p. 77).

If Sartori is correct, the

popular participation of the electorate has less significance in a
democratic system than Riker and his ilk would lead one to believe.
Substantially concurring with Sartori's position, Elkin also argues
"that state [nation-state] officials are not closely bound by voter and
group preferences, although the apparatus of popular control does
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matter" (Elkin, 1985a, p. 14; see also Elkin 1985b).
voting per se is not necessarily democratic.

Interestingly,

Rather "only voting that

facilitates popular choice is democratic" (Riker, 1982, p. 6).

That

is, voting that takes place where there are the various necessary
democratic institutions such as free speech and independent competing
political parties.

Thus voting, in and of itself, is meaningless in

the democratic sense if it is not based on free speech and free choice.
In a rather interesting way, Riker— following Dahl's example— equates
democracy with the interaction of groups and oppositions in a situation
of equal relative freedom where it is through an emphasis on voting
that the groups and groups and oppositions make themselves felt"
(Riker, 1982, p. 5).

Finally, Dahl and Lindblom note that "the greater

the inequality [in tabulating individual preferences], the more voting
becomes like delegation" (Dahl & Lindblom, 1953/1976, p. 89).
Scheduling goals by delegation is where one party (an individual
or a group) makes a choice which other parties acquiesce to only
"because they expect certain rewards and deprivations for compliance"
(Dahl & Lindblom, 1953/1976, p. 91).
The scheduling of goals through market choice (explained in
detail in the section on capitalism) is a transaction where parties
involved exchange one good for another.

Assuming the exchange is free

of coercive influence, it only takes place when each party receives
from the transaction an object (outcome) of equal or greater subjective
value than that which is traded.
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Whatever method or form participation takes it is evident that
participation— -where it is of contributory value— must necessarily
assume other characteristics of democracy.

Political Liberty/Freedom

A second characteristic of contemporary democracy is political
liberty.

Liberty, which is often (though naively) equated to freedom,

provides much of the basis for participation.

As was developed in the

section on liberalism, liberty is denotatively related to liberal
democracy while the notion of freedom was primarily an element of
classic democracy.

Tocqueville tends to use the terms interchangeably

while simultaneously playing on the subtleties of difference that
occurs because freedom is an element of liberalism.
Tocqueville finds the impetus for political liberalism to be more
than the reactive product of a people who are poorly governed— for that
kind of liberalism is but a temporary desire.

In a similar vein, Rawls

finds that if persons can effectively exercise their basic liberties in
their initial situation, then "they will not exchange a lesser liberty
for an improvement in their economic well-being, at least not once a
certain level of wealth has been attained.

It is only when social

conditions do not allow the effective establishment of these rights
that one can acknowledge their restriction" (1971, p. 542).

Tocque

ville also proposes that the love of liberty must be inspired by more
than the prospect of the material advantages that typically accompany
it, since they are not always immediately evident.

Liberalism cannot

be sustained by motives that at their root seek merely to enjoy the
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comfort, independence and wealth that liberty brings.

"It is the

intrinsic attractions of freedom, its own peculiar charm— quite
independently of its incidental benefits— which have seized so strong
a hold on the great champions of liberty throughout history; they loved
it because they loved the pleasure of being able to speak, to act, to
breathe unrestrained, under the sole government of God and the laws [of
nature]" (Tocqueville, 1856, p. 204).
For the purposes of this paper liberty is typically discussed
relative to constitutional and legal restrictions.

Under these

circumstances liberty is the evolution of institutional structure, "a
certain system of public rules defining rights and duties" (Rawls,
1971, p. 202).*®

Ultimately it becomes evident that there exist many

different manifestations of liberty, but the basic essence of liberty
remains unchanged.
Freedom in the intended sense does not mean the ability of one to
exploit the many.

Rather, freedom is intended to connote the unfet

tered ability of the individual to achieve their own goals not at the
expense of others (although this is rarely the case in the real world).
Implicit in the two preceding sentences is the fact that individual
liberties which are left unrestricted will "collide."

Although the

philosophical ramifications remain beyond the scope of this paper,
there are important distinctions to be made between negative and
positive freedom.

Negative freedom— the absence of coercion— is a

position strongly advocated by such scholars as I. Berlin and F. Hayek.
Conversely, positive freedom--the "power to do what one wishes"
(Gordon, 1980, p. 133) has been stridently argued by Marx (Brown, 1986,
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p. 114) and others.

In as much as the freedoms of many individuals

must be built into a system so that they can be realized, it seems
quite plausible that freedom, at least in the positive sense, could
easily be corruptive. Additionally, "without some inner discipline or
sense of proportion, our tendency to self-indulgence could become self
destructive" (Brown, 1986, p. 114).

Ultimately it seems evident that

there must be a limit on how much freedom is good— a limit that is
directly related to the amount of responsibility exercised by the
individual.

The evaluation of one liberty must really be an evaluation

of the system as a whole, since "the worth of one liberty normally
depends on the specification of other liberties and this must be taken
into account in framing a constitution and in legislation generally
(Rawls, 1971, p. 203).

In this way freedom is "intimately" related

with power (Bobbio, 1976/1987b, p. 91)

in that one must be free to

exercise power before they can be said to have it.

Hence, without

freedom there is no power, and no one has any more freedom than they
have power.

The result of this relationship is that any standard which

provides for power to be conferred on the individual must consider
whether the individual is free to exercise it.

For personal power to

be effective the individual must be free to make choices.
means the freedom to pursue ones goals.

Liberty

As previously expressed,

liberty is necessary to organize participation in government.

Without

freedom the pluralism necessary for democracy would whither away.
Thus, the fundamental value of liberty in democracy is "not to provide
freedom as an end in itself, but to render effective both political
participation and the process of choice in voting" (Riker, 1982, p. 7).
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"In the liberal democratic view there is a direct connection between
one's freedom and his understanding of reality" (Dahl & Lindblom,
1953/1976, p. 120).

To early liberal democrats like Jefferson, access

to information— the freedom to disseminate and collect it— was an
element necessary to achieve individual freedom.

In their view, there

exists a direct relationship between how accurately individuals
comprehended reality and how "efficiently"
their goals.

individuals could attain

They further postulated that individuals realized their

greatest liberty where their goals were the most efficiently attained.
Although liberty, like participation, was originally perceived by only
a few as an instrument to achieve democracy, it grew to become an
integral part of the democratic ideal.

Political Equality

The third characteristic of democracy, political equality,

is

like the previous characteristics in that it originates in need as an
instrument of participation.

The necessity for equality in a variety

of circumstances complicates establishing concise perceptions of
political equality.**

In this setting, equality is basically "the

administration of institutions as public systems of rules.
case equality is essentially justice as regularity.

In this

It implies the

impartial application and consistent interpretation of rules according
to such precepts as to treat similar cases similarly (as defined by
statutes and precedents)" (Rawls, 1971, p. 504).

For example the

voting process would be rather insignificant "if each person's vote
were not counted in the same way" (Democracy, 1967, p. 339).

However,
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other circumstances of equality are intimately related to political
equality. For example, the relative equality of the individuals' vis-avis the law, or their position relative to educational or economic
opportunity all impacts their political equality.

Indeed one of the

features Tocqueville found most startling in America was the degree of
social equality that he observed.

"This equality of conditions

Tocqueville called democracy" (Herr, 1962, p. 37) in contrast to the
condition of aristocracy.

Tocqueville "does not hesitate to 'deduce'

political consequences from a social state (equality of condition); in
other words, he deduces a political state which is given the status of
a cause" (Lafort, 1988, p. 187).

1

0

Ultimately Lafort interprets

Tocqueville's intent to show that "there was a time when men's efforts
tended to increase and strengthen the might of social power, and, now
that it has reached its height, it is their task to impose limits upon
it, to assert and protect the rights of private citizens, and to
preserve the independence of the individual" (1988, p. 209).

Though

tangential, such circumstances of equality (or inequality) are critical
variables in the attainment of political equality.

Where inequality is

extreme, it denies some individuals the opportunity for the selfcontrol and self-realization assumed by democratic justice.
Dahl and Lindblom suggest that "the heart of the matter [of
equality] is whether one wants individuals (adults) to have equal
freedom ....

A commitment to freedom has little meaning until this

question is answered" (1953/197 6, p. 46).

Thus, equality is an

instrument that facilitates freedom and allows the democratic polity to
achieve political self-realization.
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Systemic Responsiveness

The final characteristic of democracy is that of systemic
responsiveness.

Dahl asserts that there is a continuing responsiveness

by the democratic government to the preferences of its citizens based
on their political equality.

He reserves the term "democracy" for a

political system which contains the characteristic quality of being
"completely or almost completely responsive to all its citizens" (Dahl,
1971, p. 2).

Such responsiveness requires that policy-making agencies

are sensitive to a whole range of pressures.

However, as noted

elsewhere (Elkin, 1985a, 1985b; Lindblom, 1977; Sartori, 1962),
responsiveness is highly qualified and indeed tentative.

At the ideal

level, if policy-making agencies are not responsive democracy may be
inadvertently denied when some interest affected by a decision is left
out of account.

In reality, inclusion is partially a function of

social power.
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CHAPTER V I

SYSTEMS FOR DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION

Democracy can exist only under particular conditions, and one of
the most important conditions is that of popular participation.

While

participatory theory has been briefly touched upon, and will be
examined in a later chapter, the thrust of this section is to review
how popular interests are aggregated for action within democratic
systems. There are three basic models of democratic systems which are
generally recognized.

Lot System

The first is the lot system.

In ancient democracies the lot was

used as a means of achieving equality of opportunity where advantages
of privileges could not be equally or simultaneously distributed.

It

should be observed though, that since public discussion is an integral
part of democracy, the use of the lot system is hardly an alternative
for deciding policy.

More accommodating than the lot system in the

cultivation of necessary public debate, is the system of direct
democracy.

Direct Democracy

One of the most frequently cited examples of direct democracy—
i.e., of a people governing themselves— is that of ancient Athens.
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Consistent with the Athenian theoretical tempo, Rousseau equated direct
democracy with the decisions of a general assembly of all citizens, not
just their representatives, in a place where they could meet to discuss
and make decisions. Under these particular circumstances democracy was
considered a suitable institutional basis for those states whose small
size permitted the gathering of all their citizens in one place.

In

this light Bobbio proclaims "no one doubts that perfect democracy,
ideal democracy (if democracy means government by. the people and not
just in the name of. the people) is direct democracy" (Bobbio,
1976/1987b, p. 68).

13

However, with today's massive nation-state it

is fairly obvious that because of scale, technical, and knowledge
constraints, direct democracy is less than feasible (or even nonviable) method for most interest aggregation at the national level.
Today, paradigms of the tools of direct democracy, such as national
referendum, are still used to provide citizens with a mechanism for the
expression of their personal opinions on only those issues of paramount
importance.

Clearly there is no disputing the value of such a method

for arriving at collective decisions.

It is also clearly inconceiv

able, though, that the referenda is applicable for the collective
debate and resolution of all the issues that arise in our increasingly
complex contemporary industrial societies. Although there apparently
exists much agreement on what makes a small group democratic, there is
simultaneously little agreement on how democracy is to be realized in
mass groupings.

The variability of social condition from area to

individual area within a nation-state only serves to further exacerbate
the problem.

Unfortunately, there exist further impediments to
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"perfect democracy."

Almost always direct democracy has been a

democracy of illusions.

Frequently it amounts to little more than the

ratification of the decisions of an executive whose power is based on
charisma.

This type of "power is far more immovable and irresistible

than that of any executive of a representative body" (Bobbio,
1976/1987b, p. 69).

It is interesting to note that the Marxist view of

direct democracy differs substantially from this position.

The Marx

ists tend to see direct democracy as being defined by the exercise of
the constitutional device of the binding but theoretically revocable
mandate.

The crisis of direct democracy have stimulated Bobbio to

proclaim that "democracy is difficult, but direct democracy is even
more difficult" (Bobbio, 1976/1987b, p. 68).

As a result of the

limitations of direct popular participation in the circumstance of the
nation-state, modern democratic theory has evolved toward representa
tive forms of government.

To the degree that direct democracy has

"aspired to absorb state functions within society through schemes for
self-administration through collective decision making, falls victim to
the dialectic of modern politics.

Only representative democracy,

albeit in modified form, can meet this challenge" (Bobbio, 1976/1987b,
p. 23).

Representative Democracy

Representative government is government by persons who have been
elected by and thereby authorized by the people to govern them.
theory of representation assumes two things.

The

First, that representa

tives seek the approval of the electorate (are chosen) for political
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office and other positions of authority by engaging in free competition
with other rivals— who may also be freely chosen.

Governing this

competition is a set of procedural rules based on community wide
consensus.

Essentially political representation amounts to the

representation of interests. Latent in the principle of representation
is the possibility that individual interests may be represented by
another individual with or without authorization.

Depending upon the

breadth of their political base, a democratic representative is
normally considered responsible for looking after either the interests
of their constituents, or the interests of the people as a whole.

In

this way the representation of the interests of particular groups of
people may occur without their having had any part in choosing the
representative.

Combined with the representatives' attending to the

needs of their constituency, they are also responsible for the
justification of their actions.

Where representatives are obligated to

periodically submit themselves for review at re-election time, they are
consequently bound to maintain the goodwill of their constituents.

For

"choosing and rejecting representation is ... the central act of
participation by the citizens of a mass democracy, from which the
effectiveness that they might have in other respects derives" (Benn &
Peters, 1965, p. 339).

However, representatives are more than mere

agents of their constituency— in addition to representing the interests
of the electorate they also have and are expected to exercise discreti
onary judgement to enact or pursue legislation that is in the indirect
interest of the electorate.

"In a well-ordered society they must,

nevertheless, represent their constituents in the substantive sense:
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they must seek first to pass just and effective legislation, since that
is a citizen's first interest in government, and secondly, they must
further their constituents' other interests insofar as these are
consistent with justice" (Rawls, 1971, p. 227).
Today the representative state is widely perceived as the best
(most viable while maintaining ideological consistency) democratic
system even though it has not achieved a completely satisfactory
ultimate goal.

To be fair, it should be noted that there has been no

occasion where the representative system has existed in its pure state.
It has always had to deal "with the existence of an administrative
state, a state which obeys a completely different political logic,
based on a type of power which is descending rather than ascending,
secret rather than public, conservative rather than innovative"
(Bobbio, 1976/1987b, p. 82).

It is precisely this adulterated state of

representative democracy that is problematic to the democratic ideals.
"Representative democracy, when combined with hierarchically controlled
political parties and concentrated and incompetent government in a
centralized state, can serve as a means to negate the wider process of
pluralism and public influence and to legitimate the claim to a
monopoly of political power" (Hirst, 1990, pp. 7-8).

In this way

representative democracy may undermine "the wider pluralism of polit
ical influence which is the social base of a genuine democracy, in the
sense of power constrained by public accountability and public influ
ence" (Hirst, 1990, p. 8).
Finally it is necessary to observe that representative democracy
and non-representative democracy are by no means mutually exclusive.
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In fact, although non-representative democracy can be beneficially
integrated with representative democracy, it can never be used to re
place it.
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CHAPTER V I I

PARADOXES OF DEMOCRACY

Despite its many attributes, democracy— even, or perhaps espe
cially, in its most highly developed state— is plagued by a number of
paradoxes. These paradoxes represent the kind of bifurcated processes
that are present in contemporary society— processes that represent a
compromise no matter which alternative is chosen.

For Bobbio the state

and society still represent two separate but interdependent movements
within the national system, but they have become increasingly inter
twined in function.

This intertwining is what produces the paradoxes

of democracy in the nation-state setting.^
Bobbio, for example, finds five such noteworthy paradoxes.
First, is the paradox that issues from an increasing demand for more
and more democracy under conditions that are increasingly antithetical
to its existence.

The larger the scale of the organization, the more

likely that it moves away from its ethical base in direct democracy and
evolves to rule with the "iron law of oligarchy" (Bobbio, 1976/1987b,
p. 69).

In this circumstance direct democracy is reduced to rubber

stamping the decisions of the executive.

The derivation of the second

paradox results from the relationship between size and function.

As

the size of the state increases, so does the range of functions
performed by the "bureaucratic apparatus." This growth process results
in the growth or hierarchically organized bureaucratic structures.
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Since in the Weberian tradition the bureaucratic apparatus has a
descending (top-down) power structure rather than an ascending (bottomup) power structure it is non-democratic in nature.

Perhaps even more

importantly, is that bureaucracy increases (and must do so) as a
reciprocal of an increase in demand for democracy.

Indeed, the state

has no choice if it is to fulfill the demand for increased democracy
(Bellamy, in Bobbio, 1976/1987b, p. 22). The third paradox issues from
the effect of technological development in industrial society.
Increasingly, complex technological questions require an increasingly
higher level of technical expertise for solution.
tion is to trade democracy for technocracy.

Hence, the tempta

The fourth paradox grows

from the conflict between democracy which tends to force "a general
conformism" through the repression and suppression of the individual by
means of social pressure or indoctrination, and the natural trait of
mass society to assumes and esteem the freedom of the individual to
develop in an uninhibited manner.

The final paradox is that democracy

in its most successful forms has appeared with an economic system which
promotes inequality.

And:

while political emancipation is not a sufficient condition
of human emancipation, it is nevertheless a necessary one,
and that the latter can only come about via the former.
Political emancipation necessitates the development,
extension and strengthening of all the institutions which
gave birth to modern democracy, and can derive no benefit
what-so-ever if they are suspended, even for a moment.
(Bobbio, 1976/l987b, p. 84)
With the general groundwork of democracy established and its
accompanying paradoxes noted, it becomes evident that democracy even
without the strains imposed by an accompanying economic system is of a
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tenuous nature.

In particular, three issues (participation, pluralism,

and polyarchy) that warrant further investigation emerge from the
multifarious requisites of democracy.

The first and second issues of

participation and pluralism respectively, devolve as questions of
degree.

The third issue concerns the degree to which the democratic

ideal can be approximated— the significance and scope of polyarchy— is
essengtially a clarification of the delineation between democratic
ideal and method.
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ENDNOTES — PART I

1.
Seesection on delineations of ideal and method for a more
detailed discussion.
2.
See the later discussion of monism and pluralism for additional
discourse on faction.
3.
The use of "city-state" to denote small-scale democracy is done
in the euphemistic sense— certain Roman Republics, medieval Italian
cities, early New England towns, Scottish burghs, and Swiss Cantons are
all examples of small-scale democracy.
4.
This is a qualified position, see among others:
Schumacher
(1973) and Dahl (1982, 1987) for general economic and political
rebuttal that requires the qualification of this position.
5.
Dahl (1982, pp. 12-16) reviews this argument more fully; also see
Schumacher (1973, especially pp. 57-68) where he offers a much more
complete analysis of the merit and contemporary trends of democracy on
a scale smaller than the nation-state.
6.

This is also known as the notion of workable competition.

7.
The "principle of participation" transfers the notion of justice
as fairness— the idea that principles held in common are both necessary
and advantageous to everyone and that these principles must be designed
from a situation of initial equality where each person is represented
fairly— to the constitution; assuming, of course, that constitutional
democracy is actually capable of satisfying the principle of partici
pation (Rawls, 1971, pp. 221-2).
8.
As cited in Bennett and Bennett (1975), Weiner (1971) would also
include violent or "antisystemie" actions such as riots, assassination,
and armed insurrection.
9.
McClosky (1968) and Weiner (1971) require that political activity
be voluntary; thus excluding such activities as tax paying and military
conscription on the grounds that involuntary activities are not
indicative of the opinions of the polity. For a much more detailed
discussion of the meaning of participation and the work of McClosky and
Weiner, see Bennett and Bennett (1975, pp. 158ff).
10.
Thus the general description of liberty would run something like:
"this or that person (or persons) is free (or not free) from
this or that constraint (or set of constraints) to do (or not to do) so
and so" (Rawls, 1971, p. 202).
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11.
Dahl and Lindblom (1953/1976, p. 46) conclude that there is no
such thing as general equality— thus necessitating a distinction of
circumstance.
12.
Lefort undertakes a captivating and thorough analysis of Tocqueville's deduction of freedom from the equality of condition and its
political significance (1988, pp. 183-209).
13.
Although Bobbio is a "socialist," this distinction is essentially
the distinction between democracy in the Western sense and that of
Eastern socialists.
Lindblom also (1977, p. 261) is among the many
others who note this distinction in usage. This distinction is also a
favorite with those who subscribe to the participatory theories of
democracy when they criticize those who believe in more limited
participation see for example Pateman (1970).
14.
This relationship also produces paradoxes for the individual
citizen's behavior. Bobbio (1985/1989, pp. 41-2) sums up this issue
with alacrity when he notes that:
These two processes [that of "state" and that of "civil
society"] are represented by the two aspects of citizen
ship, that of the citizen qua participant and that of the
citizen qua state protected subject, which often conflict
with each other within the same person.
For through
participation the active citizen calls for greater protec
tion from the state and thereby reinforces the very state
which he or she wishes to control.
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PART I I

THEORIES IN DEMOCRACY

No longer is democratic theory centered on the participa
tion of 'the people', on the participation of the ordinary
man, or the prime virtue of a democratic political system
seen as the development of politically relevant and
necessary qualities in the ordinary individual; in the
contemporary theory of democracy it is the participation of
the minority elite that is crucial and the non-participa
tion of the apathetic, ordinary man lacking in the feeling
of political efficacy, that is regarded as the main bulwark
against instability. (Pateman, 1970, p. 104)
Pluralism exists in a society to the extent that there
exist a number of different organizations through which
control is exerted and over which no unified body of
leaders exerts control. (Dahl & Lindblom, 1953/1976, p.
302)
The complex social process we call polyarchy— the realworld approximation of democracy. (Dahl & Lindblom,
1953/1976, p. 43)
The theory of polyarchy, an inadequate, incomplete,
primitive ordering of the common store of knowledge about
democracy, is formulated in the conviction that somewhere
between chaos and tautology we shall be able sometime to
construct a satisfactory theory about political equality.
(Dahl, 1956, p. 84)
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CHAPTER V I I I

PARTICIPATORY THEORY

Contemporary participatory theory in Western democracies derives
essentially from the bifurcation of traditional democratic theory.*
Given the commonality of background, the two schools exist not as
opposites, but rather as philosophies of degree.

It is understood that

the schools, hereafter referred to as revisionist and participationist,
also share a common belief in the desirability of democracy per se.
The primary issue that brings them into conflict is whether democracy
is augmented or impaired by an

increase in popular participation.

A

secondary issue develops over the relative value and applicability of
normative verses empirical theory.
The fervor over the implications for democracy of high rates of
participation or apathy (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954; Dahl,
1966; Lipset, 1959/1981; Walker, 1966) is more than three decades old,
but its salience has not diminished with time.

In fact, today the

gravity of the implications of the participation issue have stimulated
previously complacent mainstream scholars to move and speak-out in a
progressively more radical manner. At the same time democratic society
at large has become more complacent and more conservative.
In the dispute between the revisionist and the participationist
positions, it is not the accumulated empirical evidence (upon which
revisionism relies heavily) that is in contention; rather, it is the
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interpretation drawn from that evidence that is contentious. The crux
of the democratic debate over participation lies in the interpretation
of the evidence.

"These interpretations rest ... on the respective

views of the nature of man and politics" (Keim, 1975, p. 7).
The trend which developed in democracy emphasized equal and
direct participation not merely for the purpose of self-protection (as
with the revisionist theory) or even seIf-advancement.

The motive

stems from the Radical or Rousseauist tradition (Pateman, 1970, pp.
22ff) which asserts that only in doing so, can the individual be an
autonomous human being (See also Bachrach, 1967, 1975, p. 39).
Today the revisionist position has supplanted the traditional
position to the point that "the widely accepted theory of democracy (so
widely accepted that one might call it the orthodox doctrine) is one in
which the concept of participation has only a most minimal role"
(Pateman, 1970, p. 1).

Keim (1990, p. 3) speaks for many when he calls

"democratic revisionism ... the new democratic orthodoxy."

However

correct Pateman's critical assessment of the prevailing orthodoxy is,
it tends to excessively diminish through ambiguity the actual role of
participation in the revisionist scheme.

The revisionist position

maintains that the ordinary citizen must have an opportunity to
participate in political activity for those occasions when he is
strongly opinionated about some matter.

By maintaining this reserve of

influence, the governing body is forced to act in accordance with, and
be responsive to, the interests and desires of the demos.

This system

is portrayed as being better than that of widespread participation
because the business of government is left in the hands of a highly
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capable albeit small portion of the populace who are still beholden to
the final control of the demos.
Notions of participatory democracy often conjure images of small
communities holding town-meetings to decide community wide decisions.
There is a sense of the community being directly involved in the
decision-making process that will affect it.

In a narrow sense

"participatory democracy connotes decentralization of power for direct
involvement of amateurs in authoritative decision-making" (Cook &
Morgan, 1971, p. 4).

Thematic Positions

Revisionists

Schumpeter

The term "revisionist" is used in reference to the work of
Schumpeter to denote a perspective that does not subscribe to various
aspects of the "classical theory of democracy" and seeks to revise or
alter these aspects as necessary to achieve a more reasonable or
realistic theory of democracy in the modern state.

The work of

Schumpeter in this area is considered of profound significance in
democratic theory because he essentially effected an alteration in the
direction of democracy theory.
Schumpeter asserted that the "classical theory of democracy" was
based on a number of assumptions that were both unrealistic and
unreasonable.

Perhaps missing the mark slightly, Bachrach (1967, p.

18) asserts that Schumpeter leveled his "main attack" against the
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ideological concept of democracy— that democracy is comprised of both
means and ends.

Rather Schumpeter asserted that the separation of

ideal and method was "the starting point of any attempt at defining it
[democracy]" (1942/1976, p. 242).

Indeed, Schumpeter did wish to

separate ideal from method (as Dahl and Lindblom later did with the
distinction of polyarchy and democracy). The function of democracy is
separated from being an ideal or end in itself.

In this context

"democracy is a political method, that is to say, a certain type of
institutional arrangement for arriving at political— legislative and
administrative— decisions and hence being incapable of being an end
itself" (Schumpeter, 1942/1976, p. 242).

Second, Schumpeter showed

that the collective notions of "common good" and "the will of the
people" are myths.

These notions cannot exist because the citizens of

a community face "irreducible differences of ultimate values which
compromise would only maim and degrade" (Schumpeter, 1942/1976, p.
251).

Next, he sought to debunk the notion "that 'the people1 hold a

definite and rational opinion about every individual question and that
they give effect to this opinion— in democracy— by choosing 'represent
atives' who will see to it that opinion is carried out" (Schumpeter,
1942/1976, p. 269).

Finally, as an alternative to the prevailing

notion of government by the people, he proposed to substitute govern
ment elected or approved by the people from among competing elites.
Hence for Schumpeter the democratic method was defined as "that
institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which
individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive
struggle for the peoples vote" (1942/1976, p. 269).
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Dahl

The work of Dahl, "whose influence ranks with that of Schumpeter"
(Graham, 1986, p. 127), takes a rather different route, but comes to a
similar conclusion.

Today "the writings of Robert Dahl constitute the

locus classicus of democratic revisionism" (Keim, 1975, p. 3).
The issue first breached by Schumpeter which seeks to explain—
and subsequently to justify— the limited political activity of the
average citizen is crucial to the revisionist position.

Dahl also

pursues this issue, although he undertakes a much more strenuous
exploration into the matter than Schumpeter did.

Initially Dahl

separates civic man ("homo civic us") from political man ( "homo
politicus") finding that "homo civicus is not by nature, a political
animal" (Dahl, 1961, p. 225).

And as to those few individuals who are

politically minded "not much can be said with confidence about the
factors which shape homo politicus out of the apolitical clay of homo
civicus" (Dahl, 1961, p. 225).

Dahl later concludes (1963, pp. 59-60)

that "obviously man is not instinctively a political animal" and
additionally, "man is not by instinct a reasonable, reasoning civicminded being."

Rather, man is driven by basic biological and physio

logical motives that define his behavior even on those rare occasions
that he is forced (because of last resort) to step into the political
arena.

According to this view, political involvement is undertaken

only by necessity, and only to achieve instinctual gratification
("reward”) of primordial needs.

Once the goal inspiring political

involvement has been attained, Dahl's citizen returns to the civic
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arena.

Dahl, with substantial reservations, recognizes some of the

force of Schumpeter's argument which is itself built upon the work of
such thinkers as G. Mosca and R. Michels.

Participationists

Pateman

Pateman contends that Schumpeter and the revisionist position
have misinterpreted the intent of the "classical" theorists on the
topic of participation.

She reinterprets most notably the works of

Rousseau and J.S. Mill to establish a case for the legitimacy of
widespread popular participation.
For Pateman "the theory of participatory democracy is built round
[sic] the central assertion that individuals and their institutions
cannot be considered in isolation from one another" (Pateman, 1970, p.
42).

The contemporary limitation of democratic participation to

essentially just a choice of leadership is not democratic.

Hence the

reliance on representative institutions, even at the national level, is
"not sufficient for democracy."

In contradistinction to the revision

ist interpretation of the empirical findings on participation rates,
Pateman asserts that if society seeks the responsible participation of
individuals at the national level,

then individuals must be given

"social training" in other areas so that "the necessary individual
attitudes and psychological qualities can be developed" (Pateman, 1970,
p. 42).

It is through the process of participation itself that the
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individual receives the social training leading to development of the
democratic man.
The ability to make participation viable beyond the level of
representation, is dependent upon the democratization of industrial
authority.

This is to be achieved by not only consulting the worker,

but by placing them at the policy-making level.

Bachrach

Bachrach asserts that "democratic theory, especially classical
democratic theory, conceives the public interest in terms of both
results and process" (1967, p. 3).

In doing so, revisionism has

contributed to a widespread feeling of powerlessness by revising
democratic theory to exclude any stress upon the value of political
involvement as a method of achieving command over one's life.
Bachrach is fully cognizant of the implications of scale and
complexity in contemporary government, and he is willing to acquiesce
"that major policies will be made by a relatively small number of
activists and experts" (1967, p. 95).

Despite the impossibility of

realizing true government by the people, Bachrach believes that it is
still possible to have widespread public participation.

By extending

the scope of the political realm to cover "private governments," such
as corporations, labor unions then popular participation (and control)
could be extended to a much greater percentage of society (1967, p. 6).
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Themes of Participation

Schumpeter and Dahl both engage the issue of participation by
juxtaposing the empirical data on the contemporary political behavior
of the demos with the presumed requisites of classical theory. From
this exercise, they conclude that the expectations of classical
democratic theory vis-a-vis participation is un-realistic or undesir
able and must be revised to reflect contemporary conditions.
The foundation of the revisionist school devolves largely from
the work of Schumpeter,
position.

with Dahl developing and extending the

Revisionists characteristically assert that widespread

participation in the creation of public policy is not a requisite of
•
• 3
democracy. This contention is based on empirical
studies
that

purportedly show that the majority of citizens in contemporary
democracies are politically apathetic, ignorant, and inactive.

Worse

yet, charge the participationists, the revisionists' attitudes and
beliefs toward dissent and contrary opinion make them basically opposed
to democracy.

On the other hand the existence of an elite group which

is politically concerned, active, and tolerant cannot be overlooked.
Assuming the substantive veracity of this elite group model, the
revisionists believe that the tenets of classical democracy should be
modified to reflect the realities of contemporary democracy under the
leadership of a representative elite.
The participationists rally around essentially two points.
First, they contend that widespread popular participation (especially
as opposed to elite participation) is both necessary and desirable for
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the existence of democracy.

Second, is the contention that low levels

of political interest and political participation are the result of
political structures and processes which have neither the incentive nor
the capacity to provide adequate opportunity for participation.

In

this sense the participationists are critical of contemporary society
which they find to be too loosely based on the theory of representative
government and biased against popular participation.

Visions of Classical Theory

In the most simplistic way, democracy in the traditional (and
classical) Western sense means rule b£ the people.

"In its origin ...

'democracy' meant what we know as 'direct democracy"' (Pennock, 1975a,
p. xiii).

When democracy is taken to mean rule by the people, it

carries within it at least some sense of the implication that the
citizens should play an active role in the governing process (Sartori,
1962, p. 90).

"To have democracy we must have, to some degree, a

government of the people; but we also know that if there is a govern
ment, it has to be a government over the people" (Sartori, 1962, p.
73).

Within this context, the people must take part in the activity of

ruling— to participate in, as it were, the activity of ruling least the
role of governing be entirely forsaken for the role of governed.

Thus,

"at the heart of traditional democracy theory is the vision of the
average citizen participating actively in government, at least in the
process of setting its policies, but this vision is nowhere fulfilled
in any of the Western democracies" (Smith, 1975, p. 127; see also
Berelson et al., 1954, pp. 307-12).
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Classical Theory and the Revisionist Vision

The revisionists generally attribute to classical theory the
requirements that the "citizens of a democracy polity to be politically
interested, informed, and active" (Osbun, 1985, p. 11).

Moreover, this

"citizen political behavior was to be rationally motivated, that is,
action was to be consistent with well informed and well considered
opinions on public issues (Osbun, 1985, p. 11).

On these grounds the

revisionists assert that the role of the average individual has war
ranted a revision of the classical theory of democracy.

The individual

is found to be uninterested and incapable of actively participating in
government and is therefore presumed to benefit from delegating their
interests to elected representatives who compete for office.

For the

revisionists classical theory has failed to correctly assess citizen
interest and capability, which has led to expectations of popular
participation that are unrealistic.

Classical theory is also often

perceived to require the direct participation of the demos in the
making of public policy decisions— something clearly not viable on the
scale of the

nation-state.

Additionally, participation cannot be

required of the otherwise inert masses least freedom be diverted.
Hence for the revisionists, the unrealistic expectation of participa
tion in classical theory of democracy is replaced with an expectation
geared more to reality— where participation is largely reduced to the
election of representation and the selection of alternate sets of
competing leaders.

The revisionist embrace of the limitation of

popular participation is based on the belief that the stability (and
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perhaps even durability) of the system will be strengthened by
restricting public policy decisions to those most qualified while
simultaneously allowing the average citizen to feel that they are still
involved in the public political process.

"The involvement of

individuals in politics through group association gives most citizens
a stake in the society and helps to generate the loyalties needed to
maintain a stable regime with a minimum of coercion" (Connolly, 1969,
p. 4).

To this end, revisionists propose that the emphasis of clas

sical democracy should be reversed to place attach significance to the
selection of leaders through open and competitive elections, while the
deciding of public issues by the electorate is relegated to a secondary
position of significance.
Interestingly the revisionist position appears to have achieved
a notable internal consensus on what classical democratic theory
required from its citizens? although there is no precise indication of
which classical theory or theorists have been cited (Pateman, 1970, p.
17; Walker, 1966, p. 285).
Finally the revisionists assert that the fulfillment of the
ideals of classical democracy theory vis-a-vis participation are un
necessary is illustrated in the very fact that contemporary democracy
works, and works fairly well (Berelson et al., 1954, p. 312; Dahl,
1956, pp. 150-1; Milbrath, 1965, p. 143) without fulfilling the ideal
specifications of widespread popular participation.

Since democracy

appears viable without fulfilling the classical requisite of popular
participation, the revisionists conclude that the contemporary con
ception of democracy, which posits primary emphasis on the vesting of
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political decision-making power with the electorate and only secondari
ly chooses representatives to carry out the "opinions" of the people,
need not remain bound with traditional conceptions of popular partici
pation (Schumpeter, 1942/1976, p. 269).

Thus, in the revisionists

view, "the role of the people is to produce a government" (Schumpeter,
1942/1976, p. 229).

And the democratic method becomes "that institu

tional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which
individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive
struggle for the people's vote" (Schumpeter, 1942/1976, p. 269).

Classical Theory and the Participationists Vision

There is the perception within the participatory fold that the
prescriptions of classical democratic theory are both reasonable and
recognizable in contemporary democracy.

Their interpretation of

classical democracy leads them to believe that democracy requires the
widespread participation by the average citizen in the public policy
making process. Instead of proposing "revision" of the notion of the
requirements of participation contained with classical democracy— as
per the revisionists— they advocate that revision occur in the polit
ical structures and processes so that widespread and informed citizen
participation will be encouraged.

As an added bonus, participation

will contribute to an increase in the quality of life because of the
opportunities afforded in human development.
The participationists, on the other hand, assert that any lack of
interest or ability is the result of systemic failings.

They allege

that better education of the demos coupled with the invaluable experi
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ence of first hand participation will enable the demos to fulfill their
traditional role. For the participationists the role of the individual
is directly at odds with the prevailing system of competitive represen
tation.
In participatory theory, the failing of traditional democratic
theories emanates from the lack of provision of mechanisms which
provide for participatory behavior in the contemporary setting.

The

fact that citizens are disinterested or uninformed of public policy
issues derives from the lack of developing and instituting an effective
means of transmitting information.

These deficiencies can be allevi

ated through the provision of better, more open, structures— education,
communications, and self-representation— on which participation is
built upon.

The Purpose of Participation

Among political theorists it is seldom disputed that political
participation is included as a necessary but not sufficient feature of
democracy, and possibly even a tenet of democracy.

However, this

seemingly innocuous assertion opens way to a rather heated debate over
whether participation is essential to democracy or essential only to
its justification.

The issue of participation revolves around what

place (function) it is to assume in any viable contemporary theory of
democracy (Pateman, 1970, p. 1; Keim, 1975, p. 1).

"A major obstacle

to any rational discussion of participation is the ambiguity the
subject matter breeds.

To some, participation means choosing leaders,’

to others, it means actually deciding policy" (Keim, 1975, p. 2).
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Developing tangentially with the question of function is the vexing
question of whether traditionally prescribed levels of participation
are still necessary, desirable, or even compatible in the contemporary
context of democracy.
The revisionist position has drawn considerable criticism for its
embrace of the participatory apathy of the demos.^

In the first place,

the revisionists are accused of intentionally contributing to political
stasis. This claim is made on the grounds that their perspective of
participation is a justification and safeguard of the

existent polit

ical status quo; and, that they intentionally discourage review of the
merits of widespread participation relative to citizen apathy through
the suppression of inarticulate and unfulfilled desires or interests.
Next, the critics of revisionism assert that revisionism is too narrow
in its pursuit of political arrangements which are efficient and
stable; that is, the revisionist outlook is criticized as being unrealistically utilitarian in orientation.

The revisionists are found

to largely ignore the normative considerations of justice and human
development.

"Moral development, so it is argued, requires that a man

look beyond his private interests and have some vision of the common
good; and it is held that participation in some level of government is
indispensable to this process" (Smith, 1975, p. 127).

Additionally,

participation in government is thought to promote the self-esteem of
citizens, help-them to safeguard their interests, and to help them
develop interests and abilities previously not known.

It is this

narrowness of perspective that prompts Keim to conclude that the re
visionists goal of participation centers on "the limited protection of
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interests, defined primarily in terms of the gratifications of one's
private life" (1975, p. 7).
In revisionist theory, the representation of interests is the
primary function of participation.

Given Dahl's view that man is a

"creature of imperious desires" who must occasionally resort to polit
ical means to gratify his biological and physiological needs, the
purpose of political participation is to maximize these interests. In
this utilitarian scheme, all political actors whether individuals or
groups of individuals are seen as utility seekers.

Keim (1975) thus

finds the function of participation to operate for revisionists as a
"self-protection" mechanism.

Hence a crucial ingredient in the

contemporary American democratic political system is a process whereby
"all active and legitimate groups in the population can make themselves
heard at some crucial stage in the process of decision" (Dahl, 1956, p.
137).

Utilitarian Perspectives

Mayo (1960) has suggested that in the adherence to Schumpeter's
lead, contemporary (revisionist) theory holds that "democracy has no
overriding purpose to promote.

By excluding the infinite and intangi

ble normative values democracy becomes a "method for choosing leaders
or rulers" (Mayo, 1962, p. 557) and thus much more accessible to scien
tific definition and similar economic concepts.
Bachrach (1967, p. 22) asserts that contemporary democratic
theorists are receptive to Schumpeter's view of democracy because they
desire an "end of ideology" so that they can confine democracy "to
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reaching decisions on concrete issues while at

the same time keeping

the future open [for further revision]."
Bachrach maintains that without Schumpeter making the distinction
of ideal and method "it is doubtful that elitism and democracy could
have developed as they have into a congenial and close relationship"
(1967, p. 19).

Normative Perspectives

Keim (1975) finds there to be several distinct orientations of
participatory theory.

The first type of participationism finds its

basis in terms of "self-rule" and is exemplified by the work of
Bachrach and Pateman.

c

While the second type is characterized by two

versions of "self-realization."

The versions of self-realization are

only briefly described for reference, as their proximity to Marxist
(socialist) ideology and generally unsubstantiated ideological premises
are beyond the limited scope of this paper.

The Role of the Individual

In contemporary Western democracies it is commonplace to have
highly limited citizen participation in the process of government
(especially if what constitutes participation is not broadly defined).
On the average, citizens have virtually no influence in national
affairs and they have little more influence in setting the politics of
state and local governments to which they are subject— despite having
greater access and opportunity.
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The revisionists hold a rather nominal position for the indi
vidual.

For example, the individual is not expected to be constantly

engaged in political activity; rather, homo civicus is expected to
mobilize his resources of influence and enter to political arena only
when he is motivated to do so.

Contained within this vision is the

notion that homo civicus possesses a store of potential influence that
can be used to pressure political activists anytime their performance
becomes unsatisfactory. The system's key mechanism for popular control
over political leaders is the threat of potential influence.

Simulta

neously, the use of potential power/influence also indicates the degree
of salience individual issues hold among the public at large— where
inertia signifies contentment and involvement signifies discontent.
The notion of potential power is based on the assumption that politics
is an

instrumental activity; that is, "homo civicus will participate

if and only if politics will serve him as a means of achieving goals
otherwise unobtainable by more direct means" (Keim, 1975, p. 6).
Revisionism has shown that direct involvement by the polity in
the decision-making is not a necessary element in democratic theory.
Rather, in revisionist theory it is the task of the citizen to assess
the performance of the regime and to register preferences about regime
policy.

In general, these tasks are accomplished by an indirect method

where representatives actually make decisions and citizens judge them
after the fact.
In a rather Millsian way, participationists hold that the
traditional democratic theory found widespread participation desirable
as a prerequisite for the improvement of mankind.

Considerations of
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efficiency and stability— while desirable— are not the paramount
consideration in democracy.

Thus, the contention by revisionists of

the prima facia desirability of certain results of citizen apathy—
e.g., stability and efficiency— is hardly contested by participa
tionists.

Rather, they counter that social justice and the self-

realization of the citizenry is more intrinsically desirable than the
utilitarian concerns of stability and efficiency.

Their position is

particularly weak in that they have not been able to prove, other than
in small scale examples,^ that such benefits might accrue as the result
of widespread participation.

Levels of Participation

The revisionists' position on the role of intense popular
participation in the public decisions of the democratic state is that
it is neither necessary nor desirable for democracy.

Some proponents

of revisionism have argued that widespread popular participation poses
a significant threat to the stability of modern democratic systems
(Milbrath, 1965).

Democracy, it is claimed, would be affected by

widespread participation to the point that it "would be rendered so
inefficient, powerless, or unstable that it could not carry out its
ordinary and necessary functions, or could not carry them out well"
(Smith, 1975, p. 131).

The revisionists' angst of the participa

tionists' position is largely due to what they see as the unbridled
expansion of politics into private social areas of democratic life. "A
permeation of politics into all aspects of life is antithetical to the
basic principle of limited government in a constitutional democracy"
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(Milbrath, 1965, p. 147).

The original revisionist perspective that

"high participation levels would actually be detrimental to society if
they tended to politicize a large percentage of social relationships"
(Milbrath, 1965, p. 153) has with considerable qualification moderated
significantly of late (see among others Dahl, 1984, 1985).

Apathy

A number of political theorists, beginning with Schumpeter, have
accepted and embraced, the inactivity of the demos as an asset rather
than treated it as a liability. Their position— here labeled revision
ist— is based on the premise that widespread participation would occur
at the detriment of the democratic process:
Decision making would be unwieldy and inefficient because
of the number to be heeded and persuaded; since most
citizens lack the specialized knowledge needed to govern
competently, the decisions reached would frequently be
defective; political passions would run high, thus ham
pering government and perhaps rendering it unstable; and,
finally, much time would be lost in political activity that
could better be spent in other ways. (Smith, 1975, p. 127)

Education

Both revisionists and participationists subscribe to the notion
that individuals should receive some kind of training in democratic
process (Pateman, 1970, p. 45).

However, where the revisionists are

skeptical and leery, the participationists are much more articulate and
speculative about what level such training should occur.
Much of the participatory argument revolves around the notion of
educating of the demos so that they can develope the skills is
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essential to democracy.

Based on her contentions about the role of

education in the work of Rousseau and J.S. Mill^ "the major function
of participation in the theory of participatory democracy is ... an
educative one, educative in the very widest sense, including both the
psychological aspect and the gaining of practice in democratic skills
and procedures" (Pateman, 1970, p. 42).
For Pateman (1970) the locus of this educational experience is to
be the work-place ("industry").

"Industry occupies a vitally important

place in the theory of participatory democracy, that is sufficient to
establish the validity, or otherwise of the notion of a participatory
society" (Pateman, 1970, p. 108).

For Gutman (1987) the work-place

should be supplanted by the schools as the most important training
ground for democracy.

By Gutman's assessment, schools are most

desirable because they begin to shape the individual very early in life
and are impactive on a much broader spectrum than other available
alternatives. More importantly she asserts, people who are educated in
democratic values and procedures are more apt to participate and have
O

a greater chance of benefitting from democracy in the work place.

Community

Barber (1984) proposes participatory democracy at the community
level (as opposed to the education or work-place level).

It is his

proposal to create a community of self-governing citizens who are more
bound together by civic education than mere homogeneous interest. His
envisioned community is "made capable or common purpose and mutual
action by virtue of the civic attitudes and participatory institutions
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rather than their altruism of their good nature" (Barber, 1984, p.
117).

Work-Place

Dahl (1984, 1985) is deeply troubled by the low quality and
quantity of participation.

Faced with the specter of "industrial

democracy," he has moved with qualification to consider participation
in the work-place— that is, work-place democracy.

His position is

based on objections to property rights and the inefficiencies of
industrial democracy, and although he is aware of multiple pitfalls of
work-place democracy— just one of which is inefficiency— he suggests
that perhaps the benefits will offset the losses.

Ultimately, Dahl

perceives the issue to be a question of whether rights to freedom and
equality or right to property and the pursuit of wealth are to be
granted primacy.

If the former is to be achieved, the qualified resort

to the economic arena— in this case the work-place— would appear to at
least partially offer the means. While the latter option is what our
current system offers.
The participationists claim that the revisionists view of
participation limits popular participation to a choice between
alternate sets of leaders.
from two perspectives:

They are critical of this stance primarily

First, freedom or free choice is not possible

given the current structure of society and; second, the fulfillment of
human development potential is blocked by the lack of freedom/free
choice.
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The participationists contend that the limited participation
offered by the revisionists is "more symbolic than substantive" (Osbun,
1985, p. vi) and is perceived as merely being a way to disarm and
manipulate the polity to insure the continuity of existing political
and social systems which in fact posits policy-making decisions with a
political elite.

Thus the revisionists' solution to the issue of

participation is deemed as constituting "a denial of the human right to
self-determination" (Osbun, 1985, p. vii).
Conversely, Milbrath (1965, p. 142) suggests that it is simply
common folklore that makes Americans believe that decisions made by all
the people are "better" than decisions made by only some of the people.
The average American operates under the premise that "when only part of
the people participate, the government is likely to be directed so as
to violate the interests of the nonparticipators" (Milbrath, 1965, p.
142).

Accumulated empirical evidence indicates, Milbrath continues,

that "despite the low level of political interest and activity, demo
cratic governments continue to flourish and provide reasonably satis
factory governance for the citizens" (1965, p. 143; see also Berelson
et al., 1954, p. 312; Dahl, 1956, pp. 150-1).
Ultimately, there is nothing to suggest that participation in
government will yield the

attainment of individual interests.

"Participation in government is neither necessary nor sufficient for
being able to secure one's interests, although it is often a useful
tool for so doing" (Smith, 1975, p. 130).

It has been suggested that

widespread participation at a level more significant than voting would
in all likelihood reduce the utility of participation to the point
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where it is reasonable to suspect that no one's interests would be
adequately met (Smith, 1975, p. 130).

The revisionist position which

finds danger as the result of widespread participation in government,
emerges largely unscathed by the participationists' criticism— not
because of the strength of their position, but because the participa
tionists have yet to provide evidence to support their position. As it
stands now the participationists position is little more than wistful
speculation and supposition.

Conversely, participationists do have a

legitimate stake in the claim that the revisionists' assessment of the
ramifications of widespread participation remains rather dubious.
Pateman would also counter that the revisionists do not have a unique
grasp of systemic stability.

"There is no special problem about the

stability of a participatory system; it is self-sustaining through the
educative impact of the participatory process.

Participation develops

and fosters the very qualities necessary for it" (Pateman, 1970, p.
43).

In fact the "subsidiary hypotheses" that participation has an

integrative effect and that it promotes the acceptance of collective
decisions is at least as germane to the participationist position as it
is to the revisionist position.
It is difficult "to deny that more political participation may
both be entirely possible and highly desirable" (Pennock, 1975a, p.
xvii).

Unfortunately the participatory theory seems to contain within

itself a number of contradictions which render it impotent. As Pennock
(1975a, p. xvii) points out:

"most principles carried to their logical

conclusions encounter difficulties, and this one [participationism] is
no exception."

The salient caveat though, is how far a principle may
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be carried before it encounters the difficulties that render it
impotent.

In the end the revisionist position reigns, not so much

because of its positive contributions, but by its more limited contra
dictions. By building from this more viable foundation, participation
ists may find slower realization, but in return they may sidestep many
of their irretrievable contradictions and progress beyond their
struggle to achieve a community of active equals.
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CHAPTER IX

PLURALIST THEORY

"Pluralism has long provided the dominant description and ideal
of American politics" (Connolly, 1969, p. 3).

In the descriptive sense

it portrays the overlapping balance of power among the various
economic, religious, ethnic, and geographical groupings who all have a
"voice in the shaping of socially binding decisions" (Connolly, 1969,
p. 3).

Pluralism in the ideal sense is desirable not so much because

of any specialized function it performs, but rather because of its
general function it is perceived as the most effective mechanism for
promoting worthy public and private ends.
The participatory involvement of the individual in group activity
"enables him to develop the language, deliberative powers, and sense of
purpose which make up a fully developed personality" (Connolly, 1969,
p. 4).

Furthermore, should a path of interest be blocked by some

government or social entity, the variety of groups open and available
to the individual serves to promote a diversity of experience and
interests which enables them to make contact with alternative centers
of power.
As previously noted by Connolly (1969), social stability is
enhanced by the low level participation of the demos which develops
feelings of "stake" and loyalty.

Long-term stability is further

promoted because the distribution (balance) of power among the various
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groups in society tends to be reflected in the public policy outcomes,
while at the same time the system is still open to innovation and
change. New groups— created as the result of some political, economic,
or social change— can express new opinions and interests which are
gradually assimilated in the balancing process to

become one of the

standing variables which shape future political conflict and issue
resolution.
Pluralist theory is based on the notion that "no single group can
control the shifting sentiments and forces which emerge in times of
stress" (Connolly, 1969, p. 29) but at the same time the input of
individuals and groups can effect systemic change (See especially Dahl,
1956, p. 145; 1967, p. 38).
Democratic pluralism is predicated on two major assumptions.
First it assumes "that most men acquire firmly identifiable political
interests in their social organizational involvement, and that their
expectations, as well as their fulfillments and frustrations, are
transferable from the social to the political realm" (Bachrach, 1975,
p. 41).

The second assumption follows the work of Dahl (especially

1956) and many others, and devolves from the premise "that the American
political system is essentially an open one— that political demands,
spearheaded by legitimate groups, are convertible into issues that are
seriously considered in an appropriate decision-making arena" (Bach
rach, 1975, p. 45).
Within contemporary pluralist theory Connolly (1969, p. 8) dis
tinguishes two broad "types" of pluralist interpretations.

The first

type is most prevalent among political theorists and views government
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as being the arena where major group conflicts are both debated and
resolved.

While the second type is more prevalent among economists and

sociologists and views major social associations such as organized
labor and big business as being involved in a balancing process which
takes place primarily outside the realm of government, with government
acting less as a participant and more as an umpire.
The emphasis of this section will be on the arena version of
pluralism.

In particular Dahl's work is credited as being "the most

precise and persuasive interpretation" (Connolly, 1969, p. 9) of this
version of pluralism.

In this context Dahl originally finds that

government is "the" crucial forum for any study of power; to wit:
Government is the most crucial organization. ... Government
is crucial because its controls are relatively powerful.
In a wide variety of situations, in a contest between
governmental controls and other controls, the governmental
controls will probably prove more decisive than competing
controls. ... It is reasonable to assume that in a wide
variety of situations whoever controls governmental
decisions will have significantly greater control over
policy than individuals who do not control governmental
decisions. (Dahl, 1956, pp. 48-49)

In the 1976 preface to Politics Economics and Welfare. Dahl (with
Lindblom) revises his position on the relationship of government vis-avis the study of social power.

Dahl's new conclusion is that in 1953,

he and Lindblom had underestimated the formative influence of the great
corporations upon government.

This preponderance of influence has

significantly affected the autonomy of government in the application of
power.
The theory of democratic pluralism represents a radical break
with classical monistic democratic ideal.

It is the notion of plu
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ralism as a desirable aspect of democracy that breaks with classical
democratic ideals.

Although Rousseau recognized that pluralism in

democracy was perhaps inherent and perhaps unavoidable, he was
suspicious of it and considered it quite undesirable.

From classical

Athens to Rousseau "the prevalent view that citizens body should be
fairly homogenous in race, ethnicity, religion, language, status,
wealth, and knowledge" (Dahl, 1986, p. 235).

For more than two

millennia the monist view of democratic theory found the notion of
conflicting interests anathema.

Diversity and group identity was to be

avoided least it subvert or destroy the demos perception of having
common interests and goals.

Thus diversity— -with the notion that

subgroups might pursue their own special interests— was beseeched in
pursuit of the ideal of a common good.
Whereas pluralism can and does occur in every system— it can
occur with vigor and proliferation only in those systems that are
reasonably proficient at fulfilling the conditions of polyarchy (Dahl,
1956, p. 84).

Ultimately Dahl finds that all democratic countries are

pluralist democracies because in all democratic countries at least some
important organizations are relatively autonomous.

Indeed, circuitous

as it may seem, a country cannot be democratic without a minimum degree
of pluralism.

Thus, "a country is a pluralist democracy if a) it is a

democracy in the sense of polyarchy and b) important organizations are
relatively autonomous" (Dahl, 1982, p. 5).
To appease Hirst and those of his ken, political pluralism as
discussed in this paper is primarily of the American variety— drawing
heavily from the work of R.A. Dahl— and as such is somewhat removed
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from English (Hirst, 1990, p. 10) or European political pluralism.

The

former variety generally refers to "a system of multiple, competing
interest groups which, through bargaining and compromise, contribute to
the shape of public policy.

Power, while not equally distributed,

depends more on commitment and organizing skill, rather than social
position or economic influence" (Zeigler, 1990, p. 40).

Additionally

American pluralism rests more on access while pluralism in the latter
sense is more ideologically sterile.

Pluralism in the european sense

is more a reference to the political process pertaining to the
organization of interest groups, their attempts to influence, and their
ability to survive or die "largely without the participation or concern
or government bureaucracies" (Zeigler, 1990, p. 40).

Thus, unless

otherwise qualified, pluralism as discussed for the duration of this
paper is intentionally oriented toward the American variety.
At the most ecumenical level the theory of "pluralism"— whether
political, economic, or social— is based on the existence and operation
of a diversity of organizations within the boundaries of a particular
nation-state.

Integral to the notion of organizational activity is

that they have some

degree of autonomy with respect to each other, and

with respect to the government of the state.

"Pluralism is best

understood as the belief that advanced industrial democracies,
especially the U.S., generate a system of multiple, competing elites
(including interest groups) which determine public policy through
bargaining and compromise" (Zeigler, 1990, p. 41).

Pluralism is borne

of the actuality of large-scale democracy, and a fundamental tendency
in political life— that is, the natural gravitation of individuals and
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groups of individuals to struggle to gain relative autonomy from
control by others.

Such "struggles for autonomy result from conflicts

and cleavages; when these struggles are successful, as they often are,
they result in turn in tendencies toward pluralism" (Dahl, 1986, p.
244).

At its root, the concept of pluralism is generic.

Of signifi

cance is the recognition that there are varieties of pluralism that
develop as a result of, and are hence related to, specific circum
stance.

Although it is not the intent of this paper to pursue plu

ralism very far beyond the borders of the U.S., it is worth while to
note that the term is no longer limited

to Western democratic theory.

What makes the pluralism of Western democracies discernable from that
of other regimes is the degree to which pluralism is prevalent.

For

the purposes of this discussion non-qualified pluralism is by default
Q

a reference is to political

pluralism— its frequently attendant

implications of social and occasionally economic pluralism are only
secondary, considerations.
In keeping with the dichotomous nature of most political theory,
the genesis of pluralism was as the opposing view of monism.

The

assent of pluralist theory was an outgrowth or the attempt to democra
tize large-scale governments.

It appears that Laski, in his attack on

state sovereignty (1917, 1919) where he developed pluralism as an
alternative to the prevailing monistic view, was furthering and re
fining a concept that already existed and rather accepted.

Certainly

there are hints of pluralism in Madison's work which emphasized the
role of constitutional limitations in the promotion of political
stability and the protection of minority right.

Tocqueville also was
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clearly interested in pluralism— albeit the social preconditions— and
augmented the Madisonian objectives of stability and rights with the
concept of personal development through group association (Connolly,
1969, p. 28).

By the 1920s the notion of the pluralist state was quite

prominent in both the U.S. and

Britain.

After a decade of interest,

pluralism receded into the background of political theory with its
essential ideas intact.

Sometime after Dahl and Lindblom (1953/1976)

used the term in the early 1950s, "pluralist theory" appears to have
come "to designate a strange melange of ideas" (Dahl, 1986, p. 235).
Although pluralism is often used synonymously for "diversity," that is
not the intent here.

For the purposes of this paper, "pluralism" shall

used in its original sense as the opposing view of monism.

Monism Versus Pluralism

It was the shift in scale from city-state to nation-state that
brought about a shift from monistic democracy to pluralistic democracy.
With the shift came a transformation of practices and institutions as
well as a transformation of democratic theory which made organizational
pluralism both inevitable, but more importantly, also legitimate.

In

this sense pluralism was a corrective vision to the prevailing monist
vision and as such was revolutionary in implication.

Taken in their

historical perspective, the ideological divergence of Rousseau and
Tocqueville is exemplary of the large shift in democratic theory.
Rousseau, with his monist background, apprehensively found that
subgroups (organizations) were inevitable.

However, these were "tacit

associations" that arose on a rather spontaneous or short-term basis as

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

101
the liaison of unorganized individuals who were temporarily drawn
together by a common interest.

By nature, tacit associations were of

little threat since the circumstance under which participation occurred
permitted no special advantage to accrue.

For Rousseau "the ideal

situation for decision making was one where no organized groups were
present, just individuals, because the former might be able to make
their 'particular wills' prevail" (Pateman, 1970, p. 24).

Rousseau

felt that ultimately the existence of independent organizations within
the state would nurture a diversity that was detrimental to the general
will and that in a large community their deliberative diversity would
be destructive in the extreme.

Slightly more than two generations

later, Tocqueville had already accepted the idea that it was the large
nation-state that was a fitting center for democracy in modern times.
In keeping with his perspective on the relationship of scale to
democracy, Tocqueville embraced pluralism with some qualification.

He

believed that the "liberty of association" is was necessary to guard
against the "despotism of faction" or the arbitrary application of
power by the state. In Tocqueville's eyes, the independent associations
(organizations) were praiseworthy as the

necessity of "people who

wished to enjoy not only democracy and equality but also liberty and
civilization" (Dahl, 1982, p. 27).

Tocqueville was especially adamant

about the need for "associations" in countries with democratic
constitutions.
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Organizations, Political Autonomy, and Control

Of the myriad types of organizations in modern democratic
systems, the most important— because they are central to autonomy and
control— are the governmental, political, and economic organizations.
Though not necessarily legally seperate, inmost critical respects the
major institutions of government in all democratic countries— the chief
executive, bureaucracies, parliament, the judiciary, or local govern
ments, are to varying degrees all semi-independent of one another.
Another characteristic of modern democratic regimes is the extent of
independence granted to political associations, political parties, and
interest groups to interact in the arena of government.

"What for

centuries was held to be the lethal poison of republics, the spirit of
faction, is in modern democracies institutionalized in parties and
interest groups" (Dahl, 1982, p. 28).

The existence of political

organizations--as well as other types — is possible because the
institutions of polyarchy are structured so that any efforts to destroy
the relative autonomy of the organizations that are formed to contest
the government's conduct would come at a prohibitively high cost (Dahl,
1982, p. 37).

Once the low cost of organization is recognized, the

social impetus for organization increases as citizens become more
conscious of the benefits which accrue from cooperation and from
pooling resources.

Indeed one characteristic of modern society is the

highly developed sense its citizens have of the advantages of organiza
tion (Dahl, 1982, p. 38).

Because of this, organizations are likely to

proliferate in modern countries unless they are restrained or destroyed
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by repression or coercion.

Logically then, independent organizations

will most likely flourish in circumstances of polyarchy— since it is
there that their protection is institutionalized.
Tocqueville and others have argued that organizations (he calls
them associations) are desirable because they are essential to freedom.
In support of his position, there are two primary reasons why rela
tively independent organizations are desirable. First, they contribute
substantially toward the mutual control of a political system by elites
and the masses.

Second, although autonomous organizations are an

inevitable outcome where democratic processes are implemented on a
large scale (as with the modern nation-state), they make large scale
democracy possible.
Independent organizations play a significant role in large
political systems because their existence helps to preclude domination
and to foster mutual control.

The impetus for mutual control in the

government of the state, resides in the fact that the primary alterna
tive to mutual control is hierarchical control.

Hierarchical govern

ment of a system as large as a nation-state begs domination by the
elites in the hierarchy who control the government of the state.

By

diluting the power accumulation of a hierarchical structure, indepen
dent organizations help to curb not only hierarchical impulses, but
also the "inevitable" domination prescribed by Michels's "iron law of
oligarchy."10

Thus pluralism in its support of independent organiza

tions becomes the fundamentally contradictory position to the elitist
and Marxist positions which contend that domination is inevitable. The
elite theorists Pareto, Mosca, and Michels asserted that minority

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

104
dominance is inherent in any large-scale society, whether the minority
is a class or any other elite group.

Unlike the Elitists, the Marxists

do not find

domination to be

they assert

that it is the result of a particular economic type—

specifically capitalism.

an inherent feature of

society,' rather,

It is their contention that bourgeois society

is dominated by necessity by a minority class of (exploitative) cap
italists.

Once capitalism is replaced by socialism, freedom will

supercede the previous domination.
Although both elitism and Marxism correctly emphasize the
tendencies of domination, they generally fail to correctly assess the
drive behind tendencies of political autonomy and mutual control.
Developed to countervail to the extreme of Michels's iron law, Dahl
asserts the

existence of a concurrent law.'

"every organization

develops an

impulse toward its own independence" (1982, p. 33).

Independence can become a viable possibility in that control and
domination require an investment of resources which can exceed the
return from domination.

The preceding circumstance presumes rational

motivation and not emotive (irrational) motivation.

Indeed history

abounds with examples illustrating how individuals have combined their
resources and managed to increase the cost of control to the point that
they overcame domination and acquired at least a degree of political
independence (autonomy).

While domination is not inherent in social

existence and can often be transformed in a system of mutual control,
there are clearly circumstances where "subjects" cannot always break
free of the bonds of domination.
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The all pervasive tendency toward oligarchy— leadership domin
ating membership— always exists; however, the principle of mutual
control offers an effective method to counter it.

Mutual control

though, is no panacea of democratic control and should not be confused
as being an equivalent to equal, equitable, or democratic control.

To

claim that independent organizations promote mutual control and
contribute to the prevention of domination is not a claim "that they
guarantee justice, equality, or democracy" (Dahl, 1982, p. 36).

Thus,

a political system can be pluralist and at the same time still lack
democratic institutions.
The existence of independent or autonomous organizations is more
than a mere consequence of the process of democratizing the government
of the nation-state.

"They are also necessary to the functioning of

the democratic process itself, to minimize government coercion, to
political liberty, and to human well-being" (Dahl, 1982, p. 1).

Con

versely the independence or autonomy necessary for the existence of
independent organizations creates the opportunity that they may
potentially be used to "increase or perpetuate injustice rather than to
reduce it, to foster the narrow egoism of their members at the expense
of concerns for broader public good, and even to weaken or destroy
democracy itself" (Dahl, 1982, p. 1).
Though not the focus of this review, economic organizations are
significant (perhaps even more so than political organizations) because
they increasingly are to be found residing at the locus of autonomy and
control.

In our society the primary economic organizations are

business firms and trade/labor unions.

The autonomy of these organiza
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tions is particularly complicated in that their contributory signifi
cance to democratic processes is rivaled only by their potential for
harm.

The independence that permits the right of collective bargaining

units to strike is seen by many as an essential element in any
democratic scheme.

The act of striking exemplifies the relative

autonomy trade/labor unions have to both employers and to the govern
ment.

The role of business in modern democracy is historically

unparalleled, and with this expanded role (and increased clout) comes
an unparalleled opportunity to bend or destroy democracy.

Both the

traditional and contemporary critics of privately owned and operated
business have argued that the potential for business to harm a
democratic system could be significantly diminished by greater state
control.

However, of recent "more and more advocates of democratic

socialism have concluded that centralized state socialism is likely to
be not only

inefficient but also inhuman and undemocratic as well"

(Dahl, 1982, p. 29).

The current trend seems to seek, and to a degree

find, solution in corporatism; although Bobbio (1984/1987a) , for
example, does not accept corporatism without qualification.

He rejects

corporatism at the national level (and for political representation)
but finds application at a lower level as long as it is limited to the
arena in which the relevant interests normally practice.

Contemporary

corporatists— similar in motive to the socialists before them— seek to
effectively reign in the autonomy of business so as to defuse and
control its capacity for harm.

Unfortunately any further discussion of

corporatism remains beyond the scope of this paper, let it suffice to
note that corporatism exists as an alternative paradigm to that of
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pluralism.

Accompanying organizations as integral components of

pluralist theory are the notions of political autonomy and control.
The relationship of political autonomy and its compliment control
(Dahl, 1982, p. 16) is tightly interwoven into the role of organiza
tions in pluralist democracy.

Political autonomy is based on a rela

tionship between specific entities.
tion is political autonomy dyadic.

Only in its most simple incarna
Further contributing to its

somewhat chimerical nature is that there is no quantitative way to
measure the constantly varying magnitude of influence.

The proviso of

relative autonomy is introduced to separate pluralism from the extremes
where the existence of any organizations with some autonomy qualifies
it (all systems qualify) or the qualification that all important
organizations in a system must be fully independent of all controls (no
systems qualify).

Thus, "an organization is relatively autonomous if

it undertakes actions that (a) are considered harmful by another
organization and that (b) no other organization, including the
government of the state, can prevent, of could prevent except by
incurring costs so high as to exceed the gains to the actor from doing
so" (Dahl, 1982, p. 26).

Control on the other hand, like political

autonomy, always describes a relationship between actors where the
"preferences, desires, or intentions of one or more actors bring about
conforming actions, or predispositions to act, of one or more [other]
actors" (Dahl, 1982, p. 16).

Thus, control is a causal relationship;

that is, one actor stimulates or causes the actions of another actor in
a way which conforms to the preferences of the first actor.

Understood
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in this way, control does not have to be intentional— it may be un
intentional as well.

Conflictive and Organizational Pluralism

In the explanation of pluralist theory Dahl makes an insightful
and useful distinction between types of pluralism.

He finds that there

are two different but related ways that the term is used (1986, p.
244).

First, conflictive pluralism results from the numeric size and

pattern of enduring cleavages that give rise to the conflicts that are
characteristic of a specific group of people.

Second, organizational

pluralism results from the numeric size and relative independence of
the organizations and those conflicts that are characteristic of a
specific group of persons.

Within organizational pluralism there

exists a direct relationship between the components (numeric size and
relative independence) and the result (organizational pluralism), that
is, the greater the number of organizations and the greater their
relative independence, the greater the amount of organizational plu
ralism that will exist.

In that organizational pluralism is often an

outcome affected by conflictive pluralism, the ensuing explanation,
while specifically addressed to organizational pluralism, will also
develop conflictive pluralism in its contributory role.

Causes of Organizational Pluralism

Dahl believes there are four not fully independent factors that
explain the extent to which a country experiences organizational
pluralism:

(1) the amount of latent conflictive pluralism, (2) the
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nature of the socioeconomic order, (3) the nature of the political
regime, and (4) the concrete structure of the political institutions
(1986, p. 246).

Latent Conflict and Cleavage

The latent amount of conflictive pluralism, which results from
the esoteric identifications of a particular subgroup that share some
unique commonality of background, is significantly related to organiza
tional pluralism.

Dahl finds that throughout history there has been a

repeated underestimation of the persistent strength of subculture
identifications "centered around religion, region, ethnic group, race,
language, and failure to foresee the emergence of new identifications
centered around a variety of economic differences that do not fall
nicely along a single prominent cleavage line but rather generate
several or many cleavages" (Dahl, 1986, p. 246).

For Dahl, the various

manifestations of "class" are but one element in a diverse pattern of
cleavages and conflicts that is much more than a diametric relation
ship.

Here too, the traditional interpretations of class have had a

tendency undervalue the fragmentation is induced as a result of
ideological diversity among elites.

Finally, while conflictive

pluralism is prevalent in all regimes, it is with considerable variance
in amount— even among regimes of similar type, and especially in
polyarchies.

It is in this atmosphere that societies as a whole

benefit from pluralism.

"The system of multiple group pressures

provides reasonable assurance that most important problems and
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grievances will be channeled to governmental arenas for debate and
resolution" (Connolly, 1969, p. 4).

Socioeconomic Type

The nature of the socioeconomic order is also related to
organizational pluralism.

Since capitalism is the primary economic

order where polyarchy occurs— and therefore organizational pluralism
flourishes— it might logically be inferred that a high degree of
organizational pluralism is a product of capitalism or the private
ownership of the means of production.

Conversely, it would appear as

if socialism, with its principal means of production socially owned, is
not conducive to organizational pluralism.

While the existence of

organizational pluralism in a socialist economic order is not necessar
ily anathema to Marxism, this is not the issue.

Arguments that

extrapolate from the above relationships commit a two-fold error.
First, they wrongly presume that control of a business enterprise is
automatically (necessarily) conferred by ownership.

Second, they

falsely conclude that "ownership" may be equated to "control."
However, "experience in this century has conclusively demonstrated that
ownership is definitely not a sufficient condition for control" (Dahl,
1986, p. 248).

Given the great variety in forms of "managerial

dominance" that occur with an equally great variety of ownership types
"one cannot even be certain that a particular form of control requires
a particular form of ownership" (Dahl, 1986 p. 248).

In this light, it

becomes evident that whether the economic order is capitalist or
socialist, the crucial ingredient is one of control, not ownership.
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The key factor is how much autonomy (i.e., freedom from internal and
external controls) economic enterprises are permitted to exercise.
Since capitalism need not be highly decentralized just as socialism
need not be highly centralized, the amount of organizational pluralism
in a country is not a factor of what kind of economic order it has, but
rather it is dependent upon the degree to which the decisions affecting
economic enterprises are decentralized (Dahl, 1986, p. 250).

Regime Nature

It is the nature of the regime that plays a significant role in
the extent of organizational pluralism that is permitted to exist.
Where regime nature predisposes it to condone inclusion of opposition
groups as well as to institutionalize a high level of guarantees for
opposition groups— as polyarchies do— the desirable and inevitable
result is extensive organizational pluralism.

Hence it is the insti

tutional guarantees which establish and assert "the right to form and
join organizations, freedom of expression, the right to vote, the right
of political leaders to compete publicly for support, particularly in
elections, the existence of alternative sources of information" (Dahl,
1986, p. 252) which are crucial conditions for the growth of organiza
tions. Political organizations in particular benefit from institution
al guarantees since such guarantees "both heighten the incentive for
forming political organizations and reduce the costs of doing so"
(Dahl, 1986, p. 252).
Finally, it would be wrong to conclude that movement toward or
away from organizational pluralism must necessarily end in either a
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highly polyarchal regime or a highly hegemonic regime.

Certainly a

rather "pluralistic" regime that is not highly "democratic" is a very
real possibility.

From this context "polyarchy” should be viewed as

that which occurs as the diametric opposite of hegemony.

Thus, a

polyarchy is "a regime in which the right to participate is broadly
extended and the institutional guarantees to opposition groups are, ...
comparatively strong and the barriers to opposition groups compara
tively low."

Conversely, a "hegemonic" regime is a regime that has

weak or nonexistent institutional guarantees for opposition groups and
the barriers to those groups are high." Dahl continues on to note that
"indeed one of the most striking differences among regimes in the
modern world is to be found precisely in the extent to which those who
oppose the conduct of the government of the state are permitted to
organize, express themselves, and participate in political life" (1986,
p. 252).

Thus, "organizational pluralism is ordinarily a concomitant,

both as cause and effect, of the liberalization and democratization of
hegemonic regimes" (1982, p. 39; 1986, p. 252).

Institutional Structure

It is the substantive structure of "concrete political institu
tions" which provides the basis for the existence of organizational
pluralism.

In the U.S., for example, organizational pluralism is

guaranteed by extensively decentralizing government authority through
constitutional norms and political practices which use both federalism
and the separation of executive, judicial, and legislative powers.
However, as noted earlier, differences of basic variables (e.g., the
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patterns of conflict and cleavage) from country to country can mean
that significant degrees of organizational pluralism can still exist in
less decentralized regimes.

Britain, for example, is clearly a

polyarchy although the unitary structure of her parliamentary govern
ment— where executive and legislative power are not separated— mean
that her political institutions are at the other extreme of the
decentralized U.S. model.

Thus there is considerable variation in the

patterns of organizational pluralism from country to country.

Pluralism and Incremental Politics

"Incrementalism" is the descriptive name that has developed to
denote how social policy changes occur in a pluralist society.

For

pluralists, social change in the successful polity is characterized by
small incremental changes from a previously established (but not
necessarily permanent) status quo position.

That is to say, "social

oscillation in the pluralist ideal is and ought to occur at a very
narrow range around some point of equilibrium" (Lowi, 1969/1979, p.
38).

It is "a way of 'smuggling' changes into the political system.

Important changes in policy and in the political system often come
about quite indirectly and as a surprise to many of the participants in
the system" (Lindblom, 1979, p. 521).

Considered in the ideal sense,

incrementalism is desirable for a number of reasons.

First, it

provides a basis to systematically explore solutions to complex
problems that are beyond synoptic analysis.

Second, it reduces

political controversy by reducing the size and value of the stakes in
contention.

In this way, incrementalism motivates the losers of a
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political dispute to take their loses in a manner that dampens the
disruption to the political system.

"Small incremental steps do not

upset the democratic applecart; big steps do" (Lindblom, 1979, p. 522).
Third, incrementalism "helps maintain the vague general consensus on
basic values (because no specific policy issue ever centrally poses a
challenge to them) that many people believe is necessary for widespread
voluntary acceptance of democratic government" (Lindblom, 1979, p.
520) . It does this by reducing the degree of change to a point that it
is perceived as being non-threatening to the principal values of any
party.

"Political change must not challenge the fundamental consensus

which exists on the rules of the game and other basic values without
which non-coercive democratic government is impossible" (Lindblom,
1979, p. 522).

Finally, it must be observed that there is nothing

tactically conservative, or slow moving about incrementalism.

"A fast

moving sequence of small changes can more speedily accomplish a drastic
alteration of the status quo than can an only infrequent major policy
change" (Lindblom, 1979, p. 520).

Incremental change is typically the

most expeditious method of political change because incremental steps
do not generate much antagonism, thereby avoiding the paralyzing rifts
caused by drastic policy change.
The inability of the U.S. political system to effectively deal
with major issues is often attributed directly or indirectly to the
practice of incremental politics, when it is in fact tied to the use of
market-oriented systems to perform many of the organizing and coordi
nating of a society.

Lindblom (1979) suggests root causes other than

political incrementalism— to wit, widespread veto power and "governmen
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tal timidity."

It is in the veto power that the market has its

greatest influence over the political system, although the governmental
timidity that leads to incrementalism is largely caused by the
indoctrination of a system anxious to perpetuate thinking conducive to
free-enterprise.
In the U.S. there exists an especially pronounced dispersion of
veto power spread throughout the political system.

Of particular

significance are not those powers which reside in the Constitution and
legislative procedures, but rather those powers which arise from
private property rights— specifically the property rights of busi
nesses.

With the backing of "judicial interpretation" the property

rights of business permit them the "veto of many forms of government
regulation that might otherwise be attempted to cope with our [national
political] problems" (Lindblom, 1979, p. 520).

It is one of the funda

mental characteristics of political systems which occur in consort with
market-oriented systems to assign the vast majority of the organizing
and coordinating duties of society to business organizations.

The

owners and managers of these organizations are then induced to perform
of their own volition in specific ways by the offer of various cher
ished market rewards (inducements).

In this way government coercion

through decree or command, which is non-democratic and is generally
barred in the constitutional rules, is unnecessary.

Hence numerous

policy lines that are attractive to the political system for the
solution of its problems are beyond approach because of the threat they
represent to the privileges (inducements) and privileged position
granted to business to induce its performance.
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Governmental timidity (ideological conservatism) appears to grow
from the multifaceted nature of indoctrination which circulates around
the private enterprise system.

This indoctrination factor makes it

"difficult for many political leaders, and for ordinary citizens as
well, to open their minds to the possibility that the American
Constitution, with its many curbs on the popular will, including the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees to corporations, is not an adequate
set of rules for coping with our current great problems" (Lindblom,
1979, pp. 520-1).
Lowi (1969/1979, p. 38) notes two additional criticisms of
incrementalism.

First, incrementalism presupposes the existence of a

"predefined equilibrium" which fulfills the competing spectra of wants
and needs.

Second, Lowi argues that political equilibrium, like

economic equilibrium, may not occur at an optimal level; it may occur
at a level of participation that is less than acceptable.

Problems of Pluralism

For democratic political systems on the scale of a nation-state,
a plurality of reasonably "independent organizations is necessary not
only for mutual control but also for the democratic process.
on the scale of a country,

Applied

the democratic process in turn makes

relatively independent organizations both possible and inevitable"
(Dahl, 1982, p. 166).

Even though a considerable degree of pluralism

is a necessary and desirable condition for a (large-scale) democratic
regime, "pluralism also creates problems for which no altogether
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satisfactory solution seems yet to have been found" (Dahl, 1986, p.
244).
As has been portrayed, the independent organizations of demo
cratic pluralism have many desirable aspects; however, they also bring
with them a number of inherent problems.

But first it is worth noting

that these same desirable attributes may substantially contribute to
the alleviation of the problems; that is, it is a flexible, open, and
dynamic system capable of making substantive changes where necessary.
It also should be noted that regardless of regime similarity or
difference, arrays of organizational pluralism are significantly
different from one country to another.

Pluralism varies not only in

amount, but also in the degree of inclusion or exclusion; as well as in
the patterns of cleavage and conflict in which organizations subse
quently participate.

Interestingly, "some degree of organizational

pluralism is a necessary condition for polyarchy and a fairly high
degree of organizational pluralism appears to be a consequence of the
institutional guarantees and exclusiveness [or inclusiveness] of
polyarchy" (Dahl, 1986, p. 253).

However, there is not a particular or

specific array or amount of organizational pluralism that is essential
to maintain polyarchy.

Organizational pluralism is a rather dynamic

reactive occurrence, and it may change freely without losing the
condition of polyarchy.

Since the undesirable aspects of organiza

tional pluralism may be changed, pluralism offers at least the
possibility of achieving better (less undesirable) mixtures.
Occasionally the problems of pluralism are attributed to the less
than democratic nature of the governments that exist— even in those
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countries governed by polyarchy.

In this contest, it is asserted, the

solution is simply to increase democratization.

However, it must be

recognized that this simplistic diagnosis is in fact a very complicated
prescription— for increased "democratization presupposes a democratic
society" (Dahl, 1982, p. 81).

The traditional meaning of democratiza

tion is based on reducing political inequalities through the redistri
bution and decentralization of political resources.

If it is recog

nized that it was the democratization of authoritarian monarchies which
led to polyarchy, then logically it must be necessary to continue the
process by democratizing polyarchies. An increase in democratization
would yield policies which articulate majority preferences and in
terests rather than the narrow interests of special interest groups.
Given the scenario of increased democratization, the expectation is
that organizations would then respond more efficiently to the general
interests of their membership rather than the current practice which
traces organizational responsiveness only to small oligarchies at the
top.

Ultimately, to achieve greater democratization in the political

arena, social and economic structures too would have to be changed to
give a more equal distribution of political resources.
However appealing the case for increased equality of political
resource distribution may be, it is fraught with procedural questions
that make it appear all but elusive.

For example, how is the political

equality of individual citizens to be reconciled with inequality among
organizations.

And what demos is to have the final control of the

agenda for what affairs (Dahl, 1982, p. 82).

Probably the most

commonly addressed dilemmas of democratic organizational pluralism
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revolves around the barrier posed by the existence of a permanent
majority.

There are two not mutually exclusive solutions to the

problem of minority unfreedom and majority dominance.

The first is to

modify the majority principle in some fashion so that it is not
oppressive to minorities.

And the second is to establish a means of

granting the minority a greater measure of autonomy or even total
independence.

For example, a constitutional principle of autonomy

could be used to eliminate domination altogether (and thus increase
freedom).

Where both solutions are used together, the result is a

consociational rather that a majoritarian system of polyarchy.
Ultimately it becomes evident that further democratization is never
entirely free of disadvantages.

However, "as long as great inequali

ties in political resources persist democratic pluralism must fail to
attain the potentialities of large-scale democracy" (Dahl, 1982, p.
107).

The Dilemma of Pluralist Democracy

It would be an egregious mistake to consider the dilemma of
pluralist democracy to be uniquely exclusive to that type of system.
Indeed Dahl asserts that "all contemporary political theories and
ideologies are menaced by the dilemma of organizational autonomy and
control" (1982, p. 3). Thus, the basic dilemma is neither exclusive to
democratic systems nor, as described earlier, is it restricted to a
specific economic type (capitalist or socialist).

Although authori

tarian regimes are more capable of suppressing and hiding man's
inclination toward organization and organizational autonomy than non
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authoritarian regimes, they too face this dilemma to a degree.

However

this dilemma is most prevalent in the democratic scheme because of the
inherent nature of democratic systems and their ideal type.
In the title of his 1982 book Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy.
Dahl intimates that there are a number of issues which have yet to be
fully reconciled by pluralist

democracy.

And indeed there are.

However, the use of the word "dilemmas" is so artfully chosen and
profound in its implications that it bears comment.

The notion

embodied in the term "dilemma" is that of competing alternatives which
are often fairly equal but somewhat less-than satisfactory.

Indeed the

existence of pluralism within democracy creates what might be called
the grand dilemma; for independent organizations are highly desirable
in a large-scale democracy and to a degree necessary, while at the same
time their independence gives them the capacity to do harm.

Independent Organizations

Dahl (1982, p. 40) identifies four circumstances where indepen
dent organizations appear to contribute to the problems of democratic
pluralism:

(1) independent organizations tend to stabilize political

inequalities, (2) there is a tendency for independent organizations to
deform the civic consciousness, (3) they tend to distort the public
agenda, and (4) independent organizations have a tendency to alienate
the demos from final control over the agenda.
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Tendencies of Stabilized Political Inequality

It is widely recognized that the effects of organizational plu
ralism on the decision-making institutions of polyarchies is not
particularly equitable with decisions made that are often made for
"public" or "general interest."

"Although organization is indispens

able for offsetting the universal tendency toward domination, the
pattern of pluralism in a particular country even while checking
domination may help to sustain inequalities of various kinds, including
inequality in control over the government of the state" (Dahl, 1982, p.
40).

Such inequality is especially likely to occur where the organiza

tions do not have a broadly inclusive membership since the organized
citizen must be recognized as being more influential than the unorga
nized citizen.

The inequality resulting from organizational pluralism

becomes a significant problem because it "develops a self sustaining
pattern over fairly long periods" (Dahl, 1982, p. 41).

That is the

institutional guarantees of polyarchy and the functions of organiza
tional pluralism do not necessarily produce a very high degree of
equality in the distribution of resources— political and thus economic
and social— and ultimately of control over government.

"Thus organiza

tional pluralism is perfectly consistent with extensive inequalities
... even when the institutional guarantees of polyarchy exist" (Dahl,
1982, p. 40).

It is amusing that critics of pluralist theory often

wrongly assert that individual groups have equal influence over de
cisions, for this could not be farther from reality.
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Accompanying the tendency toward inequality is a tendency for
stasis.

Stasis is particularly dangerous because it translates into a

tendency to maintain systematic inequalities.

That is, "major public

problems go unsolved because every solution that does not have sub
stantial agreement among all the organized forces is, in effect vetoed"
(Dahl, 1986, p. 254).

A given pattern of organizational pluralism may

inadvertently produce a stable system where mutual veto powers produce
a stalemate that blocks any movement toward reducing inequalities.

Deformation of the Civic Consciousness

Dahl (1982, p. 43) suggests that because organizational pluralism
occurs symbiotically with a plurality of interests, there is said to be
a direct relationship— that is, a linkage between them.

This "symbi

otic" relationship assumes that where they are socially permitted to
occur, whatever causes the one also causes the other.

Already in

Rousseau's work it is evident that he saw the linkage between a plu
rality of "associations" and a plurality of interests as being
detrimental to the general civic consciousness. Rousseau surmised that
"associations" would hinder and subvert the articulation of the general
will by providing a platform designed to reinforce particular inter
ests.

Organizations are not neutral in their portrayal of members'

desires and interests.

They do more than merely receive and transmit

signals from their membership about members' interests.

Rather

organizations selectively filter and amplify signals and create new
ones.

"Often they sharpen particularistic demands at the expense of

broader needs, and short-run against long-run needs" (Dahl, 1982, p.
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44).

Organizations simultaneously reinforce both cohesion and

division, through the efforts of leaders to downplay potential internal
conflicts and cleavages among members while exaggerating the "salience"
of conflicts with individuals or groups outside the organization.

By

promoting the fragmentation of outside citizen interests and concerns
while consolidating internal interests and concerns, organizations make
it possible for the minority to subvert and deform the interests and
concerns ("will") of the majority.

Distortion of the Public Agenda

Another problem grows from the inequality of resources (remem
bering that organization is a resource) that give organizations the
ability to stabilize injustices also gives them the ability to distort
the public agenda through their unequal capacity to influence the
determination of which alternatives are considered.

Because organiza

tions by nature reinforce a civic orientation that encourages group
egoism, distrust of other groups, and weakened perceptions of general
interest, they encourage the consideration of those alternatives which
offer tangible short-term benefits to the proportionally small number
of citizens who are organized.

Those alternatives which hold the

promise of substantial long-term benefits to the greater number of
unorganized citizens are typically forced from the agenda entirely.

Alienation of Final Control

Organizational pluralism has been variously described by critics
as that system whereby private groups appropriate public functions.
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They assert that through economic organizations, such as business
firms, labor unions, farmers associations, functions that would better
be left in the public domain are wrested into the private sector.

As

evidence, the critics cite the U.S. example; where crucial economic
decisions are effectively beyond the control of not only the national
legislature but more importantly the electorate.

That non-government

organizations undertake public functions can be easily established, but
the normative issue of whether they would better be left in the public
domain is more difficult to establish; for it begs the matter of
fundamental political rights which remains beyond the scope of this
paper
While one criterion of the democratic ideal of final control over
the agenda, prohibits irrevocable delegation of control, it does not
prohibit delegation.

Although as champion of popular sovereignty he

was ever vigilant against any infringement of popular sovereignty, even
Rousseau conceded that although a demos may be small enough to govern
itself through direct assembly,

it would have to delegate some

administrative duties to officials.
The acceptability (and necessity) of revokable delegation still
faces certain problems that lead to the ultimate alienation of final
control.

There are at least three reasons why representatives in

modern democratic countries cannot always bring about the compliance of
wayward/recalcitrant organizations.

First, because having access to

their own resources gives organizations the capacity to raise the costs
of control by representatives to prohibitive levels.

Second, the

largess of institutional structures as well as prevailing tradition and
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ideology contribute to their resistance to control (Dahl, 1982, p. 50).
As inducement for compliance, representatives are often reduced to
offer special concessions to recalcitrant organizations— concessions
that in the long-run only strengthen and perpetuate the special status
of the organization by increasing their resources for resistance.
Lindblom (1977, p. 174) illustrates quite clearly how businessmen as a
group are the epitome of an organization which extracts privileged
position as the inducement for compliance.

Third, the myriad complexi

ties associated with organizational pluralism makes it virtually
impossible for democratic representatives to force compliance that they
cannot even entirely comprehend.

"Representatives readily yield some

of their control, knowing that should they attempt to impose a national
policy on complex subsystems [organizations] they would produce chaos"
(Dahl, 1982, p. 52).

Ultimately it becomes evident that representa

tives of a democratic system are destine to loose control as the
complexity of the system increases beyond basic subsystem relation
ships.

Logically as the representatives lose control, by extension it

seems appropriate to conclude that the demos then has lost its final
control over public affairs.

Worse yet, cautions Dahl, we are

witnessing a fundamental transformation of democracy and given the
institutions of polyarchy, "this shift in power away from the elected
representatives looks to be irreversible" (1982, p. 80).
In final analysis, the dilemma of pluralist democracy remains.
Organizations ought to possess some autonomy, and at the same time they
should also be controlled.

The crucial question is how to establish

what degree of autonomy from government should be granted organiza
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tions, and what degree of control should be retained for government.
Dahl (1982) suggests that the problems of pluralism are less a result
of any failure of pluralism per se than they are consequences of
failures in democratization.

"in a truly democratic country, the

defects of pluralism would tend to disappear" (Dahl, 1982, p. 81).
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CHAPTER X
THE THEORY OF POLYARCHY

The term "polyarchy" was originally used in the Oxford English
Dictionary to elucidate the converse of monarchy.

As such, polyarchy

meant "the government of a state or city by many" (Dahl, 1986, p. 223).
The term as it is used in modern political science was coined by Dahl
and Lindblom in 1953 when they developed it for distinctive use when
speaking of democracy in the methodological sense as opposed to the
ideal sense.

In this sense, "polyarchy is process, sometimes called

democracy, in which non-leaders control leaders" (Dahl & Lindblom,
1953/1976, p. 23).

They later observed that "in some societies, the

democratic goal is still roughly and crudely approximated, in the sense
that non-leaders exercise a relatively high degree of control over
leaders.

The constellation of social processes that makes this

possible we call polyarchy" (Dahl & Lindblom, 1953/1976, p. 275).

In

195 6 Dahl revises the use of polyarchy to reflect more than mere
process, but rather as a set of institutions (pp. 63-84).

Like

democracy, there are different facets of polyarchy which are consistent
and complementary of one another.

Taken together they define the

boundaries of a complex concept.
At some risk of repetition then, polyarchy is in large part
democracy as method; it is however, a process not divorced from ideal,
but likewise, not restricted to the letter of ideal either.

Indeed as
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developed in Part I "the gap between the prescriptive definition of
democracy and its actual performance is very great" (Sartori, 1962, p.
91).
In to most ecumenical sense, polyarchy is the institutionalized
political process which achieves the accommodation of the multitude of
conflicting demands of single individuals as well as groups of in
dividuals who have managed to make themselves "heard" in the decision
making process (Dahl, 1956, p. 145).

The central mechanism in this

process is bargaining, because only through bargaining can mutual
satisfactions be achieved while at the same time acknowledging claims
of intensely held interests (Dahl, 1956, p. 150; Dahl & Lindblom,
1953/1976, chaps. 12-13).

Given the implicit filtering process that

occurs pursuant to an election, Keim concludes that it is the processes
of bargaining and elections which form the matrix of polyarchy (1975,
p. 5).

Requisites of Polyarchy

Shared Convictions

Considered in context, as "polyarchy is a prerequisite for
approximating the democratic goal,"

so is "a minimum level of

agreement ... a prerequisite for polyarchy (Dahl & Lindblom, 1953/1976,
p. 49).

That is, "the extent to which polyarchy exists must be related

to the extent which the norms are accepted as desirable" (Dahl, 1956,
p. 75).

Hofstadter (1955) finds the degree of "shared convictions" to

be a recurring theme that has played an important role throughout
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American history.

"There has been a common ground, a unity

of cul

tural and political tradition, upon which American civilization has
stood" (Hofstadter, 1955, p. x).

Pluralism

The relationship between pluralism and polyarchy is crucial.
"Polyarchy requires a considerable degree of social pluralism— that is,
a diversity of social organizations with a large measure of autonomy
with respect to one another" (Dahl & Lindblom,

1953/1976, p. 302).

Further pursuit of polyarchy's lineage brings to light issues of
participation.

If pluralism is essentially the ultimate expression of

participation in polyarchy, it can be considered likewise as a
requisite of polyarchy.

"The more 'voluntary' a group— that is, the

more easily a member can withdraw and achieve his goals in a alterna
tive group— the less reason any member has for obeying a command, and
therefore the more limited the capacity of leaders to achieve control
through command. ... this social fact is of extraordinary importance as
a condition for polyarchy" (Dahl & Lindblom, 1953/1976, p. 109).

Social Focus

Polyarchy depends additionally on the existence of certain social
conditions.

For example, in contradistinction to Dahl's Madisonian

democracy which devolved from the constitutional restraints upon
majority action, "the theory of polyarchy focuses primarily ... on the
social prerequisites for a democratic order" (Dahl, 1956, p. 82).

This

is not to say that Madison was diffident about the necessity of certain
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social conditions for a non-tyrannical republic, but rather that his
primary focus (and that of the rest of the founding fathers at the
Constitutional Convention) was on constitutional controls as opposed to
social controls.

Dahl believes that as a result of this orientation,

Americans have myopically come to place too much faith in the necessity
of constitutional checks and balances, while placing too little faith
in social checks and balances.

"We admire the efficacy of constitu

tional separation of powers in curbing majorities and minorities, but
we often ignore the importance of the restraits [sic] imposed by social
separation of powers" (Dahl, 1956, p. 83).

Supported by historical

evidence from Latin-America and beyond, the theory of polyarchy would
indicate that no constitutional provisions can yield a "non-tyrannical
republic" if it lacks the necessary social prerequisites.

"Conversely,

an increase in the extent to which one of the social prerequisites is
present may be far more important in strengthening democracy than any
particular constitutional design" (Dahl, 1956, p. 83).

Regime Type

Polyarchy can be viewed as a distinctively different type of
regime that devolved in the post 19th century era. Polyarchy is
distinctive because it features first, a high tolerance for those who
wish to challenge the conduct of the government and second it features
extensive opportunities for participation in the

influencing of the

conduct of the government including the peaceful removal of incumbent
government officials.
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Dahl (1956, p. 84) specifies eight component propositions which
together form the minimum basic specification of requisite conditions
for democratic control— polyarchy.

These conditions are as follows:

During the voting period:
1. Every member of the organization performs the acts we
assume to constitute an expression of preference among the
scheduled alternatives, e.g., voting.
2. In tabulating these expressions (votes), the weight
assigned to the choice of each individual is identical.
3. The alternative with the greatest number of votes is
declared the winning choice.
During the prevoting period:
4. Any member who perceives a set of alternatives, at least
on of which he regards as preferable to any of the alterna
tives presently scheduled, can insert his preferred alter
native^) among those scheduled for voting.
5. All individuals possess identical information about the
alternatives.
During the postvoting period:
6. Alternatives (leaders or policies) with the greatest
number of votes displace any alternatives (leaders or
policies) with fewer votes.
7. The orders of elected officials are executed.
During the interelection stage:
8.1. Either all interelection decisions are subordinate or
executory to those arrived at during the election stage,
i.e., elections are in a sense controlling
8.2. Or new decisions during the interelection period are
governed by the preceding seven conditions, operating,
however, under rather different institutional circumstances
8.3. Or both.

It is the existence of these institutions that makes polyarchy
different than all other regime types— including the democratic citystates of classical Greece and the Roman Republic.
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Evolutionary Product

It is also possible to view polyarchy as a set of institutions
that evolved primarily as the "product of efforts to democratize and
liberalize the political institutions of nation-states" (Dahl, 1986, p.
231).

From this view polyarchy is seen as a unique group of modern

institutions which grew out of historical circumstance— the adaptation
of democratic ideals and practices to the large-scale nation-state.
"This historically unique complex of political institutions has tended
to acquire the name 'democracy', and its institutions have largely
superceded the distinctive political institutions of the earlier
democratic or republican city-states" (Dahl, 1986, p. 231).

Necessary Process

Polyarchy viewed as the set of "necessary" (but not wholly
sufficient) political institutions which make it possible to extend the
democratic process on a scale as large as the nation-state.

From this

view-point comes the assertion of a number of necessary but not
sufficient rights:

the right to (widespread) suffrage, the right to

run for public office, the right to free and fair elections, the right
to form political parties, and the right to hold the executive branch
of government responsible to the electorate.

Control Through Competition

From this view, polyarchy is seen as a system of political
control by the masses over the leadership of the government of the
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state.

As a result of the above mentioned set of institutions, high

officials have to face the prospect of replacement through popular
elections if the wishes of the demos are not satisfied; in this way
polyarchal leadership is perceived as having strong inducement to
modify their conduct where necessary to maintain the favor of the demos
so that they can win elections in open political competition with
others. One of the features most distinctive of polyarchal regimes is
this competition among political elites for office— in a setting that
is potentially open to any of the demos— and the degree of mutual
influence between elites and the masses that develops as a result of
the competition.

In this manner the unilateral dominance of the masses

by elites as prescribed

by Michels iron law of oligarchy is averted

(Dahl, 1986, p. 232).

System of Rights

This final view of polyarchy perceives of it as a system of
rights which are guaranteed and protected institutionally and though
they are necessary to the institutions of polyarchy, the rights may
individually be esteemed in and of themselves.

"Each of the seven

institutions of polyarchy prescribes certain rights that are necessary
to the existence and functioning of the institution itself" (1986, p.
232).

And, most importantly, these rights must be enforceable in

actuality— in courts or law and not merely in an abstract or theo
retical sense.
Thus, devolves the issue of whether the economic system used in
conjunction with all polyarchal political systems— since they are the
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penultimate form of nation-state democracy— hinders or undermines that
polyarchy and the universally sought human emancipation.

As the

Marxists are so quick to point out, no matter how equal political
rights ostensibly are, political power cannot be equalized where
economic power is unequal.

For them, bourgeois democracy is a sham,

not because democracy is impossible, but because capitalism does not,
indeed cannot, provide the requisite economic conditions for it.
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to make more than passing
references to Marxist theory, one cannot overlook their vociferous
identification of the necessity and value of an economic system that
provides the demos with the capacity to realize their democratic
political goals. On this note the discussion now turns to capitalism.
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ENDNOTES — PART I I

1.
Although the two schools cannot agree on what really constitutes
the basis for classical democracy.
Pateman (1970, p. 17) accuses
Schumpeter of attacking a singular position when in fact there exists
no such singular paradigm (least of all the straw-man Schumpeter is
credited with creating).
Dahl (1956) also does not believe in the
existence of a single theory of democracy.
2.
Schumpeter's work is occasionally traced in a derogatory sense to
the work of Mosca. This obfuscation of reality is typically made with
the intent of "extolling a participatory theory of democracy in oppo
sition to the theory of representative democracy and, in particular, to
the competitive theory" (Sartori, 1987, p. 156).
3.
See for example the citations in Elkin (1985b) which include, but
are not limited to:
Almond and Verba (1965) The Civic Culture:
Berelson (1952) "Democratic Theory and Public Opinion" in Public
Opinion Quarterly and also (1954) Voting; Dahl (1956) Preface to
Democracy and (1961) Who Governs: Duncan and Lukes (1963) The New
Democracy. Political Studies: Eckstein (1961) A Theory of Stable
Democracy: Key (1961) Public Opinion and American Democracy; Lipset
(1981) Political Man: McClosky (1964) Consensus and Ideology in
American Politics. American Political Science Review.
4.
See for example:
Duncan, 6. and Lukes, S. (1963) The New
Democracy. In Political Studies, xi, 2, (pp. 156-77); Davis, L. (1964)
The Cost of Realism.
In The Western Political Quarterly, xvii, 1,
(March 1964), (pp. 37-46); Bachrach, P. (1967, 1975); Pateman, C.
(1970); Walker, J. (1966).
5.
Note how close this aspect of delineation is to work of Dahl 1970
forward.
6.
See the examples of industrial democracy cited by Pateman (1970)
and Dahl (1986)— Milbrath's example of Ghana (1967) generates serious
concerns about the application of widespread participation in politics
on the scale of the nation-state.
7.
Pateman asserts that "the central function of participation in
Rousseau's theory is an educative one" (1970, p. 24). James Stuart
Mill, on the other hand, is found to have a different perspective.
"For Mill it is at the local level where the real educative effect of
participation occurs, where not only do the issues dealt with directly
affect the individual and his everyday life but where he also stands a
good chance of, himself, being elected to serve on a local body"
(Pateman, 1970, p. 31).
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8.
Pateman is not against participatory systems in institutions of
education, with the caveat that they should be institutions of higher
education. It is her belief that the motive to give the opportunity of
participation to the student is as convincing as the motive for offer
such opportunity to the "young worker" (see Pateman, 1970, p. 109).
9.
Distinctions of political, social, and economic nature are
difficult to make because they are normative in nature. For example,
a circumstance which a participationist considers political is likely
not to qualify in the much more narrow sense that the revisionist uses
the term. Alas, the line must be drawn somewhere, and it is with the
revisionists that the lot is cast.
10.
While R. Michels's law is considered here as being common
knowledge, enlightening discussions of it and its application may be
found in Dahl and Lindblom (1953/1976, pp. 279ff) . As Dahl and
Lindblom show, Michels's work should be considered with that of G.
Mosca and V. Pareto (see Bobbio, 1984/1987a, p. 161, note 11).
11.
Aspects of this issue are dealt with through out this paper.
However, there does not seem to be any real consensus in the scholarly
community as to the answer of this question.
Dahl (1982, p. 47)
proposes that it might be more yielding to explore the "kinds and range
of organizational autonomy" which "should be regarded as outside the
final control of representation."
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PART I I I

CAPITALISM AND THE DEMOCRATIC STATE

What goes by the name of capitalism is, in reality, an
immensely complex form of organization with elements of
private ownership, to be sure, but with socialistic
elements in the organization of basic research, public
ownership of some industries and regulation of others, with
a substantial not-for-profit sector which has no place in
either socialist or capitalist models, and with varying
degrees of monopoly. (Usher, 1981, p. 65)
Capitalism is now hardly more than a name stretched to
cover a large family of economies in which distant cousins,
it is true, resemble one another, but nor more than do
"capitalist" United States and "socialist" Britain.
Socialism once stood for equality; but income and inheri
tance taxation, social security and other techniques of
"capitalist reform have destroyed its distinction. And in
the eyes of socialists themselves, public ownership of
industry is now simply an implement in everyone's tool kit
for economic reform.
Socialism has lost its unique
character. (Dahl & Lindblom, 1953/1976, pp. 4-5)
Capitalist democracy is in decay because the principle of
capitalism cannot be squared with the principle of democra
cy. The one consistently seeks to maintain inequalities
which the other, not less consistently, seeks to abolish.
(Laski, 1933, p. 215)
It is often said that democracy will not tolerate cap
italism.
If capitalism means here a competitive system
based on free disposal over private property, it is far
more important to realize that only within this system is
democracy possible.
When it becomes dominated by a
collectivist creed, democracy will inevitably destroy
itself. (Hayek, 1944, p. 70)
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CHAPTER X I

THE MARKET SYSTEM

Fundamental to any understanding of capitalism must be an
understanding of the market economy upon which it is based.

It is the

focus of the market system to coordinate supply and demand of the
products in the marketplace.

The market system is thought to ensure

particularly efficient production because producers' output is a direct
response to the demand of consumers.

Demand is signalled by the

consumers by what price they are willing to pay for an item.

The rise

and fall of price in response to the changing consumer demands is the
signal utilized by market producers to quickly and efficiently shift
resources from unprofitable endeavors to profitable endeavors.

Pro

ducers respond to price signals because they are motivated by the
profit incentive.

Thus price is the signal that either stimulates or

discourages production and it is the mechanism of price that allocates
resources in a market economy.
The principle of free market simply means that there are no
constraints on the freedom of demand and supply to determine price.

Of

course it is also assumed in the market economy that the consumer
spending is autonomous and that the consumer votes with their money.
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The Linkage of Market and Democracy

The historical dependence of polyarchies upon markets and private
enterprise has no facile explanation.

At first blush the linkage of

private enterprise systems with polyarchy appears to be redundant since
both systems are methods for control over public decisions.

It is

often proposed that the concurrent occurrence of democracy and cap
italism is simply a historical coincidence.

However, the simple fact

that polyarchy only occurs in consort with a market system suggests
that some type of linkage exists.

Lindblom (1977, p. 162) makes a

highly plausible case that they "are historically tied together in the
forms in which they have arisen, ... both are manifestations of
constitutionalism."
Historically, the contemporary pursuit of democracy is fueled by
mans' pursuit of liberty.

To this end, man has sought to insure his

liberties by instituting democratic regimes (polyarchies).

Although

the initial incarnations of constitutional liberalism were not
associated with democracy or polyarchy, the movement slowly came to be
identified with notions of popular rule in the latter 18th century as
a means to secure constitutional restrictions on the privileges of
government (Lindblom, 1977, p. 163).
As portrayed earlier, democracy was long held to be the means to
achieve social equality.

However, in the 19th century conflict between

egalitarian and libertarian aspirations, the two schools parted company
with the socialists (led by Marx) becoming the defenders of equality,
while the liberals remaining in the democratic fold subordinated the
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remnants of egalitarian tradition to those of

libertarian tradition.

From this perspective which stresses those forms of popular control
that serve liberty, the appearance of (private enterprise) market
systems along side polyarchy does not seem so surprising.

"For much of

the fuller development of personal liberty that men have sought is
freedom to engage in trade and to establish enterprises to pursue the
gains of trade, freedom also to move about, to keep one's earnings and
assets, and to be secure against arbitrary exactions" (Lindblom, 1977,
p. 163).

The constitutional liberalism that polyarchy is a component

of, is itself based on the promotion of a set of institutions designed
to assure individuals the freedom to enter into trade exchange.

Such

exchanges are perceived as vital if the individual is to have the means
to develop and control their own life circumstances.
For Locke (and American revolutionary thought) the relationship
of market and liberalism is tightly intertwined as a result of the
perception that the basis of the "liberal constitutional state was
property" (Lindblom, 1977, p. 164).

The fact that property is one of

the buttresses of market exchange, the role of the state was property
protection— including the property derived from an individual’s
physical being.

Thus Lindblom finds the association of liberal

constitutional polyarchy and market to be no mere historical coinci
dence.

"Polyarchies were established to win and protect certain

liberties:

private property, free enterprise, free contract, and

occupational choice" (Lindblom, 1977, p. 164).
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The Tenets of Market Systems

Private Property

The principle of private property establishes that all individu
als are to be assured of the economic freedom to treat personal prop
erty as they so desire.

This means that the individual is recognized

to have the right to sell, to buy, to own, and to accumulate personal
property in any of a variety of forms.

Neither the state nor any

institution or its agents may arbitrarily seize that property.
However, it must be noted that liberal property theory distinguishes
between the use and ownership of property; with only the latter being
subsequently protected.
Exchanges in the market are built upon the notion of private
property.

Contained within the conventional liberal argument is the

perception that private property in itself neither inhibits freedom,
nor is it coercively established and perpetuated.

However, this

argument is seriously compromised by the fact that what method and to
what degree the individual is capable of insulating themselves from the
demands (degradations) of the market depends considerably on what they
own and what they have to offer in the market for exchange.
According to the limited perspective of the conventional liberal
view, exchange is a "conflict-free" transaction where each actor does
as they please.

Since no one is coerced into action, all social

coordination results through voluntary exchange.

However, this

ideality of conception "is possible only because the conflicts over who
gets what have already been settled through a distribution of property
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rights in the society" (Lindblom, 1977, p. 46).

Historical record

indicates that the initial distributions were typically neither
conflict-free nor non-coercive.
It has been proposed that in addition to the classical economic
argument that property rights are an efficient economic tool in the
democratic capitalist model,

they "are maintained because democracy

needs them for its survival" (Usher, 1981, p. 7).

That is to say,

property is respected in democratic society because it is "fundamen
tally at the disposal of the community to be used as the legislature
decides" (Usher, 1981, p. 8).^

Individual Freedom

The classical economic liberal case (i.e., that made by the
adherents of free-market individualism of the 18th and 19th centuries)
,

finds liberty to be the exclusive product of the market.

2

However,

"'freedom' and 'liberty' denote situations in which controls are not
absent but are in some sense acceptable" (Lindblom, 1977 p. 45).

That

is to say, traditional capitalism does recognize that some constraints
upon individual freedom are necessary so that one person's actions don
not "take away from other people's freedom to act" (McLaughlin, 1987,
p. 221).
In the traditional liberal economic arguments of Locke, Smith,
and the Mills, individual response in the market system is based on the
attractiveness that the proffered benefits hold for the particular
individual.

Hence the individual acts of their own volition when

engaging in a market exchange and is therefore considered to be "free."
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That is, the essential notion of freedom as advanced by capitalism, is
"that a person is free if he is not coerced" (McLaughlin, 1987, p.
220).

"The consumer is protected from coercion by the seller because

of the presence of other sellers with whom he can deal.

The seller is

protected from coercion by the consumer because of other consumers to
whom he can sell.

The employee is protected from coercion by the

employer because of other employers for whom he can work, and so on"
(Friedman, 1962, pp. 14-15).
The freedom or liberty achieved in the marketplace by capitalism
should not be misconstrued as being absolute; for some social control
is always existent (Lindblom, 1977, p. 45).

Instead "'freedom' and

'liberty' denote situations in which controls are not absent but are in
some sense acceptable" (Lindblom, 1977, p. 45).

As noted earlier,

although certain kinds of freedoms are prerequisites for democracy and
although democracy is a prerequisite for certain kinds of freedom;
freedom and liberty are not necessarily implied in democracy.
Freedom in the classical free-market individualist tradition of
Locke, Smith, and the Mills, exists because the individual actors in a
market system voluntarily partake in an exchange only where each party
perceives some benefit to be gained from the exchange.
Despite its many failings, ultimately the market system is still
highly desirable from a functional standpoint.

The market system

shoulders the multifarious responsibilities of allocation that occur in
society.

In the absence of such a system, allocative functions would

have to be undertaken by governmental authorities— a scenario that does
not qualify as democratic in the Western sense.
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The Allocative Function of Markets

In a democratic society, it is of substantial importance how
decisions are made which concern the utilization of resources— how
capital, land, labor, and materials are to be allocated among the
myriad possibilities of productive activity.

These essential economic

functions are largely the providence of the market.

Even more im

portantly, though, "the political function of the price mechanism ...
was to dispense with the need for civic virtue and constitutional
forms.

It was to replace the personal and conscious in social life

with the impersonal and automatic" (Lustig, 1986, p. 133).

In its

political role market performs the allocative functions necessary to
society— it decides who in society gets what goods and opportunities.
That is, the "assignment of people to slots in a hierarchy .... the
assignment of property through institutions of inheritance, and ... the
assignment of incomes to people" (Usher, 1981, p. xii) is all performed
by the market.

Usher's argument is that capitalism is necessary to

democracy; that is, "the legislature cannot attend to the assignment of
income and other advantages, except to a limited extent, without
destroying democracy in the process" (Usher, 1981, p. xiii) . On these
grounds democracy is found to require an "assignment" method which is
non-political.

The point here is not whether political and economic

systems function as independently (on "separate tracks") as Usher
suggests, but rather that the market mechanisms provide a service to
democracy that must in one way or another be accomplished.
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In many ways, "markets do many things very efficiently.

As

classical economics correctly perceives, prices are often accurate
signals of what consumers want and what products cost" (Kuttner, 1991,
p. 262).

The linkage of consumer interest to product value is the most

accurate method to achieve a "real" value basis.

Likewise it is an

effective way to sidestep the hazards of isolation that befall
centrally planned economies.

The Market and Private Enterprise

"Capitalism is sometimes called the private enterprise system
because the private businessman stands at the center of the allocative
process" (Leeman, 1963, p. 3).

It is the individual who provides the

businessman with the information and stimulus to decide the allocative
ratios.

By seeking to maximize his own "profit", the individual

balances utility or satisfaction against actual costs (real costs)
which appear as dis-utilities or lost opportunities.

This freedom of

choice (consumer sovereignty) is one of the key characteristics of
capitalism.

Just as consumers are free to spend their incomes as they

see fit, so are workers free to work where they wish.

Likewise those

who control land and capital are free to utilize those resources as
they see fit.

In this way decision-making is highly decentralized

while the incentive to work and produce is strongly motivated by the
prospect of material gain.
It is precisely this motive of material gain that has led some
theorists'* to argue that this orientation toward private gain predis
poses citizens away from public action and public values.

"In emp
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hasizing the primacy of competition and possession, it has obscured res
publica and the need for participation" (Lustig, 1986, p. 137).
The market system which begat private enterprise and its at
tendant freedom of choice, fails in another crucial way that contra
dicts both the notion of "private" enterprise and the notion of "free"
choice.

These are the social costs that society at large must bare the

brunt of.

For example, the market mechanism has no way to assess the

cost to society of foregone or postponed public facilities such as
hospitals.

Likewise, the market mechanism has no way to record the

costs incurred through the consumption or destruction or pollution of
natural goods such as air or water/

Finally there are the future

costs that result from market actions undertaken in the present.

The

cancer and diseases stemming from the Love Canal, New York, residential
housing development built on a toxic waste dump and the large scale
farming operations of the pre-1930s that transformed vast tracts of
American prairie land into a barren waste-land and spawning ground for
dust storms are two of the numerous examples history has recorded.
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CHAPTER X I I

THE HERITAGE OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY

The Early American Democratic Milieux

The Legacy of Hobbes and Calvin

Discussion of capitalism and its relationship to the democratic
state is without foundation until the atmosphere in which it was
conceived is understood.

Without engaging in a debate over the

veracity of behaviorism, it appears that the social attitudes and
perspectives brought by our Founding Fathers to the Constitutional
Convention of 1787 played a considerable role in the shaping of our
Constitution.

Some scholars have even gone so far as suggest that our

constitution grew from an amalgamation of Hobbes's philosophy and
Calvin's religion (Hofstadter, 1955, p. 3).

The propertied men who

gathered in Philadelphia "had a vivid Calvinistic sense of human evil
and damnation and believed with Hobbes that men are selfish and
contentious" (Hofstadter, 1955, p. 3).

Their solution to the negative

orientation of human nature was to be found in the control offered by
a good political constitution.

However, they also brought with them

the populist ideal of a people able to, as John Adams said, "think,
feel, reason,

and act"'* on their own to wrest control of their

communities from "a distant and usurpative state" (Morone, 1990, p. 5).
One of the essential goals of the new Constitution was to curb
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the tumultuous and changing post-1776 popular spirit.

It was well

recognized that "democratic ideas are most likely to take root among
discontented and oppressed classes, rising middle classes, or perhaps
some sections of an old, alienated, and partially disinherited
aristocracy, but do not appeal to a privileged class that is still
amplifying its privileges" (Hofstadter, 1955, pp. 4-5).

Against this

backdrop was the fact that neither in America nor Europe were democrat
ic ideas "respectable to the cultivated classes" (Hofstadter, 1955, p.
5).

Coinciding with, and ameliorating their general disdain for

democracy, was the fact that the Founders "were intellectual heirs of
seventeenth-century English republicanism with its opposition to
arbitrary rule and faith in popular sovereignty" (Hofstadter, 1955, p.
5).

Hence as much as democracy on the left appeared undesirable, so

did the alternatives of the right where mentions of both military
dictatorship and monarchy rule renewed the bitter memories of the
revolutionary struggle.

Simultaneously pressure was felt from public

sentiment based on Hobbesian predilections that any kind of government
had to be acceptable if anarchy and reversion to the state of nature
were to be avoided.

Unwilling to abandon republicanism entirely and

not wanting to exclude the masses from participating in making the laws
which they were to obey,** it was widely accepted among the Founders
that government could not legitimately proceed from any source other
than the people (Hofstadter, 1955, p. 6).
Given their negative perception of man's nature, the Founding
Fathers thought that "it was too much to expect that vice could be
checked by virtue? the Fathers relied instead upon checking vice with
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vice" (Hofstadter, 1955, p. 7).

The Founders were not as optimistic

about the political arena as the political economists of the liberal
school who asserted that private vices by the laws of providence, could
become public benefits.

The Founders remained convinced that "if, in

a state that lacked constitutional balance, one class or one interest
gained control, they believed, it would surely plunder all other
interests" (Hofstadter, 1955, p. 8).

On these grounds what was sought

was "balanced government" which built on the "principals of nature" and
so constructed that by the relationship of the component parts each
would serve as a check upon the other.

Interest would be checked "with

interest, class with class, faction with faction, and one branch of
government with another in a harmonious system of mutual frustration"
(Hofstadter, 1955, pp. 8-9).

The Structuring of American Government

The first step in this direction was federated government.

Left

unchecked by a system of mutual frustration, Madison in the Federalist
10 argued that the greatest threat to democratic society was posed by
the majority faction, because without some sort of imposed restraint
they would have the capacity to gain "complete ascendancy."

To this

end Madison proposed what was in effect pluralism— an extensive politi
cal society composed of manifold, localized, and vested interests which
would be logistically and ideologically incapable of the concerted
actions which would lead to oppression.^

The second step necessary for

desirable constitutional government was to establish a system of
representation.

Though not original in his thinking, Jefferson's
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rather unique political orientation made him a particularly strong
advocate of representative government (Wiltse, 1960, p. 204).

Madison

articulated the majority opinion (albeit in civil cloaking) when he
noted that such a system would have the advantage of filtering ("to
refine and enlarge") the unstable and parochial passions of the masses
which would otherwise dominate law making (Hofstadter, 1955, p. 9).
The third step was as articulated by Adams, to neutralize aristocracy
with democracy by playing the two against each other.

Each would be

given its own chamber of legislature which would be overseen by a
neutral executive armed with the power of veto.

Finally, crowning the

whole package was an independent judiciary.

The Liberalism and Democracy of the Founding Fathers

"The constitution, which Americans venerate so deeply, is based
upon a political theory that at one crucial point stands in direct
antithesis to the main stream of American democratic faith" (Hofstad
ter , 1955, p. 10).

From the popular perspective of contemporary

America, democracy and liberty are virtually one and the same thing.
However, for the Founders, the liberty they sought was threatened by
democracy.

From their perspective liberty was the outgrowth of

property, not democracy.

"Nor was the regard of the delegates for

civil liberties any too tender" (Hofstadter, 1955, p. 11).

On the

economic front the constitutionalists--with an orientation more toward
mercantilism than the economic liberalism of Adam Smith— were not
seeking free trade in the modern sense; they thought the Articles of
Confederation had offered too little regulation of trade.

Rather,
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the liberties that the constitutionalists hoped to gain
were chiefly negative.
They wanted freedom from fiscal
uncertainty and irregularities in the currency, from trade
wars among the states, from economic discrimination by more
powerful foreign governments, from attacks on the creditor
class or on property, from popular insurrection. They
aimed to create a government that would act as an honest
broker among a variety of propertied interests, giving them
all protection form their common enemies and preventing any
one of them from becoming too powerful. (Hofstadter, 1955,
P. 11)
The freedom of individual property interests was perceivedto result in
the liberty for all men "worthy" enough to have property.

Sincethis

protection of property rights was considered merely the protection of
"men in the exercise of their natural faculties" (Hofstadter, 1955, p.
12), freedom to hold and dispose of property was the foremost liberty.
Unrestrained democracy was thought "sure to bring about the arbitrary
redistribution of property, destroying the very essence of liberty"
(Hofstadter, 1955, p. 12). The "democracy" sought by the Constitution
al Fathers, was "a system of government which directly expressed the
will of the majority of the people, usually through such an assemblage
of the people as was possible in the small area of the city-state"
(Hofstadter, 1955, p. 12).®

Inherent in this conception of democracy

was the belief that democracy is never more than a transitional phase
in government which devolves into either tyranny or an aristocracy.*®
Property was what the Founders thought government was based
upon— men who did not have property were perceived as being unstable or
unreliable citizens because they had no stake in society. Although the
many small land owning farmers had been rather radical in the past, the
constitutionalists thought that their stake in society was great enough
to make them a safe and responsible body politic.

When the Founders
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"spoke of the necessity of founding government upon the consent of 'the
people, ' it was these small property owners that they had in mind"
(Hofstadter, 1955, p. 14).

It was a coalition of Southern planters and

Northern merchants that planted the seed of democratic participation in
the field of American governmental policy and derailed the original
intention of the Founders to maintain a distinctly limited partnership
in the governance of the state.

Over time, "the mainstream of American

political conviction deviated more and more from the antidemocratic
position of the Constitution-makers" (Hofstadter, 1955, pp. 14-15).

Contemporary American Democracy

"Democracy does not guarantee a ’good,' 'fair,' 'just,1 society.
... In fact, democracy does not necessarily embody any absolute value
at all" (Bealey, 1988, pp. 8-9).

It seems to be popular opinion,

especially from liberal quarters, that democracy embody the values of
goodness and right.

Rather, democracy provides the preconditions and

procedures that permit such issues to be debated; that is, it estab
lishes the cultural and institutional framework within which the demos
may articulate such values. Moreover, it offers a controlled forum in
which the inevitable conflicts of values may take place.
goodness, rights or social justice are matters of opinion.

Issues of
In a modern

democracy, such matters are virtually certain to assume a permanent
place on the agenda of the state.
The association of democracy and freedom can often be deceptive.
The civil liberties or the democratic freedoms which are necessary for
democracy, require the conviction and support of great numbers of
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people.

In this way individual and minority freedom is contingent upon

mass acceptance and toleration.

Democracy does not assure contentment

for all citizens, rather, it assures only that those citizens who are
dissatisfied may express their opinions.

Thus democracy offers

opportunity for the expression of opinion, but not necessarily the
opportunity for acting out that opinion (Bealey, 1988, p. 9).

The

primary function of democracy is as a principle and method for
adjudicating the conflicts that arise when one individuals' freedom
impinges upon the freedom of another (Dahl & Lindblom, 1953/1976, p.
41).

Democracy in itself is incapable of solving the myriad problems

of social and economic inequality which face democratic society today.
Instead, the advantage of democracy is that it provides a relatively
open forum and procedure for solving such conflict.

The irony of

democracy is that in order to effectively pursue freedom for the
masses, it must build a hierarchical bureaucracy that is in direct
contradiction of the principle it pursues (Dahl & Lindblom, 1953/1976,
p. 42).

"Growth in government is often equated with lessening freedom,

accompanying controls and regulations have potential to restrict
individual opportunity.

Yet, for some people government programs are

means that create opportunity and provide personal freedom." (Markovich
& Pynn, 1988, p. 221).
The equality associated with democratic tradition is at most
political equality in governmental decisions— originally at the
Constitutional Convention it was barely a legal distinction (Hofstad
ter, 1955, p. 12).

In many other circumstances, political equality

would either be disastrous or ineffectual.

Consequently, political
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equality is often foregone so that organizational goals can be
achieved.

The idea behind political equality is that "whoever controls

government can enforce decisions on other organizations:
Lindblom, 1953/1976, p. 42).

(Dahl &

However, the American fear of public

power as a threat to liberty has resulted in government which "is weak
and fragmented, designed to prevent action more easily than to produce
it" (Morone, 1990, p. 1).

With powers largely designed to rescind

rather than thwart transgressions of the public will, the political
system often appears subservient to exogenous influence from the
economic system.

Originally the idea was to restrict government power

so that it could never be oppressive.

However,

the intentional

crippling of governmental powers has resulted in a government that is
"impotent when the citizenry asks that something be done" (Lindblom,
1977, p. 151).

However, there is also some question (largely unanswer

able) of past motive.

"If we live in a system designed by the con

stitutional fathers to frustrate in large part the popular will, their
success in doing so reminds us that even if we attempted a new
constitutional convention the same consequences might follow" (Lind
blom, 1979, p. 521).

The Madisonian concern of the imposition of

majority will over minorities should be construed as something other
than noble in intent.

Perhaps the populist sentiments Thomas Paine

(with the partial sympathy of John Adams) held of the capacities of the
people were not so widely believed.

Beyond the Constitutional

Convention, "American traditions ... show a strong bias in favor of
equalitarian democracy, but it has been a democracy in cupidity rather
than a democracy of fraternity" (Hofstadter, 1955, p. viii).
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Much of the debate over what democracy was at some past point in
history, seems to be used as an obfuscatory screen to maintain the
status quo.

History must be used with the proper motive and in the

proper context.

So used, the lessons of history are more than just

important, they are crucial to the rational conceptualization of the
strategy necessary for forward progress.

Americans need to understand

their past so that they can decide their future.

Future Prospects

The future prospects of democracy in America are not good.
say that democracy is in crisis is much more debateable.

To

The percep

tion of democracy in crisis has been existent for at least 90 years.^
But the issue so stated is too ambiguous to be of much value.

Perhaps

a more appropriate distinction would be the assertion that liberal
democracy is in crisis, or perhaps that only the democratic component
of our liberal democracy is in crisis.

If the former is the case there

is indeed great cause for concern.

Alternatively, if the latter

condition is what is lamented, there is probably less cause for
concern.

Given the collapsed threat of European and Soviet communism,

and the boost that has given to the domestic health of the American
liberal democracy as a whole (at least at the level of self-apprecia
tion), liberalism seems to be as secure as ever with the U.S. in
solitary reign as world

superpower.

Democracy on the other hand, in

the American context, has taken a step backward in distributive justice
(and humanitarianism) . However, on a historical basis the immediacy of
a decline in the democratic component alone does not appear to be
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terminal.

While Laski (1933) dealt primarily with the decrease in

democracy, he admittedly did foresee as inevitable damage that the
decrease or loss of democracy would cause to the modern conception of
liberal democracy.
The present crisis is often cast as the result of the unhappy
consociation of democracy and capitalism.
nature, but wrong in detail.

This view is correct in

The conflict between democracy and

capitalism is not the cause of the democratic "crisis", but rather a
result.

While "capitalism is persistently at odds with values of

equity, fairness, political equality among all citizens, and democracy"
(Dahl, 1990, p. 83), the culprit is the tenuous marriage of liberalism
and democracy.

"After their happy convergence in the last century,

liberalism and democracy are coming again to diverge" (Sartori, 1987,
p. 370).

Liberalism has held democracy at bay, allowing the narrow and

self-serving interpretations of the market economy to become the
primary motive of most foreign and domestic political policy.

Probably

the bias of the founding fathers was limited both by intent and by
circumstance.

At one time America was the most egalitarian socio-

political system known among extended states; past and present.
However, the pervasive equality of the America that Tocqueville
discovered was an accident of circumstance that had already long been
under siege by the turn of the century (1800s).

19

The waning of this

basic economic equality represents a condition not foreign to what the
Founding Fathers initially assumed (and promulgated) in the constitu
tion. The constitutional creation of Madison's clas? of elites was not
accident.

The constitution was essentially designed to defend private
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property and the right to inequalities of it.

However, even today the

American psyche does not seem to have much difficulty accepting
considerable inequalities among individuals.

Much more significantly,

has been the economic evolution (revolution) that has occurred as a
result of corporate growth (Lindblom, 1977).

The inequalities sought

by the founding fathers could not have fully anticipated the results
wrought by corporations (although history has recorded their expression
of concern on this matter).

As a reciprocal of market consolidation,

the opportunities of the many have decreased markedly while the
concentration of wealth in the hands of the few has increased dramati
cally.

It is as if the decrease in liberty is related to the decrease

in equality.

Less equality would seen to result in less people to take

advantage of political liberty as a result of their low economic
position.

If it were possible to measure the potential for decreased

opportunities and freedom, then the loss would be extreme.

Fortunate

ly, the potential loss is tempered by a reality based on the fact that
no matter what the extent of economic backing, there is a point at
which the cost/benefit result

of the imposition of will is not

acceptable (Dahl, 1983; Lindblom, 1977).

Control— whether it is

through exchange, persuasion, or authority— is almost never without
cost, especially where it must be imposed (Lindblom, 1977, p. 19).
That is, in an exchange system, "every attempt to control someone ...
is costly because something of value has to be offered in order to
induce the desired response" (Lindblom, 1977, p. 50).

In this way the

opportunity costs of control, especially in an exchange system, may
often become too high to make control worth while.

Alternatively,
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where control is worth while it can often lead to a loss of opportunity
that yields considerable individual frustration and possible alien
ation.

American Political Liberalism Revisited

In an attempt to identify the polity type created in America more
than 200 years earlier, Dahl (1956) developed the concept of Madisonian
democracy.

However, Sartori cuts with felicity through the semantics

surrounding Madisonian democracy, and asserts that "so-called Madi
sonian democracy is liberalism pure and simple" (1987, p. 371).
Without doubt liberalism as it is known in both the historical and
European sense is firmly ingrained in American political practice.
"The American constitution— according to European standards— is the
prototype of liberal constitutionalism in the classic and strict
meaning of the term" (Sartori, 1987, p. 370).

By definition then, the

American Constitution may be seen as leaving little room for democracy.
It is enlightening to note that the label of liberalism was never
used by the founding fathers for the polity they created.

For them

America was first and foremost a republic and only secondarily a
democracy.

From the eyes of the religious dissidents who came to

America for freedom from persecution, it is easy to understand the
appeal of the liberal state.

"But the liberal state, though it

represented a definite gain in social freedom upon any previous social
order, was in fact no more than the exchange of one privileged class
for another.

And its refusal to link political liberty with social

equality had grave consequences" (Laski, 1933, p. 62).
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Relatively early in the American democratic experience, a
settlement between the competing principles of liberalism and democracy
(egalitarianism) was reached; with primacy maintained by the liberalist
position as the two were merged.

That is not to say, though, that the

fusion of liberalism and democracy is a static relationship— to this
day the two positions vie in method and ideal, and most importantly, in
the American psyche.
Although in the tradition of the Founding Fathers, liberty has
long been thought to be incompatible with democratic equality, the two
principles have proven more durable and amicable in the scheme of
American society than might be expected.

The tenacity with which

democratic equality is gripped in the popular mind is admirable, but
its haphazard methodological application defies rational

explanation

without recourse to class (income and wealth) differentiation.

The

difficult persistence of the "democratic wish" appears to signify that
the demos— with their general disdain of big government and amenability
to significant economic inequality— has never understood the linkage
between economic democracy and political democracy or economic liberty
and political liberty, and the subordination of one to the other.

Contemporary Liberalism

"The variety of liberal theory that provides the principal
justifying account of contemporary representative or liberal democracy
argues that government is a contract for the safety, convenience, and
prosperity of the contracting parties" (Elkin, 1985a, p. 1).
in this context, is built around individual autonomy.

Society

Perhaps more
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importantly, "society is viewed as directing the state" (Elkin, 1985a,
p. 9).
The state is viewed as liberal because of the optimistic attitude
held for the role of government in promoting the good of society.
Government exists in a positive and broadly encompassing role.
Liberals such as Lowi describe American liberalism as "interest group"
liberalism "because it sees as both necessary and good a policy agenda
that is accessible to all organized interests and makes no independent
judgement of their claims" (1969/1979, p. 51).

Liberal Perspectives

Over time, liberalism has varied in its view of both democracy
and capitalism.

For some conservative scholars (Bealey, 1988, p. 25)

the inter-relationship of liberalism and democracy is considered to
signify less than a liberal democracy.

In this setting democracy is

considered liberal only "in the sense that freedom of expression and
political rights for all citizens are necessary preconditions" (Bealey,
1988, p. 26). This position maintains that in contradistinction to its
requisite of freedom of expression and political rights, democracy does
not guarantee the social and economic development of the individual or
even minority groups of individuals.

Since the democratic state is

restrictive in this way, it is inaccurate in a strict sense to call
such governments liberal democracies.
The existence of the state ("stateness") poses a considerable
challenge to the liberal concept of the "workings and purposes of
Western societies" (Elkin, 1985a, p. 9).

Mainstream liberals can be
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essentially divided into three groups in their response to this
challenge.

Given free reign the first group, the radical liberals 1
•

^

would go back to what they perceive as the origin of liberal society.
It is their argument that the growth of the democratic state needs to
be reversed because the accompanying increase in bureaucratic authority
(and collective decision-making) has had the effect of diminishing
liberty.

To regain the lost liberty, society must be restructured with

much less reliance upon collective decision-making and much more
reliance upon contractual agreements and private cooperative pacts.
The second group, the expansionary liberals as Elkin (1985a, p.
10) calls them, believe in an activist role for the democratic state.
This group can be divided in two sub-groups:
not-so-optimists.

the optimists and the

In the eyes of the expansionary optimists, the rise

of the democratic state is perceived as an opportunity to turn public
authority toward the creation of the rights based society that
liberalism promised but never delivered (Elkin, 1985a, p. 10).

From

this perspective the state is not the enemy of individual autonomy, but
rather, the ally and potential guarantor of individual autonomy through
the application of law and legislation.

In this circumstance "the

distinction between state and society is not to be dissolved, but the
balance is to shift so that the state is the creative element that
remakes society in the state's liberal image" (Elkin, 1985a, p. 10).
Subscribing to and promoting this view are Dworkin (1977) and Rawls
(1971).14
The not-so-optimistic expansionary liberals harbor the hope for
the capacity of the state to temper the arbitrary exercises of private
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power.

Their hope is restrained as a result of what they consider as

the limited degree of social rationality, the limited ability of
government bureaucracy to solve social problems, and the difficulty of
controlling political leaders (i.e., removing or insulating them from
the clutches of big business so that they can make the necessary
reforms). Despite these serious limitations, they find state authority
to be the only plausible recourse to achieve revision of current
property relationships and the internal structure of business corpora
tions which in current forms place severe limitations upon liberalism's
promises of freedom and popular control of authority.
this group are:

Falling into

Dahl (1982, 1986), Lindblom (1977), Dahl and Lindblom

(1953/1976).15
Finally, and again in the words of Elkin, are the "chastened
liberals."

The liberals of this genre worry that an activist state

will ultimately lead to a breakdown in the distinction of state and
society, public and private that will end liberalism.

By their

summation, a state that has the capacity to regulate everything is
likely to move in a fashion that is both arbitrary and conducive to the
production of unwarranted privilege.

It is their assertion that the

administrative state can be a positive attribute if it is restrained
and channelled through constitutionalism.

However, constitutionalism

for the likes of Lowi, "means freeing public authority from the power
of interest groups and tying it to explicit statements of public
objectives that are offered by the legislative process" (Elkin, 1985a,
p. 11).

It is Lowi's view (1969/1979) that the discretionary authority
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granted to state officials is of limited scope as interest group
preferences consume the vast majority of it.

The Failure of Interest Group Liberalism

In part through the pluralist model, the American public came to
see the state as an acceptable repository of power in capitalist
society; but the doctrine of pluralism also had the effect of "reducing
the essential conception of government to nothing more than a set of
mere interest groups" (Lowi, 1969/1979, p. 36).

This unintended result

of pluralism was largely the outgrowth of one of its primary proposi
tions:

a society which is pluralist intentionally breaks the contigu

ous link between the political world and the socioeconomic world in
order to frees politics.

Pluralism did not foresee though, that "in a

pluralist society there is also a discontinuity between politics and
government" (Lowi, 1969/1979, p. 36).

The same variables of competi

tion and multiple sources of power that freed politics and society from
each other, also freed government from society as well as politics.
The capacity of pluralism to neutralize most centers of power effec
tively enough to keep them within the reign of formal structures of
government, was exactly its appeal to Madison in earlier times.
Madison's use of group competition was a means to regulate group
activity and to protect governmental authority from control by any
"majority." It was a technique to limit social movement by the masses.
However, Lowi tells us, contemporary pluralism has lost sight of this
function with groups attaining a stature of virtue and power that
qualifies them to be accommodated rather than regulated (Lowi,
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1969/1979, p. 36).

With this change in contemporary pluralism

dissolves the notion of separate government— once the cornerstone of
the pluralist credo.

The recantation of pluralist promise to provide

an automatic, autonomous, and largely self-correcting political process
has had the end result of leading to a crisis of public authority
(which remains beyond the scope of this discussion).
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CAPITALISM AND ITS CONTEXT

Pluralism and Capitalism

At the nucleus of capitalist theory there is the notion that
power and control are attributes of the state. On these grounds state
action is to be both feared and resisted.

What capitalism has failed

to assess is the nature and significance of the other institutions in
industrial society that have power and control (Lowi, 1969/1979, p.
31).

In America it is the pluralist model which has finally done this,

and in doing so, has dismantled the capitalist notion of government
being the only source of power and control.
and control under pluralism is ubiquitous.

The distribution of power
As a result of this, and at

the same time pluralism rejects the capitalist notion of a single
source of power, it rejects the notion (capitalist) of a natural
distinction between the functions of government institutions and the
functions of nongovernment institutions.
Pluralism recognizes that in industrial society there exist
numerous other sources of power and control than the state.

In such

highly differentiated society, the multitudes of basic interests are
represented by organizations which are both willing and able to
exercise power.

Pluralism accepts with equanimity the expansion of

government precisely because it recognizes the highly differential
sources of power in society.

That is, the existence of these numerous
165
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and well organized interests, guarantee the impossibility of a unitary
society.^
In describing the industrial society before him, Tocqueville in
Democracy in America articulated the pluralism already recognized in
spirit if not in name by Madison 50 years before in the Federalist 10.
Both recognized that through the process of industrialization a great
social diversity, replete with extremes of wealth and poverty, would be
produced (Lowi, 1969/1979, p. 33).

This social diversity (pluralism)

"breaks the deterministic link between economics and politics:

In the

pluralist system, modern developments have brought about a discontinu
ity between that which is socioeconomic and that which is political"
(Lowi, 1969/1979, p. 34).

Thus politics in the pluralist model being

no longer the result of socioeconomic existence, becomes autonomous as
a result of the increasing numbers competing social units and the
degree of their independence.
The strength of pluralism comes from a variety of quarters.
First,

it recognized the unequal competition among groups to be a

reality of modern life.

Second, the modern pluralist model has more

than neutralized the traditional Madisonian fear of government— as long
as there are many factions competing for the indulgences of government,
there is little to fear from government.

In fact, government could be

considered favorably because there are many factions in competition for
its favor.

Third, pluralism, just like the orthodox economics of Adam

Smith, functions in a mechanistic (and hence automatic) fashion.
Moreover, the politically mechanistic way pluralism works, serves to
also reinforce the acceptance of government while holding it distinct
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from the economic arena (Lowi, 1969/1979, p. 35).

It should be noted

that pluralism's loose incorporation of positive government placed it
initially in ideological conflict with capitalism.

Since then,

ideological moderation (especially in the capitalist position) has lead
to the reconciliation and merger of the two positions.

This merger was

possible only as a result of the substantial redefinition of the
traditional American hostility toward government.

Principles concern

ing the separation of government, the coerciveness of government, the
legitimacy of government, and the administrative importance of govern
ment, were all destroyed (Lowi, 1969/1979, p. 40).

Capitalism and the Democratic State

From the preceding discussion, it should be evident that
"democracy is both a vital form of and an essential means to liberty
and equality" (Dahl, 1986, p. 8).

What remains is the issue of how

capitalism augments these values as well as democracy itself.

From the

onset it is apparent that there are a number of conflicts in the
doctrinaire positions of democracy and capitalism.
Traditionally capitalism is heralded as the system that produces
the most efficient mode of economic organization; that is, it produces
the most economic goods (McLaughlin, 1987, p. 218), and the optimal
opportunity for individuals to realize freedom.

Classical (liberal)

economic theory equates capitalism with an economic system that is a
collection of many small private enterprises, none of whom can
significantly influence market price or total amount sold.

It carries

from the market economic the presumption of private decision making.
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The government was not viewed as a legitimate participant in the
economic arena until the neoclassical economists assigned limited tasks
to government that would directly or indirectly promote business
activities without significantly interfering in the economy.

Under

this scheme the government was to correct "improper market settings,"
limit monopolized competition, and provide those public goods which the
private sector was incapable of supplying (or unwilling to supply).
In its modern context, it is apparent that capitalism (even with
the Keynesian modifications) is fraught with problems which range from
market inequities and instabilities, to power concentration, insecuri
ty, displacement of social priorities, and consumerism.

Some of these

problems are economic in orientation and others are political in
orientation. The actual classification of the origin of the problem is
not nearly as important as the recognition that these two perspectives
exist and that both of them affect our system of government.
evolved aspects have taken on

Newly

significant stature. More than ever, it

has become apparent that "to maintain a clear distinction today between
politics and economics is simply not possible" (Markovich & Pynn, 1988,
p. 18).
"The distinguishing feature of liberal democracies is the
division of labor between market and state" (Elkin, 1985b, p. 179).
With ownership and control of the means of production being essentially
posited with the private sector, the capacity to initiate and alter
major social decisions is placed in the hands of corporate owners and
corporate managers.

In this way the private sector is afforded

considerable latitude in shaping decisions which because of their
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social impact would otherwise be considered public policy decisions.
(Lindblom, 1977, p. 171).

By relegating such decisions to the private

sector, social well being becomes dependent on the market.
In the traditional theoretical perspective of

democracy, the

focus is upon the individual in their capacity as citizen.

Occurring

simultaneously, but in contradistinction, is the traditional perspec
tive of classical and neoclassical economics which focuses upon the
individual as both the producers and the consumers of goods and
services.

Although the two positions appear to be separate, they are

in reality inextricably intertwined with each other. The difference in
perspective arises from the primacy each perspective gives to one
aspect over the other.

Given this inter-relationship, the democratic

perspective cannot rationally ignore the fact that individuals are also
have a role (often competing) as producers and consumers.

Likewise,

the economic perspective cannot overlook the fact that its producers
and consumers exist in a structured political system.
A second difference between the two perspectives arises from the
demarcation of their respective spheres of influence.

The boundaries

of the political system are much more clearly delineated system than
those of the economic system.

Specific liberties, equalities and

obligations depend on the individual either being inside or outside the
political system, while the individual in the role of producers and
consumers exist in a more indefinite, almost unbounded economic system
(Dahl, 1986, p. 8) that may extend the world over.
Third, the traditional motive of the individual (citizen) in
political aggregation,

evolves from a calculus based on reason and
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ration as well as irrational and primordial stimuli.

In contrast,

traditional economics perceives that "the producer/consumer is— in the
theoretical imagination, if not in actuality— a supremely rational
computer forever calculating and comparing precise increments of gain
and loss at the margin, and acting always to maximize net utilities"
(Dahl, 1986, p. 9).

Hence an emotive feeling such as brand loyalty is

uncharacteristic of rational economic actors recognized by traditional
economic theory.
Fourth, democratic process contains a "crucial axiom" which
stipulates that citizens should have equal political influence in
matters of state governance.

That is, democracy requires that the

opportunity for each citizen to exercise influence over the decision
making process of the state, is distributed equally.

Conversely,

within traditional capitalism relationships based on power and
authority do not formally exist, but traditional capitalism does accept
vastly unequal distribution of effective consumer demand.

Instead,

these functions are subsumed by market exchanges and contracts which
are freely undertaken by rational actors with rational motive.

"Nor in

the standard version [of economic theory] is an equality of economic
resources, which might help to facilitate political equality among
citizens, and thus democracy, necessarily a desirable goal, much less
a likely outcome of market decisions" (Dahl, 1986, p. 9).

Addition

ally, the democratic vision of political equality is maintained by a
group of legal and constitutional prescriptions which essentially
guarantee certain rights, opportunities, (as well as obligations) to
each citizen.

By contrast, under the classical and neo-classical
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economic doctrine of capitalism, the role of the state is to lay down
and enforce only those rules (such as those governing contracts,
property, and collusion) which are necessary to the operation of a
market system.
Fifth, within the democratic vision "the freedom achieved by a
democratic order is above all the [primary] freedom of selfdetermination in making collective and binding decisions" (Dahl, 1986,
p. 10).

Democratic freedom then, is the freedom to establish the laws

and regulations which will govern how individuals will live together as
citizens.

"Democratic liberties therefore include all rights,

opportunities, and obligations necessary to self-determination in
collective decisions" (Dahl, 1986, p. 10).

It is implied that in a

democratic society resources should be employed as necessary to ensure
political equality.

In contrast to the democratic vision of freedom,

economic freedom is to be achieved in the setting of a competitive and
privately owned economic system, where the primary freedom is a freedom
of choice that occurs in the market place.

Having freedom of choice

means that consumers are free to choose among goods and services; that
workers are free to contract their labor with employers in return for
wages; and that producers (businessmen) are free to compete with others
in the provision of commodities and services as well as in the
acquisition of the resources necessary to produce them.

In the

economic arena the goods and services which consumers are free to
consume, is directly dependent upon their income— which is without
question not distributed equally.

The issue unfolds as income and

wealth are recognized as political resources.
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If they are distributed unequally, then how can citizens be
political equals? And if citizens cannot be political
equals, how is democracy to exist? Conversely, if democra
cy is to exist and citizens are to be political equals,
then will democracy not require something other than a
capitalist economic order— or at the very least a pretty
drastic modification of capitalism. (Dahl, 1986, pp. 10-11)
There is one final issue between democracy and capitalism that
has received increasing attention among mainstream political theorists
recently.

In the interplay of democratic liberty and equality that

occurs in the association of democracy and capitalism, the question of
how businesses— given their role of prime social actors--should be
internally governed.

From the perspective of traditional economic

theory, this question is quickly answered along the lines that since
government does not exist in private business, no leadership exists
which is empowered with power and authority— this function is appropri
ately performed by contacts and exchanges between employers and
employees.

It is the assertion of mainstream revisionists like Dahl as

well as Lindblom (not to mention numerous participationists of every
variety) that the traditional democratic perspective is lacking on this
point because it does not recognize the internal governance of a
business firm to be a government in the same sense as that body which
asserts governance over a democratic state.
Today the modern American capitalist system bears little resem
blance to the traditional image of a collection of many small private
enterprises, none of whom can significantly influence market price or
the total amount of goods sold.

Modern productive enterprises have

taken advantage of opportunities made possible by modern technology and
grown to a scale previously unknown; with the result that modern
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capitalist systems are now "typically industries now are composed of
large producers who can significantly control market conditions"
(McLaughlin, 1987, p. 218).

Furthermore, modern governments regularly

attempt to manipulate the economy through direct and indirect interven
tion.

Even if it were possible to return to nineteenth century

capitalism (and it is not), there is little evidence that it is a
necessarily desirable consideration for contemporary America.
Americans must consider whether capitalism is in fact capable of
offering what it promises; but more importantly, they must consider if
capitalism in a past or present form is really what they want for their
future.
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CHAPTER XIV

FREEDOM AND EQUALITY IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY

The Promise of Capitalism

America was established as a liberal democratic polity where
liberalism and democracy were to be realized in the political arena.
It has often been claimed that the economic arena is not to be
constrained by such guidelines.

However the limitations of this

argument have been countered innumerable times and with extensive
documentation showing a simple and relatively direct relationship
between political power and economic power.

As described in a

preceding chapter, the attitudes of the Founding Fathers make this
relationship, at least in part, one of intent rather than accident.
Substantial debate surrounds how much freedom capitalism affords
to individuals and how efficiently capitalism allocates goods and
services in society.

Some scholars such as McLaughlin (1987) argue

that the freedom of capitalism is illusory, and that capitalism is
fundamentally based on "manipulation and coercion"; yielding a system
that is antithetical to human freedom.

Conversely, Friedman argues

that a competitive capitalist economy goes a long way toward providing
people with "what they want instead of what a particular group thinks
they ought to want" (1962, p. 15).

174
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Freedom Under Capitalism

As portrayed in a preceding chapter, the system of capitalism
provides the freedom of choice. The notion of the freedom contained in
the capitalist system is proposed in contradistinction to an authority
system where the individual is assigned to engage in an exchange
regardless of the benefit derived (i.e., they have no "choice" in the
matter).

Thus,

"the capitalist ideal of freedom is simply that

whatever alternatives exist, the degree to which people are free is
solely a function of whether other humans prevent an agent from
pursuing the alternative of his choice" (McLaughlin, 1987, p. 222).
One of the most widely articulated objections to classical
liberal economic claims of freedom, is that the position ignores the
secondary effects of a transaction upon persons who are not a party to
it.

Even without resort to the third party arguments, the classical

liberal economic position fails in a number of situations.
The presence of options (choice) does not guarantee freedom in
any more than the most rudimentary existential sense.

Moreover, "if

freedom is taken simply as the presence of options, everyone is always
free, and always will be" (McLaughlin, 1987, p. 222).

For example, how

much property one owns determines the position from which they may
bargain.

An individual who has considerable assets is in a far

stronger position to negotiate favorable terms of exchange than one who
has no assets and lives hand-to-mouth.

Authority in exchange is

another source that limits liberty in the classical sense.

Since most

business enterprises are typically organized in a hierarchical fashion,
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most people (at least those who live in a nation-states with developed
market systems) spend their working hours with their freedom limited by
the authority systems of their employer.

"An organization in which few

men command thousands of others in the standardized patterns of
bureaucracy does not nourish freedom" (Lindblom, 1977, p. 47).

The

market system also abridges freedom through the impersonal (automatic)
coercive pressure it places upon the individual to labor by necessity
of survival.

Classical liberal economics viewed the impersonal

coercive pressure that the market system placed on the individual as
one of its greatest virtues.

Combined with the impersonal pressure of

the market system, there is also a degree of personal coercive pressure
that grows from livelihood being a contingent variable in the exchange.
Arrangements of personal coercion which compel everything from a wage
kickbacks to the "contribution" of personal services are especially
likely to occur in labor markets with severe unemployment.

Coercion

may also occur with the unilateral dissolution (termination) of an
existing exchange relation.^

Finally, the range of alternatives

(choices) available to the individual can be limited by design; that
is, "coercion can be covertly accomplished by systemic structuring of
alternatives" (McLaughlin, 1987, p. 222).

Hence, "liberty in market

systems exists only if everyone is able to escape coercion at the hands
of any one buyer or seller by turning to another" (Lindblom, 1977, p.
49).
Freedom in the words of Barber is "the condition enjoyed by
citizens in control of their common destiny; obedience to laws in whose
making there is significant participation; compliance with public goods
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legitimized by public deliberation and common consciousness; the reward
of a vigorous life of political participation and civic activity"
(Barber, 1986, p. 44).

Equality Under Capitalism

Capitalism contains basic values that make it the natural enemy
of democratic equality; and in many ways, limit its usefulness in
political contexts.

"Capitalism requires a competitive individual, one

who gets satisfaction from outdoing others. Capitalism does not run on
love and cooperation" (McLaughlin, 1987, p. 229).

Additionally,

capitalism is largely motivated by materialism— the notion that
happiness is achieved by possessing more and more material things—
which hardly fosters attitudes conducive to political organization.

In

short, the markets within the system of capitalism "tend to crowd out
social values" (Kuttner, 1991, p. 263).
From the traditional classical perspective, those individuals who
are extraordinarily enterprising, industrious, innovative, efficient,
or lucky, are rewarded under capitalism through increased opportunity
in the form of monetary reward.

In this role reward and incentive are

fundamental components of a market system— indeed, they are what
provide the impetus to sustain and advance the market system.

Adam

Smith, whom many consider the father of the market system, believed
that the systemic inequality breed by the market system would not be
detrimental

to the system because as the individual harvests the

fruits of success, they sow significant portions of that return back
into society thereby promoting the well being of society.

Certainly
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the inequality that accompanies systems based on monetary reward is a
systemic movement in a direction diametrically counter to the demo
cratic wish for equality.
Capitalism also has a fundamental Darwinian aspect to it that is
essential to its efficiency (not to be confused with the social
Darwinism of Herbert Spencer).

Given free reign, capitalism forces the

demise of the weak and inefficient/unprofitable and promotes the strong
and efficient/profitable.

This is positive where it maintains market

efficiency and lower prices in the near term.

However, unfettered

capitalism leads to the concentration of power in the hands of a few
thereby eliminating meaningful competition. This ultimately monopolis
tic trait inhibits the realization of democracy to a significant
degree.
Capitalism is further besieged by the perception that reliance
upon the mechanism of monetary reward corrupts the moral goals of
society by equating income or wealth with the successful life.

The

productive motivation which is often thought to come from income
differentials should rather be seen as a result of personality traits
which are modified by cultural and situational circumstance (Lindblom,
1977, pp. 43-4).

"Empirical evidence reveals no clear association

between degrees of income inequality and differences in work habits, or
diligence" (Lindblom, 1977, p. 44).

Even if an inequality of income

were justifiable as a reflection of individual superiority or achieve
ment, this is rarely the case.

Usually such an inequality is not a

reward for individual efficiency or industry but rather is acquired
through inheritance, capital gain, speculation, monopoly power, or
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graft.

More problematic for the democratic aspirations than the

unequal distribution of income, is the even greater inequality of
wealth.

Typically the wealthy inherit a substantial portion of their

assets which they in turn use to generate additional wealth.

Converse

ly those who are less than affluent are forced by the necessity of life
in modern America to "invest" in disposable goods (like automobiles)
which lose income.

The amount of poverty in a society is highly

reflective of inequalities in the distribution of wealth and income.
One cannot ignore the unequal distribution of power that accompanies
considerable wealth and income for "it undermines the precepts of a
society that highly values dispersed power and equality of treatment"
(Markovich & Pynn, 1988, p. 216).
Finally, and again in the words of Barber, equality is "the
status enjoyed by citizens who share the burdens of public responsibil
ity, who participate in the determination of public goods and common
ends, and who treat each other with the respect that comes from knowing
they belong to one another, share a common destiny, and can be free
only by creating just participatory communities.
without equality, no equality without autonomy.

There is no freedom
Only the equality of

citizens can overcome the natural inequalities of the human condition;
only the autonomy of democratic citizens can overcome the natural
insufficiency and the illegitimate dependence of essential human
nature" (Barber, 1986, pp. 44-5).
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Freedom Versus Equality:

The "Grand Choice"

As was conveyed by the title of Schumpeter's 1942/1976 book
(Capitalism. Socialism, and Democracy), there devolves a dualistic
competition which forms one of the most crucial dilemmas of modern
political economy:

"is democracy to be understood as the political

expression of capitalism or of socialist socioeconomic structure"
(Barber, 1986, p. 22).

For Barber, such dilemmas as those arising over

the basic question of whether democratic life is to be defined by
freedom and individual rights or rather by equality and social justice
are relegated to a secondary status because the primary issue of
whether society shall be directed by the political or economic system
remain unsolved.

The debate of democracy and its future is for authors

such as Hayek 1944 and Schumpeter 1942/1976 a grand economic choice
between "liberty" and "equality" while for Barber it becomes a choice
of systems— political versus economic.
In Barber's words "the grand choice classifies the social world
and its defining constructs into two polar camps:

Locke's camp, in

which can be found individualism, freedom, rights, the private sector,
voluntary exchange, the market, and private interests; and Marx's camp,
in which are found collectivism, planning, social justice, the public
sector, state coercion, rational society, and the public good" (1986,
P. 24).
Although a discussion of socialism in general, and Marxism
specifically, remains beyond the scope of this paper, the existence of
the position(s) means that by default they must be considered.

That is
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not to suggest though, that the "grand choice" is one of simple
opposites— a question of black or white.

To the considerable extent

that each system is capable of adopting attributes of the other, the
dichotomous choices become questions of degree.
Liberals and libertarians such as F. Hayek, M. Friedman and R.
Nozick all prescribe programs based on Lockean arguments and Enlighten
ment principles.

Although their arguments are contentious and vary

considerably, for the ilk of Hayek, Friedman, and Nozick, political
liberty depends on economic liberty which in turn is dependent upon the
limitation of politics and its coercive statist institutions.

From

this perspective what is public is simply the aggregate of what is
private.

The pursuit of social justice is best achieved through the

pursuit of individual interest.

"If government is a contract and

democracy a method of safely enforcing its ends— which are the
preservation of life, liberty, and property— then capitalism, ... is
the indispensable condition of democracy" (Barber, 1986, p. 23).
Problematic to such positions, is that capitalism contains internal
contradictions emanating from its basis in individual interest that
serve to rive it from democratic goals.

In addition to being ego

centric, capitalism is endemically supportive of social Darwinism— a
condition which can hardly be construed as being conducive to "life."
As for "liberty," capitalism is less than supportive— it disregards
those liberties that are not economic.

While capitalism does support

"property," it does so only in the limited sense that it supports
ownership— it does not address issues of use.
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For egalitarians the "grand choice" remains the same as for the
liberals and libertarians— if rights are chosen then equality is fore
gone; and if freedom is chosen then justice must be foregone.

However,

for extreme egalitarians, rights become a mask for privilege and free
dom becomes a euphemism for monopoly power (Barber, 1986, p. 24).
It is Barber's argument "that because democracy is the repudia
tion of all economic thinking, it is undermined by both the capitalist
and the socialist way of conceiving our choices" (Barber, 1986, p. 25).
In his view, retreat to the grand choice bars democracy "properly
understood" from being a significant option in political equations
because it confuses the issue by promoting the notion that the choice
is between types of economic systems, when in reality the choice should
be between politics and economics.

Economic Democracy

There has been increasing interest among some mainstream scholars
to argue that an alternative economic structure to American free-market
capitalism, would "help strengthen political equality and democracy by
reducing inequalities originating in the ownership and control of firms
in a system like that we now possess" (Dahl, 1985, p. 4; see also
Lindblom, 1977).

While arguments of this genre are sometimes criti

cized because they are in essence the application of political solu
tions to economic problems, it is not evident at this level that the
two are independent anymore.
From the conservative liberal position, freedom is the outgrowth
of market relations.

To produce this freedom, the market must be
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deregulated.

Taking the contrary stand,

radical liberals (and

socialists) argue that equal economic relations are necessary to
achieve freedom and focus on democratizing the work-place. The problem
with political solutions to economic problems is as Barber points out,
that "if freedom and equality are political constructs, then the pri
mary project is to democratize politics" (1986, p. 39).

Once this is

done, he contends that free and equal social relationships will spread
to other domains.

"Without a democratic politics, free markets will

only disguise private power and illegitimate coercion ... . Without
political freedom there can be no voluntary exchange hence no capital
ism" (Barber, 1986, p. 39).

Conversely, the common plans or public

goods which form one of the central premises of democracy cannot
realistically exist without political equality.

Hence, the primary

tenets of liberal democracy— freedom and equality— must be secured in
the political arena if they are to exist in the economic arena.

The Economic Impetus for Government Intervention

There is considerable (and warranted) speculation over the health
of capitalism today— a question which will be addressed in the next
chapter.

For the moment it is important to establish the impetus for

government intervention from a social perspective insulated from
national economic interests.
Government intervention is advocated on the basis that the
Smithian "invisible hand" is indeed invisible and that markets are
hardly the self-regulating paradigms envisioned by Adam Smith
(1776/1976).

Without government vigilance market systems are prone to
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socially corrosive behavior. The allocation of the market system "does
not add up to a socially defensible allocation of either private income
or public investment.

It does not efficiently or fairly distribute

certain necessary social goods like education, health, or roads or
research spending" (Kuttner, 1991, p. 263).

It is Kuttner's opinion

that a mixed economy with a large government sector can and does work
effectively

1

ft

and would be capable of addressing such issues .

Although real-world examples of market systems are tempered by
taxes and other programs of redistribution, their distribution of
social goods largely retains the great disparities of earned income
(i.e., income from wages, interest, rent, and profits) that theoreti
cally pure forms of the market system would deliver.

"in brief, pure

free-market economies can be criticized for their ... inequality"
(Kuttner, 1991, p. 4).

However, "neither logic nor empirical evidence

shows the impossibility— even the improbability— of reconciling a realworld market system with a greatly more egalitarian distribution of
wealth and income" (Lindblom, 1977, p. 43).
"Perhaps the problem with capitalism [in America] is not so much
capitalism itself but the way in which it has evolved.

Concentrated

economic power and inequalities in the system make government interven
tion mandatory, but incentives are needed to encourage investment and
efficiency" (Markovich & Pynn, 1988, p. 219).
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The Historic Setting

Post-Civil War America

In the late 19th century during the post-civil war period,
American industry was characterized by the disappearance of small
scattered producers and the emergence of large conglomerate enter
prises. As control of most of the important industries became more and
more concentrated so did the indiscretions committed by the new power
brokers.

In all probability it was the emergence of large scale

industry and mass production that made possible the substantial
improvement in the standard of living.

It was not accomplished,

however, without considerable cost to society.

Widespread labor

dislocation, social upheaval, and poverty were only a few of the costs
of large scale industrialization and mass production.

The result was

that "industry's blatant abuses of power opened the door to government
regulation" (Markovich St Pynn, 1988, p. 217).

"Accompanying this

concentration of industry was an equally striking concentration of
income in the hands of a small percentage of the population" (Hunt &
Sherman, 1975, p. 102).
The wide spread economic carnage of the great depression served
to shatter the previous American faith in neo-classical economic theory
which held omnipotent the ability of the economy to regulate itself
while providing full employment and price stability.
economic theory viewed as

What classical

the "natural" series of boom and bust

periods that create the capitalist business cycles were no longer
acceptable.

These aberrations whether temporary or not, were indeed to
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be seen as relevant to long term stability and public policy.
Shattered simultaneously with the classical economic theory was the
belief that the appropriate government behavior was to do as little as
possible to disrupt the workings of the market system. The new popular
mandate that arose from the effects of the depression, meant that
hands-off government policy was to formally give way to a policy of
limited intervention.

Government was to utilize its resources as

necessary to counterbalance economic cycles by ensuring employment
during those times when the economy itself could not reliably do so.

New Deal America

Growing out of the economic rubble and suffering caused by the
depression, the New Deal has enormous significance in American
political economy because of the precedence it established.

"The Great

Depression had discredited the idea that markets were self-regulating"
(Kuttner, 1991, p. 16) .

Later, WWII demonstrated "the power of

economic planning and the possibility of full employment" (Kuttner,
1991, p. 16) which further entrenched the New Deal motive.
While the technical aspects of the New Deal are enlightening,
they are beyond the scope of this paper and can be allocated only a
most superficial review.

The buzzwords of the 1930's— the New Deal

were never specifically defined, but they were euphemistic with the
economic intervention proposed by the Roosevelt (FDR) administration
during the period 1932-40.

These "antidepression" measures fell into

three general categories of action.

First, relief was sought for the

hardships caused by the economic depression.

Second, recovery of the
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national economy was sought.

Third, Roosevelt sought to reform those

practices that he and his advisors regarded as inhibitive or harmful of
the common good or general welfare. 19
The fact that as a tool of relief and recovery, the New Deal had
only limited success is of far less importance than the philosophical
change that it ushered in.

The latitude and feeling of the prevailing

popular mandate heralded a new outlook in American political adminis
tration— one that sought humanitarian goals, an openness to new ideas
in the relationship of government and economy, and a willingness to
expand federal powers as necessary to achieve the administrations' new
ends.
In some circles "the New Deal legislation was seen as a patchwork
approach to ensure the survival of capitalism and to stave off the
economic ruin of the people" (Markovich & Pynn, 1988, p. 27).

Under

the New Deal the government was to be responsible for the economic
welfare of its citizens.

To this end, the government utilized a

variety of means to provide temporary relief for millions of its
citizens by stimulating economic activity and moving to check the
abuses that had lead to the breakdown.

More importantly, the New Deal

introduced redistributive policies to transfer wealth from the
advantaged members of society to the disadvantaged members of society.
At the same time government also shouldered the responsibility for
regulating those business and organizations whose size suggested the
potential for the abuse of power.

It is significant to note that the

New Deal did not seek radical change through the reconstruction of
society or even the economic machinery.

Rather, New Deal policy was
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•

•

implemented as incremental change.

90

The New Deal "attempted only to

reinvigorate the market system; every major institution was retained"
(Markovich & Pynn, 1988, p. 28).

This reinvigoration was to occur and

be maintained as the government gradually intervened through conscious
and deliberate action to offset the shortcomings of the market system.
In many ways the New Deal laws are seen as having curtailed
traditional American individualism; and with them the government began
regulating aspects of the polity's lives that had previously been
considered both beyond its providence and expertise.

It was into this

new territory that J.M. Keynes stepped with his 1936 book The General
Theory of Employment. Interest, and Money which refutes (brilliantly)
the classical economic position.

Post-New Deal America

The new providence of American public policy (since the 1930s
through Reaganism) has been to directly cope with the recognized
weaknesses of capitalism.

Most of the problems facing American

capitalism are "old" problems; only a few examples are "new" and the
distinction is primarily one of frequency and severity with the
examples having changed as a result of increased strains upon the
system.

The reasons why solution or even stasis have been so success

fully elusive remain buried in the ideological foundations of our
society.

It does not appear to be a lack of experience in policy

making that has kept American polyarchy from "advancing" on the
"maldistribution" of income and wealth, poverty, racial inequality,
health care, public education,

inflation and unemployment, and
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industrial relations" (Dahl & Lindblom, 1953/1976, p. xxi).

Rather

Dahl and Lindblom as well as others find that the continued display of
"incapacities" and even "perversities" have a strain of malevolence
that emanates from central parts of our system.

The Limitations of Government Intervention

Perhaps the most quintessential case for government intervention
devolves from the natural boom and bust cycle of the market system.
The effects of the natural boom and bust business cycles of the market
led to substantial outcry for government intervention to moderate the
cycles.

In spite of its resources, government interventionist policy

can only dampen inflationary pressure or moderate unemployment with
little prospect of eliminating it.

It is the incapacity of current

methods to treat the problems simultaneously that precludes their
solution.

"Inflation is reduced by decreasing demand pressure and

unemployment; high unemployment is countered by increasing aggregate
demand and pushing prices up in the process" (Markovich & Pynn, 1988,
p. 215).

The inherent incompatibility of these two methods places

government intervention in a precarious position and in pursuit of an
increasingly elusive goal.
Where the market is unable or uninterested in providing goods and
services, government intervention is sought.

For example, issues of

unemployment are a primary social concern that capitalism has little
interest in once its needs are fulfilled.

Unfortunately the current

solution— the welfare program--is a dismal fix from the social
perspective.

The welfare dole can hardly be construed as any kind of
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conciliatory prize.

Its necessity is a burden imposed on democratic

society by an economic system that finds its roots in primary values of
competition and materialism (McLaughlin, 1987, p. 229).

Certainly the

stop-gap nature of welfare politics must give way to something more
productive if democracy is to proceed.

In a permanent capacity

welfarism in and of itself can never be a solution to the deficiencies
of capitalism.

Even in a temporary capacity welfarism is of precious

little value unless it is accompanied by both education and, as the
Founding Fathers recognized, a stake in society.

Thus even if the thin

promise of the potential to gain stake in our society were the solution
to the woes of capitalism; under the current principles of capitalism
has become so translucent that for most of the underclass it can no
longer be discerned.

If the experiments in social welfare which have

taken place on the European continent have any meaning, it is that
programs of welfare are no solution where a society remains hierarchi
cally closed to the underclass (Kotkin, 1991, pp. 23~4).
The inability of government intervention to significantly impact
the pressing social issues of "the people" stems from the fact that
"'the people' is a reification, a powerful political fiction" (Morone,
1990, p. 7).

That is to say, the democratic wish which "imagines a

single, united people bound together by a consensus over the public
good which is discerned through direct citizen participation in
community settings. ... is a utopian image" (Morone, 1990, p. 7).

That

is not to claim that many features of the ideology are not "practica
ble" but rather that they pose, in their current state, an enormous
handicap to any such solution.
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In many ways the capacity for political initiative that comes
with economic strength is also to blame.

Economic "might" typically

results in the transcendence of narrow individual interests over broad
public interest.

Take for example the mentality of the statement by a

past president of General Motors— "For years I thought what is good for
our country was good for General Motors, and vice versa" (Lindblom,
1977, p. 187).

The skewed egocentrism of this statement reveals where

corporate America feels they rate in the democratic scheme of America;
and by extension, where they feel public interests should rate in
American democracy.

Such thinking is counter to democracy, at least it

is counter to the democratic ideal, in the sense that it is founded on
consensus.
discernable,

"The people form a homogeneous body with a shared,
public interest that transcends narrow individual

concerns. Only malefactors ... would spurn the common good for private
gain" (Morone, 1990, p. 6).

However, Kuttner cautions that "American

Liberals who once scoffed at the idea that 'what's good for General
Motors is good for the country' ought not to go in the opposite
direction and insist that it simply doesn't matter if General Motors
goes down the drain" (Kuttner, 1991, p. 285).

The point is, economic

powers not only have the clout to command inordinate political sway,
but they also have the clout to deflect battles over economic equality
so that they become battles of political representation.

That is not

to say, that economic "might" alone is capable of such feats.

Rather,

such reform occurs as the result of economic clout coupled with the
political dynamic that grows from the populist base of the American
system.
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The most significant limitations on government intervention have
been handed down from the Founding Fathers. "They had no hope and they
offered none for any organic change in the way men conduct themselves.
The result was that while they thought self-interest the most dangerous
and unbrookable quality of man, they necessarily underwrote it in
trying to control it" (Hofstadter, 1955, p. 16).

Still today, attempts

to procure "organic change" on an altruistic basis are as rare as they
are successful.

The few examples that have been slipped into American

politics are essentially tokens— they are tools used to avert coordi
nated or widespread urban unrest and possible insurrection.

The

Johnson administration's "war on poverty" is merely a singular example
of a larger theme of reformist "redistributive" politics.

The

legitimation of organized labor and the political empowerment of black
Americans were also examples of the same theme.

Interestingly, all of

the bit parts in the common theme to address the struggles of oppressed
groups in society were gained on an ad hoc basis.

Such examples were

not the offspring of some altruistic social/political reformist system.
Rather, they were the child of necessity— they quell the mounting
social animosity of large groups who are ripe for unified action.
However, it is not for lack of desire that reform minded politicians
are often thwarted in their endeavors. Rather, it is due to the nature
of adversarial democracy and its reliance on consensus. Although most
such pressure for reform actions as cited above were relatively "safe"
(i.e., confined to the political arena with little or no economic
result), they were in each case "blocked by the checks of the liberal
state. Entrenched interests shout 'socialism' to mobilize conservative
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allies.

Multiple layers of federalism, overlapping bureaucratic

jurisdictions, oversight by competing authorities (furiously balancing
one another), and a multitude of other institutions all reinforce the
limits to government action" (Morone, 1990, p. 27).

In such cases

reformers must overcome the impasse between popular cries for dutiful
action and the limits on government.

By returning controversial

programs such as the legitimation of organized labor, the empowerment
of black Americans, and the "war on poverty, to the community for the
people to decide, not only is the impasse abrogated but also consensus
is created.

In this way,

the new programs create new agencies that muster up and
modernize old town-meeting ideals. They offer an exuberant
mix of democratic images and contemporary organizational
methods: open meetings, civic education, broad opportuni
ties to participate, professional staff support. The one
thing they lack is political authority (after all, if the
state could have mandated the authority, the exercise in
democracy would have not been necessary) . (Morone, 1990, p.
28)
After the programs are implemented, the overt or perceived consensus
fades into a struggle between new groups and interests to secure a
standing in the new program so as to insure a legitimate place in the
political system.

New participants in the political system use the

nascent institutions to bring out controversy that was previously
suppressed by the established elites. The battle which was originally
introduced as a quest for democratic equality in the economic sense has
been converted (subverted) into a battle of representation that takes
place on the "political periphery" (Morone, 1990, p. 28). What is most
important in this conversion process is that "battles of representation
do not easily grow into conflicts over economic status.

... The
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politics of democratic yearning promote political change while
deflecting fights about economic relations" (Morone, 1990, p. 28).
As Morone points out, the limitations on government intervention
evolve from great irony.

In the quest for the democratic wish— "the

direct participation of a united people pursuing a shared communal
interest" (1990, p. 5)— a huge bureaucracy has been built up while at
the same time "communal hopes reinforced liberal institutions" (1990,
P. 29).
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CHAPTER XV

THE CRISIS OF CAPITALISM

Systemic Economic Problems

Considerable evidence exists (high unemployment, low corporate
profit rates, international trade imbalance) to suggest that capitalism
itself is of dubious health.

Davis and Scase (1985) with only slight

trepidation, assert that the condition of capitalism today warrants
being labeled a crisis due to the emergent impediments to the private
sectors' accumulation of wealth.
Semantics aside, there are plenty of data which suggest that the
rate of profit from industrial production is on the decline in the
developed capitalist economies.

This decrease in profit rate is

thought to inhibit capital investment to the point that it prevents
economic growth which in turn "hinder the creation of new occupations
and bring about increases in the level of unemployment" (Davis & Scase,
1985, p. 133).

While the public perception may not immediately

recognize failures of the economic realm to be within the realm of
political decision making and control, nevertheless the end result is
that the disabilities of capitalism creates a social burden that
Op
#
#
becomes a political burden.
There are a variety of explanations for
the decline in the rate of capitalist profit.

195
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Declining Profits

The position of the radical economists (beginning with Marx) is
that there is an inherent tendency within the capitalist mode of
production for the rate of profit to drop as the system develops. The
tendency of capitalists to attempt to increase worker productivity by
applying increasing amounts of technology to the work process, results
in a disproportionate ratio of constant capital (equipment) to variable
capital (labor).

As this ratio becomes more skewed, it brings about a

fall in the rate of profit.

That is, as labor productivity nears its

maximum, additional expenditures of capital for new technology and new
equipment will bring about decreasing returns on that capital expendi
ture.

To compensate for such "inevitable" profit decline, businesses

typically respond by expanding the scale of production to counter the
lost profits.

Thus an economy of scale emerges where profits from low

margin goods are made by high volumes of unit sales.

Alternatively,

the capitalist corporation could increase its profit margin by
attempting to achieve monopoly status through mergers and acquisitions.23

Labor Liability

Other explanations of capitalism's declining profit rate
originate with the argument that the dynamic of the accumulation
process has been weakened largely as a result of wage labor's partially
successful struggle against capital (Hiramelstrand, Ahrne, Lundberg, &
Lundberg, 1981).

Davis and Scase (1985, p. 139) conclude that "the
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bargaining strength of employees in both Britain and Sweden has
contributed to a decline in profitability."

While the circumstances

surrounding the labor movements in Britain and Sweden are very
different than the American experience, it seems entirely plausible
that the labor union instigation of reform in the work-place (e.g.,
health and safety, security of employment, and quality of working life)
has cut into corporate profitability.

International Competition

Although this paper focuses on the domestic issues of capitalism
(and democracy), a brief look at the impact of international economic
factors on domestic relations is enlightening.
"Contemporary capitalism, dates from WWII, and is characterized
by monopolistic competition on a global scale" (Markovich & Pynn, 1988,
p. 215).

The impact of global competition and global financial net

works on American democratic capitalism is quite significant. America,
as a mature capitalist country, is threatened on two fronts from
international competitors who have been able to underprice many of the
manufactured goods produced there.

The first threat is from the native

owned indigenous companies of the developing industrial countries.

0/

The companies, beside being typically successful in regional and
national markets, are successful in international markets against the
companies of mature capitalist nations because of their lower produc
tion costs associated with lower wages, unregulated working conditions,
and lack of organized labor.

Second, are the companies that are owned

and operated by multinational corporations.

Of the two fronts
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threatening American capitalist enterprises, it is the multinational
corporation that is far and away the most dangerous.

Branch manufac

turing units are established literally the world over (especially in
less developed countries) according to comparative analyses of local
production costs. As a consequence of the atypical bargaining position
of the multinational, "governments are often forced to compete with
each other in providing favourable fsicl 'sites' for production and
this can entail the promise of strict control over trade unions, the
offer of grants and tax rebates for factory construction, and the
supply of an acquiescent labour fsicl force" (Davis & Scase, 1985, p.
140).
The new international competition is contributing to de
industrialization in Western capitalist countries.
domestic industry in a number of ways.

This impacts

First, the U.S. must compete

• •
with other nations by offering competitive
inducements25 to multina
tional corporations so that they locate production in the United
States.

Second, investment ventures in the U.S. may now be passed-over

for the more appealing profit margins in the industrializing third
world.

Third, the industrial competition in manufactured goods has

contributed to the demise of American industry by trimming profits and
winning away contracts.
The factors contributing to the crisis of capitalism— the
increased organic composition of capital, the increased strength of
organized labor, and the increased industrialization of less developed
countries— are all related.

The growth of large corporations is at

least partially due to the pursuit of economies of scale.

"The
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development of organized labour [sic] has been encouraged by the growth
of large-scale corporations which have, in turn, invested in manufac
turing in a number of developing countries" (Davis & Scase, 1985, p.
142).

The State and Capitalism

The decline in industrial profits has made it increasingly
difficult for such corporations to internally fund their investment
programs and has cut them off from external help in the form of loans
and other sources of credit.

This decline in profits has inhibited the

technological modernization and further weakened the competitive
position of many corporations in the Western capitalist economies.
Strinati (19 82) finds these factors to be the impetus for Western
democracies to become involved in the economy.

Kuttner (1991) finds

the need for state intervention to be particularly acute in America
where a tradition of laissez-faire economics has left the American
economy dangerously vulnerable to exploitation by other nations, non
capitalist and capitalist alike.
In general, Western states have increasingly relied on four
primary strategies for encouraging capital accumulation (Davis & Scase,
1985, p. 143).

First, through offers of loans and subsidies to many

corporations they have sought to reduce the production costs.

Second,

the state has become a major customer in the purchase of goods and
services at rates that guarantee healthy profit rates to the corpora
tions under contract.

Third, the state has occasionally subsumed

ownership of corporations and segments of industry faced with bank
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ruptcy when because of their public utility, strategic significance,
employment significance, or technological significance, they cannot be
allowed to fail without hurting the national economic status.

Fourth,

some states have attempted to restrict labors' wage demands (Strinati,
1982) to bolster corporate profits.

Since the bargaining strength of

labor is greatest in periods of high employment (as in the 1950s and
1960s) and decreases as employment rates fall, recent governments have
had unexpected respite from labor pressure as a result of the high
current unemployment rates eroding the negotiating strength of labor.
Winkler (1977) has argued that the growing trend of state
invention in the economy, with private ownership being combined with
public control, is leading to corporatism.

For Winkler, the "facilita-

tive" state, which was esteemed by the neo-classical economists as
being primarily concerned with the provision of the basic legal, labor
and monetary conditions essential to the efficient operation of the
"capitalist mode of production," has been necessarily supplanted by a
more "supportive" or even "directive" state role.

In contrast to the

facilitative state, the supportive state provides a range of subsidies
and services to private industry.

The state assumes the function of

currying those ingredients most facilitative to the capitalist free
enterprise system— from education and training, to health and welfare,
to high technology research and development.

The directive state is

characterized by direct intervention and command of the internal
decision-making elements in privately owned productive processes.

This

stage of state intervention, typically called corporatism, is cited
here only for perspective without any inference that the U.S. is or
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should be headed in this direction.

Corporatism and the directive

state (best exemplified by France, pre-unification Germany, and Sweden)
have suffered significant set-backs in the latter part of the 1980s and
remain a dubious proposition today.
Ultimately it becomes necessary to balance the interactive
relationship of politics in the economic arena with reality and ideal.
The stress placed by the traditional liberal-democratic model on the
freedom of the capital accumulation process from state intervention,
(as well as organized labor) has not appeared to be very successful for
more than a century.

Suggestions of reliance upon a market-disciplined

restructuring of capital to provide sufficient reinvestment capital to
sustain the capitalist engine must be viewed with increasing skepti
cism.

However, if there is any credibility in the belief that

competitive markets allow efficient corporations to make profits, the
case for at least limiting state intervention becomes stronger.

The

quandary occurs as the state must wait for corporate profits to be
converted into investment capital so that jobs can be created to reduce
the unemployment levels.

Where private industry does not or cannot do

this the state must intervene— but at what cost?

Solutions that

prescribe a directive role for the state are often seen to border on
the social democratic position which "urges the expansion of the public
sector in order to absorb surplus labour fsicl and to create demand for
a variety of goods and services" (Davis & Scase, 1985, p. 148).
Predictably, such solutions are also often seen to carry the latent
possibility of decreasing the liberties of the tradition liberal
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democratic model.

For the majority though, who have little say in the

matter, that would be the lesser of the two evils.

Systemic Political Problems

The political nature of capitalism evolves from a bifurcated
base.

First, many of the movements of the economy have an impact on

society that may be construed as political in nature. Second, there is
increasing application of political solutions to ameliorate what are by
nature economic problems. While the market system is lauded for the
efficient allocation and free movement of resources, it cannot be
relied upon always to provide those items that are essential to the
achievement of long range social goals.
Power and the concentration thereof, which capitalism not just
permits but fosters and perpetuates has been an issue in the United
States since the late 19th century.

The increasing power of the

capitalist was but one aspect of an issue that is now vastly overshad
owed by the concentrated power of corporations.

Capitalism in the

United States spawned a concentration of economic might that was also
translated into concentrated political might. Huge financial resources
permit large firms and wealthy individuals to donate weighty amounts to
political campaigns, to hire lobbyists, to influence the press through
advertising accounts, and to hire talented legal consul to pursue their
interests.
The turf battles between private enterprise and polyarchy are
more explicable when it is understood that "both private enterprise
market systems and polyarchy are methods for popular control over
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'public' decisions" (Lindblom, 1977, p. 162).

Where whole segments of

markets move toward consolidation (monopoly) as they naturally do— and
indeed must do in the pursuit of efficiency— there is an expansion of
economic power.

Economic power by nature as well as "necessity" seeks

as a part of its base to consolidate its position through an expansion
of political influence and power.

Statistics of new business starts

are sometimes cited as being indicative of the impossibility of
monopoly achievement.

This position is not convincing.

It is not

difficult to see through the profitability of mom and pop type business
enterprise— they are capable of "profitable" operation at the margin
only because what they consider as expenses are not a reflection of
actuality.

The Problem of Insecurity

The capitalist system breeds insecurity because of its constantly
changing business environment.

Firms which are inefficient because of

obsolescence are forced from the market place by modern efficient
firms.

The impact of this culling process yields substantial disloca

tions of labor and capital as industries rise and fall.

Yet it is

precisely the dynamic forces of change that make capitalism efficient.
"The problem is to combine economic progress with economic security
when to a great extent they are mutually incompatible" (Thurow, 1980,
p. 42).

Today this problem has been addressed through the intervention

of government with such programs as social security, unemployment
insurance, government backed loans, and price supports.

By offering

the umbrella of government protection, new problems are created through
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the lost incentive of firms to strive to be efficient and supply
product in demand and employees to be productive and reasonable in wage
demands.

Worse yet, once an individual or firm is under protection

there is little incentive to modify their behavior since their reward
is the removal of protection.

26

The Chrysler paradigm proved that

"under the government umbrella, success is guaranteed at any level of
performance as long as government can be convinced demise would be
detrimental to the economy" (Markovich & Pynn, 1988, p. 217).

The Problem of Public Goods

As noted in Chapter XI, the market system is based on the price
mechanism, and as such it has no way to establish the value of items
like pure air, pure water, or virgin forests that occur naturally and
are thus "free."

A free good is likely to be "wasted" by the market,

since it has not been valued by the market, it is treated as having no
value.

Hence the system has no method of establishing the entrepre

neurial cost of polluting or consuming it.

Where the market allows

private industry to remain willfully negligent of their caused
environmental deterioration, only government intervention and regula
tion can force them to recognize the associated costs.
similar fashion in which the market system breaks down.

There is a

Since price is

the exclusive signal that allocates resources and determines output,
the market system left to its own devices will naturally produce goods
that are profitable without regard to their social desirability or
necessity.

The breakdown of the price mechanism may occur on such

socially desirable and essential elements as infrastructure projects or
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health care or education.

The demand for social goods can not be

reflected through their price largely because these items are by nature
enormous items and can not be divided and bought as individual units.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

CHAPTER XVI
CONCLUSIONS

We built a powerful society without adequate thought for
the purposes to which its power was to be devoted.
We
built a wealthy society without adequate concern about the
objects upon which its wealth should be expended. We
thought that justice would be the inherent consequence of
our acquisition of power and wealth. What we forgot is
that societies are not bound together by material con
quests; their unity is found in equal devotion to a common
idea. Fellowship does not endure in states disfigured by
such sharp contrasts as those which have deprived us of an
equal interest in the operation. (Laski, 1933, p. 264)

Summary

Part I

In Part I, "The Concept of Democracy," the Western notion of
democratic government is broken down and viewed from a variety of
perspectives. The Greek origins of democracy are traced but found to
be of little real significance in the contemporary application of
democracy.

The issue which arises over the application of democracy on

the scale of the nation-state, develops into a question that can
neither be dismissed lightly, nor overlooked for the remainder of the
paper.

Classical democratic process proves to be a chimera of

circumstance.
Political liberalism— as distinct from economic liberalism— is
found to be the basis from which American democratic thought derives.
Although political liberalism preceded economic liberalism (Sartori's
206
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liberism) by some two centuries, the two positions are often confused.
Where classical political liberalism— in its quest for the freedom of
the individual in society— rejected the state, the classical economic
liberalism of Adam Smith built on the doctrine of laissez-faire sought
an extremely limited role for national government (the maintenance of
peace, property, and contract) that restricted it from interference in
economic affairs.

The degree to which American democracy contains

liberal ideals and motives, means that all references to American
democracy must be understood in a generic sense to encompass a mixture
of the two theories (liberalism and democracy) which is dominated by
the liberal component and its attendant goal of individual freedom.
With the foundation for modern democracy laid, the discussion
turns to establishing the meaning of democracy in the modern western
sense.

In its common usage, the exact meaning of democracy is found to

be somewhat difficult to establish because the term is used to refer to
both the ideal application and the methodological application of the
word.

Additionally, democracy in the prescriptive (ideal) sense is

often rather far removed from descriptive (methodological) attempts to
apply that ideal.
From the ideal base of democracy it is possible to develop what
are in effect the tenets of democracy.

What is not possible, is to

precisely establish the degree and proper mixture of participation,
liberty, equality, and systemic responsiveness— that is, there are a
number of perspectives as well as a number of real—world examples which
signify that some latitude in the mix is possible.

Freedom and liberty

are found to be less than synonymous with democracy; although, some
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freedoms (certain kinds) are found to be necessary for democracy and
democracy is found to be necessary to some types of freedom.
The fulfillment of the tenets of democracy pose vexing problems
for systems of government.

The lot system, and direct democracy are

found to contain assumptions that are unrealistic in the circumstance
of today's nation-state. Representative democracy— with both question
able success and a suspect amount of representation and democracy— is
the only system to approach the needs of the democratic nation-state.
Finally, democracy contains a number of paradoxes that essen
tially devolve from the imperfect administration of democracy on the
scale required by the nation-state. These paradoxes remain unsolved in
democratic theory and form a backdrop of on-going compromise and
debate.

Part II

In Part II, "Theories of Democracy," the discussion of evolves
from a review of three groups of theories which together form the nexus
of democracy.

The progression of the following three theories within

democracy is crucial to the understanding of their relative importance
and of their relationships to one another.
The debate over participation as presented in Part I is developed
to enunciate and solidify the mainstream views of the revisionists and
the participationists.

The initial debate over the revisionist

position (exemplified by Schumpeter) versus the participationist
position (exemplified by Pateman)

97

finds its genesis in the competi

tion between contemporary democracy and traditional democracy, as well
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as in the competition of method divorced from ideal and method tempered
by ideal.

The issue of participation and the problems thereof are

central to the democratic question.

The vast majority of this paper

devolves from the position established by Schumpeter vis-a-vis
contemporary democratic theory— a position which "has gained almost
universal support among present-day political theorists" (Pateman,
1970, p. 14).

The work cited (Dahl in particular), is largely the

extension of Schumpeter's position and as such is based on what is
perceived to exist in actuality.

In final analysis the degree of

participation necessary to maintain democracy remains a highly
contentious issue that is inextricably intertwined with the other
issues of freedom, equality, and systemic responsiveness.

It is within

the embrace of, and because of, pluralism that both the revisionist
theory and the participatory theory have significance.
The review of pluralist theory explores the root and the role of
pluralism in democratic systems.

The theory of pluralism— the open

competition of diverse interests— is the cornerstone upon which
democracy is structured.
premises.

The theory itself develops from three

First, groups have power which they exercise directly over

society and which in turn gives them a stake in the control of the
state.

Second, it is groups rather than individuals (including

individual businesses and corporations) which are the primary reality
of modern industrial society.

Third, as long as power and control are

divided among multiple strong and active competing interests, there is
little need to fear the emergence of an institutionalized "power elite"
from either government leaders of industrialists.

The greatest hope
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comes from the tradition of pluralism (both politically and econom
ically).

It is, however, no panacea.

Although recognized by pluralism

as a fact of modern life, the highly unequal distribution of political
and economic power among groups must lead the success of the pluralist
model to be at least partly suspect. The enormously positive contribu
tions of pluralist tradition will prolong the existence of democratic
capitalism but does not contain within it the capacity to initiate the
kind of substantive social change necessary to reign in the economic
system to once again be the servant of its popularly based political
master.

This section concludes with the recognition of some poten

tially grave problems that threaten and to a degree vitiate the vital
and necessary role that pluralism plays in democracy.

Whether the

pluralist model will buy enough time and create a wide enough buffer
between politics and economics to avert an auto/technocratic regime led
by major economic interests remains to be seen.
The theory of "polyarchy"— the last theory reviewed— is the
description of actual democracy,’ that is, contemporary democracy as it
exists in method as opposed to ideal. It is the imperfect but arguably
most highly developed approximation of democracy that has been achieved
in the West.

Polyarchy is the framework formed by active democracy.

It is intended (see Dahl,

1966) as being a value-free descriptive

theory which describes the operation of certain political systems
thought to be democratic in the Western sense.

28

The theories of

participation and pluralism must be considered as occurring within and
contributing to what is called polyarchy.
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Part III

In Part III, "Capitalism and the Democratic State," the nature of
capitalism and its relationship to democracy is explored.
begins with the market system and how it functions.

The review

As originally

conceived, the market system of classical liberal economics is found to
a capable allocator of resources (in a relative, not absolute sense).
In the American approximation of Adam Smith's vision of non-regulation,
the market system does a notoriously poor job of distributing social
goods and services to more than a small segment of society.
A look at the heritage of the American political tradition
reveals that the staple tenets of the ideology have, from the begin
ning, held in reverence "the sanctity of private property, the right of
the individual to dispose of and invest it, the value of opportunity,
and the natural evolution of self-interest and self-assertion, within
broad legal limits" (Hofstadter, 1955, p. viii). In this setting the
business of politics was and still is "to protect this competitive
world, to foster it on occasion, to patch up its incidental abuses, but
not to cripple it with a plan for common collective action" (Hofstad
ter, 1955, p. viii).

After an avowal limited to the verbal support of

egalitarian (equalitarian) democracy at the Constitutional Convention,
a truly democratic movement takes root but peaks around the time of
Tocqueville first "discovers" America.

The egalitarian America which

Tocqueville discovers is more a circumstance of fate than of design,
and remains a democracy strongly steeped in the ideal but only weakly
steeped in practice.
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Next,
state.

capitalism is placed in the context of the democratic

The pluralism of the modern democratic state is found to be

contradict capitalism in its assessment of power relationships and the
acceptance of government.

The armistice between the two positions

which enabled capitalism to survive, was the result of a moderation in
the position of capitalism.

Even with the moderation of the capitalist

position on power and government, capitalism as it operates in the
democratic state faces a number of problems that arise as a result of
the dependence of democracy upon private sector mechanisms to perform
public sector functions.

This overlap of function has developed

through the Smithian economic model and beyond into a turf battle
between the economic and political systems.

Given the traditional

American hostility for government, the battle has clearly been biased
toward the economic system.
The notion of capitalist freedom— the freedom of individual
choice available only through the market mechanism— is explored and
found to be significantly weak.

While the freedom of capitalism is not

an outright lie, it is found to be of such limited application that it
is in effect a misnomer.

The promise of freedom has long been used by

capitalism as a lure to countervail and quell egalitarian yearning
among the general populous.

Liberty and equality in America appear in

competition— as an either/or proposition.

"Although equality is

clearly a necessary condition for democracy, it may not be a necessary
condition for liberty; and equality is definitely not a sufficient
condition.

On the contrary, because equality facilitates majority

despotism, it threatens liberty" (Dahl, 1985, p. 9).

The traditional
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view of freedom (liberty) and equality as being mutually exclusive has
led to a political ideology that views most decisions as a "grand
choice" between these two positions.

Barber (1986) establishes that

the "grand choice" has historically been perceived in terms of a choice
over types of economic systems, when in fact it is a choice of what is
political versus what is economic.
Much of the impetus for government intervention has comes from
two perspectives.

First, an unregulated market system is found to be

neither self-regulating nor egalitarian in the distribution of goods
and services.

Second, unmoderated market economies go through

significant cycles of prosperity and famine (boom and bust). From the
standpoint that the economic instabilities of the market directly
affect the social well-being of the demos and thus political stability,
government intervention is seen as a tool to alleviate both social
calamity and political instability.
Capitalism is found to suffer also from a number of problems,
both economic and political in nature.

While classical and neo

classical economics sought limited government interventionary assis
tance in addressing economic problems, modern capitalism has needed
ever greater infusions of political assistance while at the same time
facing increasingly burdensome demands from the political system.

In

the economic arena, declining profits, labor liabilities, and interna
tional competition have increasingly made it imperative for capitalism
to seek political relief.

Simultaneously the onus of political demands

for concessions designed to promote stability and to reconcile cap-

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

214
italism's disregard of public goods have proven to be an increasingly
heavy burden for capitalism.

Conclusion

The Crisis of Democracy

Despite the manifold predictions of demise, democracy is not yet
in crisis.

It would, in all likelihood, be exciting to exclaim the

imminent demise of democracy.

Certainly substantial attention could be

garnered (had this trick not already been exhaustively utilized) with
proclamations of crisis.

However, such claims of crisis smack of

sensationalism and unfortunately, like "the boy who cried wolf" these
claims tend to undermine legitimate efforts to curry interest in
addressing what should more realistically be viewed as at most an
incremental decline.

"The system of democracy works by virtue of

certain processes which its theory never describes, to which its theory
is actually hostile. But we identify the system with the theory, as if
we actually lived by the ancient Jeffersonian image of democracy we
cherish, so that when we are confronted with some of the practices
which make democracy work we become terrified that the system is
breaking up" (Hartz, 1962, p. 25).
In its reference with democracy, the very notion of "'crisis'
suggests an imminent collapse" (Bobbio, 1976/1987b, p. 17).

Nowhere

can there be found significant evidence indicating the imminent
collapse of democracy— least of all in the U.S.

Certainly "democracy

is not enjoying the best of health in the world today, and indeed has
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never enjoyed it in the past, but nor does it have one foot in the
grave" (Bobbio, 1976/1987b, p. 17).

The impending sense of doom

carried in the notion of crisis fails to recognize or reflect the
dynamically adaptive nature of democracy.

It also fails to recognize

that "democracy has always worked through group coercion, crowd
psychology, and economic power, yet for fifty [eighty] years these
factors have sent a tremor through democratic hearts" (Hartz, 1962, p.
25).
The crisis of democracy which Laski identified in 1933 was not
new even then.

Already some 30 years prior, E.L. Godkin (see Hartz,

1962, p. 25) had heralded the impending "crisis."

What was new were

the expectations of achievement of the democratic ideal. Each time it
was the discrepancy between ideal and practice that made democracy
appear to be in crisis.

However, a look back at the discrepancy

between the ideals and practices of the Founding Fathers reveals that
from the ideal standpoint they could hardly be perceived as true
democrats.

Had it not been for the unforseen (accidental) coordination

of agenda by the Northern merchants and the Southern planters,
America's populist base would have been far weaker and much more
removed from power than it is.

Interestingly, following Laski's

"crisis" came some 40 years of exceptional growth in the practical
application of popular social reform (democratic rights).

With those

years of growth also came the growth of big government and the imperial
presidency.

The public antagonism with big government and the imperial

presidency also extended to the government programs thought to have
caused it.

Although some government programs which sought to expand
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democratic rights suffered a set-back beginning with the Carter
administration, 29 the halt m

•
the expansion
of democratic rights that

occurred with the Carter administration can hardly be construed as
crisis.

Much more appropriate is Dahl's contention that the method

ological application of democracy (polyarchy) has reached a "plateau"
(1990, p. 89).

It could even be legitimately be argued that democracy

has regressed somewhat from its high point in the early 1970s.

But

given the nature of pluralist society and incremental policy change,
the regression occurred in a very narrow spectrum; that is, it was
incremental in more than just method— it was also incremental in
cumulative impact, stopping at a level far above the apocalypse so
often heralded.

The significance of pluralism as observed by Tocque-

ville in 1835 is even greater today.

While "the existence of rela

tively independent organizations is not sufficient for democracy; ...
it is evidently necessary for democracy and liberty on a national
scale" (Dahl, 1985, pp. 46-7).
The point is, democratic method (polyarchy) is in an increasingly
perilous position, but it will not fail tonight or tomorrow, and its
cause is not yet lost in America (or abroad).

Although the adaptive

nature of the methodological democratic process has over time removed
it to a great extent from its roots in ideal terms.

Democracy is still

yearned for and sought by a popular base that seems to be growing not
just in the U.S., but world-wide

which would indicate that despite

the methodological limitations of practice,
desirable.

democracy remains highly

In the U.S. specifically, Morone's "democratic wish"
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retains its popular appeal despite its distance from the dictum of
eality in the modern nation-state.

Democracy and Capitalism

Neither is the future outlook for democracy exactly glowing.
While it would be perhaps quite gratifying to be able to emphatically
extol a virtuous prognosis for the future of democracy, to do so would
be self-deluding.

Democracy in its most highly developed examples

appears to be waning, 32 and its economic consort— capitalism— appears
to be consuming itself along with democracy.

At issue is, ostensibly,

the relationship between democracy and capitalism.
It is easy, but incorrect, to think of democracy and capitalism
as separate but coexistent social systems— each with its own high
ideals of liberty or equality or some such thing.

The true picture is

much more significantly related than that. As observed by Usher (1981)
and many others, every society must have some system of "assignment".
In every society there must be some organizational method that
coordinates the distribution of the goods (manufactured and otherwise)
that exist in that society.

Additionally such a system should promote

the existence of many kinds of goods.

What is perhaps least widely

understood "are the momentous consequences for the welfare of any
society" (Lindblom, 1977, p. 171) that such matters determine.

Thus

the ultimate question is not merely one of which economic consort is
best suited to American democracy; but rather, it is more directly the
question of how to best distribute what material goods exist in
society.

At the juncture between practice and theory, this question
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must be tempered with the realization that concurrent with the
distribution of the material world is a similar but intangible
distribution of "spiritual" goods.

"An emphasis only upon material

acquisition cannot produce a united society once the capacity to
acquire is threatened in its foundations; that it fails to make
response to those spiritual springs of discontent which, when they are
neglected, in the end always overwhelm our fragile material construc
tions" (Laski, 1933, p. 265).

Although the industrial revolution made

possible by capitalism brought achievements in material acquisition, it
came at an enormous price in terms of the human suffering imposed upon
large segments of society.

Is the human suffering justifiable because

it fueled the engine of the industrial revolution which is often
propounded as what has enabled capitalist democracy to succeed?

No.

"Democracy requires neither opulence nor ... material standards. ... It
requires instead a widespread sense of relative economic well-being,
fairness, and opportunity, a condition derived not from absolute
standards but from perceptions of relative advantage and deprivation"
(Dahl, 1971, pp. 62ff; 1985, p. 46).
The current rendition of democratic government is increasingly
incapable of fulfilling the needs and desires of large portions of the
populous.

It is a government that is largely removed from popular will

and that actively permits the further consolidation of wealth among a
declining minority portion of the populous while fulfilling broad based
popular programs only to the degree necessary to keep large segments of
the polity from riot.

The swelling ranks of the underclass is

generating a whole segment of society that has become so distanced from

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

219
mainstream institutions that even the most basic social values begin to
be devoid of meaning (see McCall, 1991, p. 6).

The underclass

becomes the chaotic discard of society, desperate for direction and
physical survival in a complex industrial society that no longer needs
them nor wants them.
Once the relationship in modern democracies of money to politics
is understood (i.e., that money is an inveterately corrupting force in
politics), it becomes apparent that the greatest immediate gains in
democratic rights can be made by reforming the economic structure of
democratic capitalist society.

Given the status of the corporation as

the largest social entities and due to their hierarchical structure
they are the greatest bastion of non-deraocratic government (authority
systems) in society (Dahl, 1985, 1990; Lindblom, 1977).

The damage

done to democratic society by narrow (selfish) pursuit of individual
interests, while undesirable, pales in significance when compared to
the damage done by the pursuit of narrow individual corporate inter
ests.

Given the capacity of economic power to procure political power,

any reformation in this area (other than the idyllic) can occur only if
the government takes an active role in pursuing a referendum of reform
inspired by popular interest.

Although Dahl and Lindblom both provide

o/

good reason

to believe that the gains made by democratizing the

internal structure of corporations are the least expensive method in
relative terms to achieve greater political democracy, it is still
methodologically expensive and precarious. As governmental bureaucracy
grows to fulfill its administrative duties, there is always the risk
that facilitative and directive government becomes intrusive and
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"impositive".

Although the quest for economic democracy through the

revision of the corporate structure is a meritorious goal, it is not
obvious that this is not merely a symptomatic fix for a structural
ailment.
One of the greatest paradoxes of democracy is that "hierarchical
organizations are also necessary for freedom" (Dahl & Lindblom,
1953/1976, p. 42).

Ultimately it appears that to have freedom on a

greater scale would require a government to control the market or for
some market functions to be subsumed under government administration
(Dahl, 1985)— both methods are less than desirable in light of the
American democratic tradition.

Free-market capitalism, if it is to be

used in conjunction with democracy because of its efficiency at
resource allocation, requires the consociation of a political system
which places greater emphasis on equality and government involvement
than is likely to occur in the American setting.
The democratic demise recorded by Laski 60 years ago was more
than social destitution wrought by economic inequality, it was a
reflection of the fundamental difference born of the subjugation of
democracy to liberalism.
of American democracy,

It is worth noting that since the beginning
the relative proportions of liberalism and

democracy have existed in a state of flux.

Liberalism through the

suppression of democracy has now yielded a condition that threatens
even itself.
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The Liberal Democratic Solution

In final analysis, it is evident that before the deficiencies of
the democratic capitalist consociation can be solved, liberal democrat
ic society must address a more basic quandary.

The incompatibilities

of democracy and capitalism, as serious as they are, are of secondary
significance when compared to the problems that arise from placing
liberal economic policy ahead of democratic political policy.

That

these contradictions (incompatibilities) are an issue of the current
magnitude is because of the underlying clashes in the nature of
democracy and liberalism.

If the intuitive appeal of Rawls theory of

justice (1971) is accepted— that no individual is more deserving than
another of natural endowment of position— then economic liberalism must
be curtailed in favor of economic democracy.

"One must choose.

One

cannot be both an egalitarian ... and a liberal" (Friedman, 1962, p.
195).

The "grand choice" lives on, but not as Friedman, Hayek, and

Schumpeter proposed it.

The issue is not a question of which economic

system is most appropriate for democratic society.

Rather the choice

should be a question of what system (political or economic) shall lead
democratic society.

Regardless of whether the choice is as black and
QC

white (or even as sectarian) as Friedman suggests,

economic liberal

ism must be curbed if political democracy is to prevail.

Dahl is

absolutely correct when he asserts "political equality is a form of
distributive justice" (1985, p. 85).
Political democracy, while not impossible, is inherently risky.
There is great risk that our current system— as imperfect as it is—
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might be traded too readily for a system that cannot deliver on its
egalitarian promises or does so through an unnecessarily harsh retreat
to despotism (Dahl, 1985, p. 35).

Nevertheless, conservative economic

liberalism remains a weak alternative in the industrial age.

What

opponents of economic democracy have failed to assuage, is that for
much of society the liberal promise of freedom to "order one's life and
property as one sees fit" (Machan, 1987, p. 179) is an empty lure.
Capitalist liberty with its basis in property, means little or nothing
to one who has little or no property.

The classic Marxian argument

that there is little or no freedom for one who must sell their blood,
sweat, and tears, just for the opportunity to subsist is highly
credible.

The trade of economic liberty (in its current lame condi

tion) for an egalitarian but "repressive" political democracy is a
gruesome prospect only when conceived out of context.

Although it

appears that in aggregate the cost of curtailment of liberal freedoms
as needed to achieve widespread democracy may initially be high, the
re-application of the capitalist method for dealing with negative
externalities (natural resources like air and water) makes the losses
appear much less significant.

The repressive costs (limitations of

liberal economic freedoms) could be distributed among the entire
populous so that on an individual basis they would rarely appear as an
inhibiting factor in any individual's "hedonistic calculus."

For the

majority of society there would be an absolute gain in freedom as
equality was more nearly approached.
In conclusion, a realistic perspective of the ultimate goal of
democracy and democratic society must be maintained.

"A democratic
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society is not a society of friends, nor a fraternity, because it must
necessarily comprise unequal relationships" (Mansfield, 1986, p. 2).
The traditional solution articulated by Mansfield— "that the formali
ties of unequal relationships can preserve equality by upholding the
dignity of inferiors and by restraining the pride of superiors" (1986,
p. 2)— is, however, no longer adequate.

Certainly a hierarchical

structure must exist if democracy is to function as a system of govern
ment.

It is the disparities of circumstance within that hierarchy that

must be limited.

To accomplish this democracy needs an efficient (but

as yet unknown) economic consort to fulfill the allocative requirements
of society.

More importantly, the federal government needs to move

into the 21st century by transcending its roots based on principles of
"eternal conflict and rigid adherence to property rights" (Hofstadter,
1955, p. 16).

Democracy can overcome its historical failure to

maintain the ideological commitment and participation of its members
only to the extent that it can fulfillment their selfish desires and
agenda.

For Tocqueville the mind-set ("manners") of the people were

absolutely vital to democracy (Tocqueville, 1835, 1840/1981, pp. 193-4;
see also Dahl, 198 5, pp. 48-9).

Democracy must be more than a

process— it must be a mind-set and ultimately a lifestyle. Capitalism
and the market system are efficient allocators and can yield an
efficient and socially responsible society when guided by democratic
rather than liberal motive.

It would be pointless to dismantle

capitalism when it needs only to be properly managed.

However, "to

concede the virtues of markets is not to embrace simple laissez-faire"
(Kuttner, 1991, p. 262).

Capitalism as it now exists must be reigned
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in; where it is "permitted to dominate politics, capitalism becomes a
vicious form of social Darwinism" (Barber, 1986, p. 39).

As Dahl &

Lindblom assert, the primary justification of an economy should be "its
achievement of the basic ends for social action" (1953/1976, p. xxvi).
Removed from the blind faith of an automatic and impersonal allocative
system, democracy can succeed as never before.

"We have implemented

popular government, democratic judgement, and the equal state on a
scale that is remarkable by any earthly standard.

There are problems

here, but no "crisis," no question of "survival" (Hartz, 1962, p. 44).
As democracy marches into the 21st century, its success remains the
inverse of its ability to displace the liberalist tradition of
capitalism with a democratic tradition.

Liberal capitalism cannot be

permitted to remain the tail that wags the democratic dog.
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ENDNOTES — PART III

1.
In assuming this position, Usher is rather close to F. Hayek's
assertion that in a free market "knowledge that is used in it is that
of all members.
Ends that it serves are the separate ends of those
individuals in all variety and contrariness" (1978, p. 183).
2.

For example see Friedman (1962) or Hayek (1944).

3.

See for example the work of Hanna Arendt or Seldon Wolin.

4.
Although costs of this type are great in aggregate, they "are
divided up among all citizens in such a way that they rarely appear
weighty in any individual's hedonistic calculus (Lustig, 1986, p. 140).
5.
See among others Peek, G.A., Jr. (Ed.). (1954) The Political
Writings of John Adams. New York: Liberal Arts Press, p. 89.
6.
See for
example the work of George Nason, James Madison, and
James Wilson; see also Hofstadter (1955).
7.
Much of the stimulus of Madison's position grew from the fear
that the masses acting as the majority would appropriate and redis
tribute more equitably the accumulations of the propertied.
8.
The Founders believed that differences in accumulations
property were due to natural differences of faculty and ability.

of

9.
The assembly of people on a local basis was designed as a means
of controlling (limiting) national influence and power.
10.
Hofstadter (1955, p. 13) cites a letter from John Adams to John
Taylor.
11.
Hartz (1962, p. 25) tells us that this was already a theme of
E.L. Godkin.
12.
Dahl notes that the equality of Tocqueville's time was a phase in
the history of the U.S. where there existed "an equality of condition
among white males that was then historically rare and probably unique
in its scope" (1985, p. 50). However, that phase was notably only
transitory, "for the agrarian economy and society on which it was based
underwent a revolutionary transformation into a system of commercial
and industrial capitalism that automatically generated vast inequal
ities of wealth, income, status, and power" (1985, p. 50).
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13.
Composing this group effort to save liberal society from the
state, are free-market advocates such as M. Friedman, (1962) Capitalism
and Freedom, libertarians like D. Friedman, (1973) The Machinery of
Freedom, minimalist contractarians like R. Nozick (1974) Anarchy. State
and Utopia, or J.M. Buchanan and G. Tullock (October, 1962) "Positive
Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political Economy" in Journal of Law
and Economics. and finally the adherents of F.A. Hayek (1973) Law.
Legislation and Liberty (as cited in Elkin, 1985b, pp. 179ff).
14.
See also: Ackerman, B.A. (1984). Reconstructing American Law.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.; and Okun, A.M. (1975). Equality
and Efficiency. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
15.

See also D.K. Cohen and C.E. Lindblom (1979) Usable Knowledge.

16.
In this way pluralism has disarmed much of the Marxian notion of
class conflict that arises from the stratification of society into two
primary groups (bourgeoisie and proletariat). "Groups amount to far
more than a facade for a class" (Lowi, 1969/1979, p. 33).
The
pluralist model of power further disarms the Marxist hypothesis as a
result of its central assertion that the blossoming of autonomous
groups forces the dispersion of what might otherwise be the monopoly
hold of capitalism on power.
17.
For a more in-depth view of the inhibitors of freedom under cap
italism (i.e., in the market place) see Lindblom 1977— especially pp.
45-51.
18.
Reich (1991) in The Work of Nations also makes a case, albeit
from a different angle, for this position.
19.
There are markedly different phases in the New Deal legislation
and administrative actions. Phase one was known as the first New Deal
and lasted from 1933 to early 1935 with the chief objective being
relief and recovery. While phase two was known as the second New Deal
or the Fair Deal lasted from 1935 to 1939 and had the primary aim of
reform.
20.
The New Deal program has been criticized because it lacked a
consistent economic philosophy. It was considered an ad hoc assemblage
that was of opportunistic rather than theoretical orientation.
21.
Actually, capitalism benefits from increases in unemployment— an
overabundance of labor helps depress labor costs and facilitates the
movement of labor resources.
22.
"Public opinion may recognise [sic] unemployment as a major
social problem but its perception in all countries tends to be shaped
by ideologies of market liberalism which identify both its causes and
solutions as 'economic', and hence beyond the realm of political
decision-making and control" (Davis & Scase, 1985, p. 170).
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23.
This is typically seen as a short-term solution since the "aboveaverage" profits will attract new competitors.
24.
There are numerous examples in Africa, Latin America, and
especially south-east Asia. The industrial might of Taiwan, S. Korea
and Hong Kong and to a lesser degree Malaysia, Singapore and the
Philippines are difficult to overlook in the U.S. economy.
25.
These inducements range from tax breaks to the provision of
research and development funding (and expertise) to government
contracts for products or services.
26.
By maintaining benefit levels slightly lower than the benefits
available in the open market, a limited degree of motivation has been
built into social systems designed to provide social security. At the
individual level there are frequently complaints about these levels
(especially unemployment compensation) during times of need— there
seems to be little realization that these benefits are emergency
services that were never meant to supplant private sector compensation.
27. While Schumpeter and Dahl enjoy the respective honors of being
the "prime mover" of the revisionist position and the "locus classicus"
of modern revisionism, the spokes-persons of the participationist
position are less obvious.
Pateman has not earned the laurels of
Schumpeter or Dahl.
Rather, her work is notable for attempting to
redress with some moderation the schism within democratic theory that
has occurred between the revisionist and participatory positions while
at the same time asserting a rather unique view of the origin of the
schism. Although he develops the participatory position differently,
Bachrach too has gained some recognition for his analysis of the
"elitist" orientation of the revisionist position.
Like Pateman,
Bachrach offers a rather moderate solution to the issue arising from
the function of participation in democratic theory.
28.
This is a highly controversial point— there are a number of
theorists who contend that the selective focus of polyarchy supports a
normative position (see Bealey, 1988; Pateman, 1970; Taylor, 1967).
29.
"Carter was elected in 1976 on a campaign against big government,
its ever-expanding bureaucracy, its special favors of special inter
ests, and especially the swollen and conspiratorial White House" (Lowi,
1969/1979, p. xiii).
30.
Witness Eastern Europe 1989-1990 and the continuation of that
movement on Soviet territory 1990-1991.
31.
Although the actual weight of popular desire (which translates
into power) in governmental decision-making is limited it does have
impact. Witness for example, the current condition of mounting
domestic pressure in the U.S. for a nationalized health-care system to
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serve the 37 million Americans who cannot afford private health
insurance (Kuttner, 1991, pp. 279-80; see also Russo, 1991, p. 28).
32.
Economic inequality is on the rise (Pear, 1991) while public
sector spending is on the decline (Kuttner, 1991, p. 80); the net
result has been a decrease in the equality of opportunity among the
polity. See also Philips (1990) for a more in-depth discussion.
33.
This is the life story of a black lower middle-class male and his
friends who acquire attitudes and values as a result of facing the
inhibitions of prejudice that thwart "legitimate" mainstream socio
economic success. The despair at being shackled at every turn leads to
the evolution of a mind-set and value structure so far removed that it
becomes almost credible to view the underclass as a separate society.
34.
The application of the economic concept, the "law of declining
returns," provides the generic basis for these assertions.
35.
This is not to suggest that Friedman is a sectarian himself— only
that he takes a micro management approach to what would better be
served by macro management.
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